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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF MEMORY FOR SERIALLY PRESENTED CAUSAL 
INFORMATION ON JUDGMENTS OF CONTINGENCY
by
Christopher A. Barnes 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2005 
Four experiments investigated whether memory errors might account for errors in 
contingency judgments. Participants viewed contingencies one event at a time, later 
recalled the frequencies o f the four event types, and judged the extent that they were 
related. Contingency judgments were more highly correlated with participants’ memory 
of the contingency than with the actual contingency (Experiments 2 & 4); thus implying 
that inaccurate mental representations of the contingency contribute to erroneous 
judgments. Decreasing the time to view each event (i.e., from 3 to 5 s) increased the 
perceived difficulty o f recalling event frequencies (Experiments 1 & 2), decreased the 
percentage o f correct frequency estimations (Experiment 1), and increased the likelihood 
of a differential pattern o f errors when recalling event frequencies (Experiment 1). 
Participants’ knowledge of the total number o f events (Experiments 2), their knowledge 
of the distribution of the four event types (Experiments 1-4), and the actual frequency of 
the event types were found to bias recalled event frequencies (i.e., in Experiments 3 and 
4); the latter of which was also responsible for the differential pattern of errors when 
recalling event frequencies. In closing, the appropriateness o f using a statistic calculated 
on one’s memory of the contingency to assess judgment accuracy was discussed.
xi
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INTRODUCTION
Sensitivity to variable relatedness permits a variety o f cognitive inferences. For 
example, an individual might foresee the occurrence of a future event after having 
observed a predictive event. Such foresight might permit the individual to delay, prevent, 
or prepare for the yet-to-occur event. Sensitivity to relatedness is especially useful in 
situations when the future event is potentially harmful. Upon viewing how events are 
related, an individual might make inferences about the cause of an event. Inferences due 
to sensitivity to variable relatedness have played a significant role in the lives of humans. 
Research has revealed that humans are sensitive to the direction and strength of relations 
(e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Ward & Jenkins, 1965; Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984). 
However, under many circumstances errors do occur when judging variable relatedness.
Many factors contribute to inaccurate judgments of variable relatedness (see 
Crocker, 1981, for a detailed discussion). Experimenters have primarily assessed whether 
individuals use accurate or error prone strategies to judge relatedness (e.g., Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1958; Shaklee, 1983; Ward & Jenkins, 1965). I argue here that memory errors 
contribute to inaccurate judgments of relatedness. Participants are able to distinguish 
positive, negative, and unrelated relations (e.g., Ward & Jenkins, 1965; Wasserman & 
Shaklee, 1984). The relevant information is the only way that a judge can successfully 
determine the strength and direction of a relation. Therefore, some representation of the
1
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relevant information is needed to form a veridical judgment. A representation is even 
more important when the individual must recall the relevant information from memory.
The experimental investigation follows a discussion of the research relevant to the 
role o f memory forjudging relatedness. First, the typical experimental paradigm will be 
discussed to highlight two procedures that differ in memory demands. Second, prior 
research will be reviewed that highlights crucial procedural factors that impact judgment 
competency. Third, three models will be discussed that can account for judgments of 
relatedness. The discussion of the models will be followed by an analysis of their 
assumptions pertaining to memory. Fourth, two areas of the research will be reviewed 
(i.e., subjective cell importance and order effects) which suggest that memory impacts 
judgments o f relatedness. Last, the extant research relevant to memory and judgments of 
relatedness will be discussed.
The current review is limited to experiments that (1) require participants to judge 
the extent that two binary variables are related and (2 ) have implications relevant to the 
role of memory forjudging relatedness. Several considerations influenced limiting the 
inclusion of experiments. First, the majority of prior research has investigated the extent 
that two binary variables are related. Second, the limitation minimizes the potential 
problem of comparing results obtained from different experimental paradigms (see 
Dennis & Ahn, 2002). Therefore, the limitation should facilitate an integrative discussion 
of experimental results. Last, no prior research has discussed the role o f memory for 
judging relatedness using more than two binary variables.
2
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The Experimental Paradigm
Several terms used throughout the literature must first be described. Event states 
refer to four forms of information, collectively referred to as causal information, that 
define the extent that variables are related. Causal information can be summarized in the 
cells of a 2 x 2 contingency table, as depicted in Figure B1 (labeled cells a, b, c, and d). 
The first of the two variables, Variable 1, is present in the cells on the top row (i.e., cells 
a and b) and absent in the cells on the bottom row (i.e., cells c and d). A similar rule 
holds for Variable 2 in the left (i.e., Variable 2 is present in cells a and c) and right 
columns (i.e., Variable 2 is absent in cells b and d). Cells a and d, collectively referred to 
as confirming cases, correspond to event states in which Variables 1 and 2 are either 
simultaneously present or absent and they serve to strengthen a positive relationship.
Cells b and c, collectively referred to as disconfirming cases, correspond to event states in 
which only one of the variables is present at a time and they serve to strengthen a 
negative relationship. Each event state, and thus each cell of the contingency table, 
represents a unique combination of the presence and absence o f the two variables.
The terminology that describes the variable relatedness must also be addressed. 
The extent that the two variables are related has been referred to as the relationship, 
relatedness, covariation, and contingency. Although each term is arguably 
interchangeable, the latter will be used throughout this discussion. Contingency also 
refers to the value o f a statistic that quantifies the extent that two variables are related, 
referred to as delta p  or Ap. Delta p  is expressed by the following equation:
Ap = [ A I { A + B ) } - [ C I ( C  + D ) ]  (1)
3
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where A, B, C, and D correspond to the frequencies o f the similarly labeled event states 
(i.e., cells a, b, c, and d). The value of delta p  is restricted to a range o f +1.0 to -1.0. A 
contingency o f + 1 . 0  indicates that the presence of one variable perfectly predicts the 
presence of the other (i.e., a relation consisting only of a and d  event states), while - 1 . 0  
indicates that the presence of one variable perfectly predicts the absence of the other (i.e., 
a relation that consisting only of b and c event states). A value o f 0.0 indicates that no 
relationship exists between the two variables. Because delta p  is calculated by to taking 
the difference between two conditional probabilities, a given contingency can be created 
using various combinations of conditional probabilities (or frequencies o f causal 
information).
Researcher may choose from one of two procedures frequently used to present 
causal information. The two procedures, trial-by-trial (TBT) and summarized (SUM), 
differ in a variety o f ways. The most important difference, at least for this discussion, 
pertains to the procedures’ demands on memory.
The TBT procedure places a large burden on memory when judging contingency. 
Causal information is presented one event state at a time. Judgments are formed in the 
absence o f all or the majority o f the causal information. Variables 1 and 2 are often 
referred to as the input and output of the relation. Judges can passively observe the input 
and output (e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965) or actively initiate or withhold the input (i.e., the 
frequency of Variable 1) and observe its effect (i.e., the presence or absence of the 
output; e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Shanks, 1985; Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984). The 
active TBT procedure samples two probability generators to determine a trial’s outcome if 
a response is initiated or withheld.
4
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The SUM procedure greatly minimizes the burden on memory when judging 
contingency. The SUM procedure simultaneously displays all of the causal information. 
Judgments are formed in the presence of the summarized causal information, which 
greatly reduces and may even eliminate memory demands. Causal information has been 
summarized using a variety of methods, which includes a contingency table (e.g., 
Smedslund, 1963; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990, Experiment 2), timeline 
(Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984), and statements that indicate the frequencies of each event 
state (e.g., Crocker, 1982; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990, Experiments 1 & 3).
Researchers have investigated whether the TBT or the SUM procedure produces 
more accurate judgments. The consensus is that judgments are more accurate when using 
the SUM procedure (e.g., Ward & Jenkins, 1965; Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984). I argue 
that misremembering contributes to the poorer performance in the TBT procedure. The 
likelihood that the causal information is misremembered in the SUM procedure is greatly 
reduced because it is present when judging the contingency.
The dependent measures used to obtain judgments of relatedness have also 
differed. Instmctions have requested, among other things, that participants judge the 
relationship (e.g., Maldonado, Catena, Candido, & Garcia, 1999), likelihood of future 
events (e.g., Shaklee & Tucker, 1983), control (e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Ward & 
Jenkins, 1965), influence and connection (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980). Interest in 
terminology has faded because early research failed to demonstrate that it influenced 
contingency judgments (see Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Jenkins & Ward, 1965). The scales 
used to record judgments have either been unidirectional or bidirectional (see Allan, 
1993). Unidirectional scales only provide information pertaining to the strength of the
5
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judgment. Therefore, positive and negative judgments can not be distinguished using 
unidirectional scales. Bidirectional scales provide information pertaining to both the 
strength and direction of the judgment. Numeric scales can be used to compare the value 
of the judgment to that of the contingency, which is not possible with nominal scales 
(e.g., less likely, more likely, etc.).
Early Research
Early research failed to demonstrate that humans produce veridical judgments of 
contingency (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Smedslund, 1963). 
Inhelder and Piaget (1958) conducted one of the first experiments that utilized two binary 
variables to investigate contingency judgment. Their primary focus was to assess the 
development of the concept of correlation in children. Interviews with the children, aged 
12-15 years, suggested that they used a variety o f erroneous rules to judge contingency. 
The older children were able to distinguish between confirming and disconfirming cases 
but their concepts of correlation were incomplete and frequently led to inaccurate 
judgments. The authors speculated that adults, due to a more complete concept of 
correlation, would produce more accurate judgments.
Inhelder and Piagefs (1958) speculation motivated the work of Smedslund (1963). 
Nursing students viewed cards that depicted either the presence or absence of a symptom 
and whether the patient was later diagnosed with a disease. Participants judged the 
contingency, estimated the frequencies o f causal information, and rank ordered 
contingencies according to their strength. Participants performed poorly on all of the 
tasks. Experiment 2 removed peripheral cues from the cards and permitted participants 
more time to examine the causal information, which did not improve their performance.
6
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Thus, another experiment suggested that humans are unable to form veridical judgments 
of contingency.
Jenkins and Ward (1965) also set out to determine whether individuals could 
accurately judge contingency. In three experiments, participants judged the extent that 
their responses (i.e., the active group) or those o f another participant (i.e., the passive 
group) had on the occurrence of the output. The experiment was explained to participants 
as either a scoring task, in which responses could produce points, or a control task, in 
which they predicted a trial’s outcome before responding. Judgments were inaccurate and 
uncorrelated with contingency in both the score and control conditions. The best 
predictor of participant^ judgments, which also served as a bias, was the frequency of cell 
a event states (i.e., obtaining a "point" or producing the predicted outcome). Experiments 
2 and 3 investigated whether participants had an improper understanding of control and 
improving their understanding o f it would improve judgment competency. Explicit 
training reduced the bias associated with the frequency of cell a event states but failed to 
improve judgment accuracy.
Ward and Jenkins (1965) assessed whether different procedures impacted 
judgment competency. Contingencies were presented to groups using either the TBT, 
SUM, or both procedures. Participants that viewed the SUM procedure were more likely 
to produce veridical judgments than those that viewed the TBT procedure or both 
procedures. Their experiment demonstrated that judgment competency is improved if the 
SUM procedure is used (e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Smedslund, 1963), which suggested 
that conditions do exist in which humans can provide veridical judgments of contingency.
7
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Researchers’ failure to obtain veridical judgments of contingency was also 
influenced by variable symmetry. Variable symmetry refers to whether the binary states 
of either the input or output correspond to one or two variables. The two states of an 
asymmetric variable correspond to the presence or absence o f a single variable, while 
those o f a symmetric variable correspond to the presence of distinct events (i.e., blue or 
brown eyes). Because variable symmetry can be independently applied to the input (I) 
and output (O), it distinguishes four types of problem sets: 1 1 / 1 0 , 1 1 /2 0 , 2 1 / 1 0 , and 
2 1 / 2 0 .
Allan and Jenkins (1980; 1983) conducted an exhaustive investigation of the four 
types o f problem sets defined by variable symmetry. Four aspects o f their research 
prompted researchers to use asymmetric variables in later research. First, they concluded 
that variable symmetry contributed to the not p-not q assumption (Allan & Jenkins, 
1980). The 21/10 problem sets prohibited participants from observing the result of not 
responding (Allan & Jenkins, 1980), which led participants to erroneously conclude that 
no outcome will occur if no response is emitted. Therefore, participants used an 
inappropriate baseline when contrasting observations and forming their judgments of 
contingency. Second, they demonstrated that asymmetric variables are one way to 
mitigate the bias associated with the frequency of cell a event states (Allan & Jenkins, 
1980; 1983). Third, Allan and Jenkins (1983) argued that if  the input and output are not 
similarly defined by variable symmetry that the problem sets is not causally compatible. 
Biases were minimal when the input and output variables were similarly defined (i.e., 
11/10 or 21/20) and it was concluded that they were causally compatible. Causal
8
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
incompatibility interfered with and biased participants’ contingency judgments. Fourth, 
judgments were the most veridical with 11/10 problem sets (Allan & Jenkins, 1983).
Explaining Contingency Judgment 
The need for a theoretical account became apparent as the body of research 
investigating contingency judgments increased. Three models o f contingency judgment 
will be discussed. Following their introductions, each theory’s assumptions pertaining to 
memory will be discussed. The rule-analysis technique (Shaklee, 1983) will also be 
discussed immediately following the introduction of the first model.
Rule Based Model
Claims that judgments are formed according to a rule based strategies can be 
traced back to the first investigation of binary contingency judgments (Inhelder & Piaget, 
1958). Although judgments may mimic a pattern predicted by a given rule, it does not 
eliminate the possibility that they are formed by another mechanism. This point is 
stressed because many researchers do not wish to imply that participants follow these 
rules when judging contingency (e.g., Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993).
Cell A Rule. The cell a rule states that participants form contingency judgments 
by comparing the number of cell a event states to those o f the remaining cells. A relation 
is judged as positive if  the frequency of cell a is the higher than each of the remaining 
cells, as negative if  it is lower than each of the remaining cells, and as noncontingent if  it 
is equal to each o f the remaining cells.
A-Versus-B Rule. The a-versus-b rule compares the number of times the output 
variable occurs in the presence and absence of the input. In other words, it compares the 
frequency of cell a with that of cell b to distinguish among positive, negative, or
9
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noncontingent relations. A relation is judged as positive when cell a occurs more 
frequently than cell b, as negative when it occurs less than cell b, and as noncontingent 
when they are equal as frequent.
Use of these rules was thought to be an indication of immature reasoning. Neither 
the cell a  or the a-versus-b rule requires a distinction between confirming and 
discontinuing cases. In addition, the a-versus-b rule does not rely on cell information 
from the entire contingency table. Use of a rule used all four cells and required 
distinguishing between confirming and disconfirming cases was thought to be an 
indication of mature reasoning (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Shaklee, 1983; Shaklee &
Mims, 1982).
Sum-of-Diagonals Rule. The sum-of-the-diagonals rule incorporates all four cells 
and distinguishes between confirming and disconfirming cases (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). 
The difference between the sums of the confirming and disconfirming cases, both its 
value and sign, are used to judge the relation. A relation is judged as positive if the 
difference is positive, as negative if  the difference is negative, and as noncontingent if  the 
difference is zero.
Conditional Probabilities Rule. The conditional probabilities rule or delta rule is 
the only rule that always leads to the correct strength and direction (Ward & Jenkins, 
1965). The equation for the delta rule is the same as that used to define contingency (See 
Equation 1). The delta rule takes the difference between two conditional probabilities: (1) 
the probability o f the output in the presence of the input (i.e., Al [A + B]) and (2) the 
probability of the output in the absence of the input (i.e., C! [C + DJ). A relation is judged
10
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as positive i f  the difference is positive, as negative if  the difference is negative, and as 
noncontingent if  the difference is zero.
Rule-Analysis Technique. The rule-analysis technique (Shaklee, 1983) can 
determine which a participant used to judge contingency. The rule-analysis technique 
uses 1 2  contingencies that differ in the four rules success determining the direction of the 
contingency. The rule-analysis technique exploits the flaws the three lesser sophisticated 
rules to create four subsets of problems. The four subsets are created, one set for each 
rule, in a way that they can only be solved by a rule of equal or greater sophistication.
The four rules, listed from the lowest to the highest level o f sophistication, are as follows: 
cell a, a-versus-b, sum-of-the-diagonals, and conditional probabilities. The cell a subset 
can be correctly judged by all of the rules, the a-versus-b subset can only be correctly 
judged by the three more sophisticated rules, and so forth. Therefore, a judge's pattern of 
success across subsets can be used to determine the rule likely used to judge contingency.
Shaklee and colleagues have demonstrated the generality and reliability of the 
rule-analysis technique. The likelihood that children are categorized as having used a 
more sophisticated rules increases with age (Shaklee & Mims, 1981), which is consistent 
with that suggested by Inhelder and Piaget (1958). The rule-analysis technique also 
consistently assigns the majority of participants to moderately sophisticated rules (i.e., 
they use either the sum-of-the-diagonals or the a-versus-b rule; Shaklee & Hall, 1983; 
Shaklee & Mims, 1981; 1982; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980), which is consistent with 
individuals’ frequent tendency to produce inaccurate judgments. However, it is possible 
that a participants pattern of success is not consistent with the hierarchical arrangement o f 
the problem sets. Such a participant might be using more than one rule or an unidentified
11
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rule. Inspections of participants’ judgments that can not be categorized by the rule- 
analysis technique have not identified a new rule (Shaklee & Hall, 1983; Shaklee & 
Mims, 1981; 1982; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980).
The rule-analysis technique has several advantages over other techniques used to 
determine a participants rule to judge contingency. First, it is not based on self-reports. 
Shaklee and Hall (1983) showed that self-reports, which have been used in the past (e.g., 
Smedslund, 1963), are not consistent with participants' success when judging the subsets. 
The one exception was that participants categorized as having used the delta rule 
provided explanations consistent with their patterns of success. Second, it is not based on 
the correlations between participants’ judgments and that predicted from each of the rule- 
based strategies. Participants are said to have used the rule that predicts a pattern of 
success that is most highly correlated with the success of his or her judgments (Ward & 
Jenkins, 1965). This technique is problematic because the patterns o f success o f the four 
rules are highly correlated with one another and researchers often do not report the 
correlations between the other rules (Shaklee, 1983).
Associative Model
Three factors likely contributed to the use of the Associative Model to account for 
contingency judgments. First, researchers became increasingly reluctant to state that 
participants cognitively compute contingency judgments (e.g., Wasserman et al., 1993). 
Second, the Associative Model could easily account for cue competition effects which 
could not be explained by the existing models at that time (De Houwer & Beckers, 2002). 
Third, there are similarities between the results obtained in Pavlovian conditioning 
experiments and those in the contingency judgment literature (Alloy & Abramson, 1979;
12
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Shanks, 1985; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987). The similarities 
become apparent if  the input is considered equivalent to the conditioned stimulus (CS), 
the output as equivalent to the unconditioned stimulus (US), and the strength of the 
contingency judgment as equivalent to the strength of the conditioned response (De 
Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Shanks, 1985). Therefore, the Rescorla-Wagner model 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), which explains Pavlovian conditioning, can also serve as a 
model o f contingency judgment:
AVn = aP(X-SYn.,) (2)
The model holds that AVn is the change in the predictive strength that occurs on the 
current trial, a  and P are leaming-rate parameters that depend on the saliency of the input 
and output, respectively, X is the maximum amount of predictive strength supported by 
the output, and £Vn_i is the algebraic sum of the predictive strengths o f all stimuli that are 
present on each trial.
The model predicts a negatively accelerating learning curve for the increase in 
predictive strength (AVn) of the input variable. Predictive strength will eventually reach 
an asymptote (X), at which point judgments will be the most accurate and future changes 
in AVn will be miniscule. The model suggests that stimuli (EV„-i), which includes the 
context, actively compete for the limited amount of predictive strength (X) on each trial 
(see the portion o f Equation 2 in parentheses). Therefore, the predictive strength o f the 
input variable only increases on trials when it is present. The competing stimuli obtain 
predictive strength when the input variable is absent. Because cue competition is a core 
feature of the Associative Model it can easily account for a number o f retrospective 
revaluation effects. Retrospective revaluation effects refer to a variety of phenomena that
13
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alter the predictive strength of the input variable on trials in which it is absent. 
Retrospective revaluation effects will not be discussed here in detail because experiments 
typically include more than two variables and recent reviews are available elsewhere 
(Allan, 1993; De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Shanks, 1993).
Belief Revision Model
The Belief Revision Model consists of two distinct mechanisms that collectively 
function as an anchor-and-adjust judgments of contingency (Catena, Maldonado,
Candido, 1998; Catena, Maldonado, Megias, & Frese, 2002). The two mechanisms of the 
Belief Revision Model, the information-computing and information-integrating 
mechanisms, operate in a serial fashion.
The information-computing mechanism, which calculates the value of causal 
information, is activated first. Judgments of the causal information can be accounted for 
using the following equation:
NewEvidence = (wi * a  + W2  * 6  + W3 * c + W4  * d) / (a + b + c + d) (3)
where a, b, c, and d  again correspond to the frequencies of causal information and w* 
corresponds to the subjective weights given to each form of causal information. Although 
the subjective weights are free parameters in the model, they are restricted to a range that 
is consistent with previous research (i.e., | a \ > \ b \ > \ c \ > \ d  | ; see Kao & Wasserman, 
1993; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990).
The information-integrating mechanism combines the unique contribution of the 
causal information with causal knowledge. Causal knowledge is assumed to be a function 
of the recently judged causal information as well as cognitive, motivational, and
14
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emotional factors. The information-integration mechanism incorporates NewEvidence 
using the following equation:
Ji = Ji-1 + (3 (NewEvidence-Jj-1) (4)
where Jj  corresponds to the resulting contingency judgment on the current trial, J,-1 
corresponds to relevant causal information and causal knowledge, and |3 corresponds to a 
learning rate parameter. The Belief Revision Model can account for order effects, which 
neither the Rule Based or Associative Models can account for, because of its anchoring 
information-integrating mechanism (e.g., Catena, Maldonado, & Candido, 1998; Catena, 
Maldonado, Megias, & Frese, 2002). However, the Belief Revision Model is limited in 
that it, like the Rule Based Model, cannot account for retrospective revaluation effects.
The Belief Revision Model is consistent with the intent o f an integrative theory of 
contingency judgment proposed by Alloy and Tabachnik (1984). Their theory attempted 
to explain the interaction between prior expectations and causal information. The Belief 
Revision Model is superior to Alloy and Tabachnik’s theory because it consists of a 
testable model instead of a theory driven review o f the literature, which later received 
harsh criticism (Goddard & Allan, 1988).
The Models and Memory
The importance of memory for the models ranges from crucial to irrelevant 
(Baker, Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996). The following discussion highlights each 
theory’s assumptions pertaining to memory.
The Rule Based Model assumes that contingency judgments rely heavily on the 
memory of causal information. Contingency judgments are a function of the rule used, 
the raid's inputs (i.e., causal information), and one’s competency when computing the rale’s
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output (i.e., a judgment). To arrive at a veridical judgment o f contingency the judge must 
have perfect episodic memory of causal information (Baker, Murphy, & Vallee- 
Tourangeau, 1996). Therefore, failure to produce a judgment predicted by a rule-based 
strategy might reflect errors in estimating the frequencies o f causal information.
The Associative Model assumes that episodic memory is of no importance to 
contingency judgments (Baker, Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996). Judgments are 
influenced by the empirical properties of the input and output (e.g., their temporal 
contiguity and proximity). Observing the empirical properties serve to strengthen their 
association and the resulting judgment is an indication of the strength of the association. 
Memory and an understanding of covariation are noticeably absent from the Associative 
Model because it was originally a model of animal conditioning (Alloy & Tabachnik, 
1984). Researchers studying animal conditioning often challenged the existence of 
cognitive representations and would be extremely hesitant to assume that animals have 
them.
The Belief Revision Model assumes that memory serves two roles. First, the 
information-computing mechanism relies on memory of causal information in a manner 
similar to that described for the Rule Based Model. Second, the information-integrating 
mechanism relies on memory of causal knowledge (Maldonado et al., 1998). Judgments 
are the result of integrating causal knowledge and causal information. Memory of causal 
knowledge serves as the model’s“anchof and has the greatest impact on resulting 
judgments. Causal information also influences the resulting judgment but to a lesser 
extent; that is, assuming that the learning rate parameter is assigned a value greater than 
0.0 but less than or equal to 1.0. The restriction on the learning parametefs range is
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necessary for any learning to occur (i.e - , P > 0  .0) and for the impact of the current causal 
information to “adjust’, not dominate, the resulting judgment (i. e., P < 1.0).
Memory and Contingency Judgment 
Few researchers have addressed the relationship between memory and 
contingency judgments. Two bodies of research are reviewed which suggests that 
memory impacts contingency judgments: subjective cell importance and serial order 
effects. In addition, several reviews of the literature are highlighted that have discussed 
the role o f memory forjudging contingency (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Baker, 
Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996; Crocker, 1981; Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, & 
Baker, 1993). Last, experiments that have investigated the role o f memory forjudging 
contingency are reviewed (e.g., Shaklee & Mims, 1982; Yates & Curley, 1986).
Existing Bodies of Research
Two bodies of research suggests that memory plays a role in judging contingency. 
Research pertaining to subjective cell importance is discussed first and is followed by a 
discussion of order effects in contingency judgment. The former body o f research is 
relevant to the encoding and recalling of causal information, while the later is relevant to 
the role of memory of past judgments.
Subjective Cell Importance. Research investigating subjective cell importance has 
many implications for the role of memory forjudging contingency. Subjective cell 
importance can be defined as beliefs about the causal information necessary forjudging 
contingency (Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990). Delta p  is calculated on the frequencies 
of all four forms of causal information. However, participants do not similarly believe 
that all forms o f causal information are equally important forjudging contingency
17
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(Crocker, 1982; Maldonado, Catena, Candid, & Garcia, 1999; Mandel & Lehman, 1998; 
Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990; Wasserman & Kao, 1993; White, 2003).
Crocker (1982) was the first to demonstrate that participants differentially weight 
the importance of causal information. Participants indicated which forms of information 
were both necessary and sufficient to judge contingency (e.g., the relation between 
practicing and the outcome of a tennis match). Participants had a strong tendency to rate 
the importance of causal information in the following order: a>  b>  c>  d. However, the 
rank order switched when instructions explicitly requested what information was relevant 
forjudging the likelihood of practicing and losing a match (i.e., b > a > c>  d). Crocker 
discussed the importance of using unambiguous dependent measures. Wasserman, 
Domer, and Kao (1990; Experiments 1 and 3) later replicated her finding and showed 
that the differential ratings holds when the order that participants rate the causal 
information is counterbalanced.
Wasserman, Domer, and Kao (1990; Experiment 2) also sought to determine how 
causal information is used when judging contingency. A set o f 25 contingency tables was 
constructed with combinations of three cell frequencies (i.e., 5, 10, or 20). The tables 
were constmcted so that a set of three tables existed that only differed in the frequency of 
one cell. For example, a table defined by 10a, 106, 10c, 10d  could be compared to one 
defined by 15a, 106, 10c, 10c? and 20a, 106, 10c, 10c?. Therefore, any differences in 
judgment could be attributed to the use of cell a. The differential use of causal 
information was consistent with the differential ratings of cell importance (e.g., Crocker, 
1982). Wasserman et al. (1990) concluded that participants must transform the values of 
causal information either prior to or while judging contingency.
18
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Kao and Wasserman (1993) assessed the subjective weighting of cell information 
through two parameter fitting techniques. First, the weighting parameters for each cell 
could be allowed to vary while fitting them to participant^ judgments. Therefore, one 
could assess which rule accounted for the most variance in participants’ judgments. 
Second, restricting the range of parameters in accordance to the predictions of the four 
rules might help determine the rule used by participants. For example, the a-versus-b rule 
disregards cells c and d  so their respective parameter weights can be assigned a value of 
0.0. Participants would be said to have used the a-versus-b rule if  their parameters for 
cells a and b each approximated .50. The two parameter fitting techniques were not 
successful predicting rule use. However, the resulting parameters did suggest a pattern of 
differential cell use consistent with the rank order o f each cell’s importance (e.g., Crocker, 
1981; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990).
Maldonado, Catena, Candid, and Garcia (1999, Experiments 4A & 4B) 
demonstrated that the subjective weights assigned to the event states are not fixed. Their 
rating scale differed from those used in previous experiments in that it was bidirectional 
(cf. Crocker, 1982; Wasserman, Dorner, & Kao, 1990), which permitted an indication of 
the magnitude and direction of each cells contribution to a judgment. The rank order of 
the absolute values replicated previous research (i.e., | a \ > \ c | > | b \ > | d  | ; see 
Crocker, 1982; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990); however, the ratings for cells b and c 
were negative in sign. Their experiment also indicated that preexposure to a 
noncontingent relation significantly reduced ratings of cell importance for cell a. Their 
finding is important because researchers did not previously entertain the concept of 
malleable cell weights.
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The idea that subjective cell importance may influence memory of causal 
information has not been discussed in the literature. Researchers have primarily 
entertained the idea that participants do not equally weight the causal information when 
forming their judgments (Maldonado et al., 1999; Wasserman, Domer, Kao, 1990). 
Crocker (1982) mentioned that participants might opt not to integrate recalled causal 
information due to beliefs about cell importance, but she did not entertain the notion that 
one’s beliefs might influence memory. I argue that subjective cell importance might 
influence the encoding and/or recalling of causal information. Alloy, Crocker, and 
Tabachnik (1980; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) reported similar evidence when 
they demonstrated that prior expectations and biased information seeking can account for 
errors when recalling causal information. However, the question remains whether beliefs 
about the importance o f cell information influences memory o f it when no strong prior 
expectations exist.
Order Effects. Research investigating order effects is also relevant for the role of 
memory forjudging contingency. Order effects can be defined as any reliable difference 
in contingency judgments that result solely from the order o f presenting causal 
information. Order effects are important because the order o f event states has no impact 
on the value o f the resulting contingency. When using the TBT procedure, event states 
that can be arranged in multiple orders. Dennis and Ahn (2002) criticized experiments 
because they consisted of evenly distributed causal information, which fails to simulate 
real-life exposure. One interpretation of order effects is that individuals are more likely to 
forget causal information portrayed either at the beginning, middle, or end of a problem 
set. A second interpretation is that participants use memory of past judgments
20
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(Maldonado, Catena, Candid, & Garcia, 1999) and causal information (e.g., Dennis & 
Ahn, 2002) as the reference point for forming contingency judgments.
Experiments investigating order effects in contingency judgment can be grouped 
into two categories. First, several experiments have demonstrated a primacy or recency 
effect (Dennis & Ahn, 2002; Wasserman, Kao, Van Hamme, Katagiri, & Young, 1996; 
Yates & Curley, 1986). A primacy effect is defined as the initial causal information 
having a greater impact on contingency judgments, while a recency effect is defined as 
the causal information experienced towards the end o f a sequence having the greatest 
impact. Second, experiments have demonstrated that judgments are sensitive to the last 
event state encountered (Catena, Maldonado, & Candido, 1998; Catena, Maldonado, 
Megias, & Frese, 2002) and the type of contingency previously judged (i.e., a positive, 
negative, or noncontingent relation; Maldonado, Catena, Candid, & Garcia, 1999). 
Therefore, the current discussion will separately review experiments pertaining to 
memory effects (i.e., primacy and recency effects) and judgment sensitivity (cf. the 
interpretation of order effects proposed by Lopez, Shanks, Almaraz, & Fernandez, 1998).
Memory Effects. Yates and Curley (1986) found evidence o f a primacy effect in 
contingency judgments. Participants judged a contingency composed of two blocks that 
differed only in their sign (i.e., Block 1 = .428; Block 2 = -.428). The two blocks were 
presented as one continuous sequence o f 28 events using the TBT procedure. Half o f the 
participants were told that they would later recall the cell frequencies to maintain a high 
level of attention throughout the problem set. Estimates of the two conditional 
probabilities required for the delta rule were used to determine contingency judgments, 
which showed evidence o f a primacy effect in the forewarned and naive conditions.
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However, the primacy effect only reached statistical significance in the naive group. The 
authors concluded that forewarning participants of the recall task increased the likelihood 
that they attended to the entire problem set (see also Anderson & Hubert, 1963) and, as a 
result, reduced the magnitude of the primacy effect.
Dennis and Ahn (2001) investigated judgments o f a noncontingent relation when 
the causal information was disproportionally distributed throughout the problem set. 
Participants judged a noncontingent relation that unevenly distributed an equal number of 
confirming and disconfirming cases. That is, 90% of the confirming cases were presented 
in either the first or second half of the problem set. Judgments were positive for 
participants that experienced the bulk of the confirming cases first and negative for those 
that experienced them in the second half. The authors claimed that a belief-updating 
model o f contingency judgment could account for their data. They mentioned that the 
model should assume that participants disproportionally weight initial information, that 
initial information is used to form specific beliefs about the contingency, and that these 
beliefs are less influenced by causal information encountered after the specific beliefs are 
well formed. However, the Belief Revision Model was not mentioned as a suitable 
candidate or even cited in the experiment.
Judgment Sensitivity. Catena and colleagues (Catena, Maldonado, & Candido, 
1998; Catena, Maldonado, Megias, & Frese, 2002) demonstrated that the frequency-of- 
judgment effect occurs when using a repetitive-judgment procedure1. The repetitive- 
judgment procedure requires that participants judge a problem set multiple times as more 
of the causal information is continually encountered. The frequency-of-judgment effect
1 Catena and colleagues refer to the repetitive-judgment procedure as the trial-by-trial procedure. The name 
of the procedure was modified due to the term trial-by-trial referring to the method o f presenting events, as 
is the norm in the literature.
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refers to the tendency for participants’ judgments to be sensitive to a confirming case if 
viewed prior to forming a judgment. The frequency-of-judgment effect has proven to be 
reliable, greatest after encountering a cell a event state, and has been demonstrated using 
summary tables (Catena et al., 2002, Experiment 2).
Catena and colleagues (i.e., Maldonado et al., 1999) also demonstrated that 
judging noncontingent relations affects later judgments of contingency. Judgments of 
positive and negative contingencies were lower when participants previously judged a 
noncontingent relation. The decrease in judgments for the negative contingency resulted 
in participants’ judgments more closely approximating the actual contingency (thus 
replicating Maldonado, Martos, & Ramirez, 1991). However, a similar decrease in 
judgments for the positive contingency resulted in less accurate judgments. The 
researchers intended to replicate a similar phenomenon found in the animal literature 
referred to as learned irrelevance (e.g., Baker & MacKintosh, 1977; 1979), which is a 
retardation in the learning of relations upon preexposure to a noncontingent relation. 
However, the current experiment suggested that preexposure to a noncontingent relation 
facilitated the learning of a negative contingency. As a result, the authors argued that the 
Associative Model is flawed in its account of contingency judgment.
In conclusion, the research investigating order effects favors the second proposed 
interpretation. That is, that memory serves as the basis from which additional judgments 
are integrated. However, support for the second interpretation does not rule out the first. 
That is, it is still possible that the likelihood of forgetting causal information is also 
influenced by its position. The failure to support the first interpretation may be due be 
cause it is close to impossible to know exactly which event states are forgotten because
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
repeat occurrences o f causal information are indistinguishable. Therefore, it is not 
possible to test the first interpretation using the typical procedures used in contingency 
judgment experiments. Therefore, researchers might wish to assess memory of past 
judgments. Past judgments are thought to be integrated with causal knowledge and 
beliefs (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Shanks, 1991; Maldonado et al., 1999), which might 
make it difficult to obtain a pure assessment of past judgments.
Reviews of the Role of Memory
Several reviews have addressed the role of memory forjudging contingency (e.g., 
Baker et al., 1996; Crocker, 1982). The most comprehensive review is Crocker’s (1982) 
six-step model of contingency judgment. Individuals are susceptible to biases that might 
contribute to inaccurate judgments at each step of Crocker’s model: (Step 1) deciding 
what data are relevant, (Step 2) sampling cases, (Step 3) classifying instances, (Step 4) 
recalling the frequencies o f causal information, (Step 5) integrating the evidence, and 
(Step 6) using the covariation estimate for future judgments. The following discussion 
will only review the steps that are most relevant to the role o f memory forjudging 
contingency.
First, Crocker (1982) argued that a judge must determine the appropriate forms of 
causal information (Step 1). She argued that participants actively seek out information 
that confirms the question asked, which might improve the likelihood that participants 
accurate recall the frequency of cell a. Seeking out cell a might improve memory o f it 
due to the pursuit itself, intrinsic rewards, increased attention, or the increased likelihood 
of successful encoding. In summary, the process of determining the relevant information 
may affect the later recall o f causal information.
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Second, individuals must also correctly categorize causal information (Step 3). 
Correctly categorizing causal information might be particularly difficult for 
disconfirming cases, which are not as visually distinct as the confirming cases. 
Confirming cases, unlike the disconfirming cases, are easily distinguishable because the
'y
cues are either simultaneously present (cell a) or absent (cell d) . As a result, 
disconfirming cases may be more likely to be erroneously encoded into memory. If 
disconfirming cases are erroneously categorized (i.e., 7a, 5b, 1 lc, 9d might be perceived 
instead as 7a, 7b, 9c, 9d), it would alter the perceived contingency (i.e., 0.03 versus 0.00, 
respectively) and potentially influence the resulting judgment. Therefore, judgment 
errors might also be caused failures to correctly categorize causal information.
Third, individuals must recall all of the causal information when judging 
contingency (Step 4). Shaklee and Mims (1982) found evidence that the magnitude of 
errors when recalling cell frequencies increased as subjective cell importance decreased. 
(The magnitude of errors was as follows: d > c > b > a.) In addition, Crocker argued that 
causal information consistent with prior expectations might have an advantage of being 
successfully recalled (Crocker & Taylor, 1978; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). 
Therefore, judgment errors might be due to only a subset o f the causal information being 
available when judging contingency.
2 Cell d  is represented by the absence of two variables when the output is asymmetrical.
3 If the above described categorization error occurred, notice that it would differentially affect individuals
that use different rule-based strategies to judge contingency. For example, conditional probabilities rule 
users should perceive a slightly more positive relation, sum o f diagonals rule users should similarly 
perceive a noncontingent relation, a-versus-b rule users should instead perceive a negative relation, and it is 
unclear what type o f judgment a cell-a rule user would perceive. The judgment o f cell-a rule user can not 
be predicted because the remaining cells are both higher and lower in frequency. It could be argued that if a
cell-a rule user were required to provide a judgment it would be done with very little confidence (See Alloy
& Tabachnik, 1984, p .115, fora similar explanation for judgments when both situational and prior 
expectations are low).
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Fourth, individuals will likely use the judgment for future use (Step 6). Memory 
of past judgments may deteriorate, change in direction, become exaggerated, or 
attenuated as time passes. The accuracy of past judgments is particularly relevant to the 
Belief Revision Model, which holds that it serves to anchor judgments of contingency 
(Maldonado et al., 1998). If past judgments are subject to forgetting or are altered as time 
passes, the resulting judgments would also be affected.
Assessments of Memory
Experimenters assessing the role of memory forjudging contingency have done 
so either directly or indirectly. Direct assessments require participants to recall the 
frequencies of causal information, while indirect assessments require mental 
computations based on causal information. It is impossible to know whether errors in the 
indirect assessments are the result o f faulty computations or discrepancies between the 
actual and used cell frequencies—that is, unless cell estimates are also recorded.
Direct Assessments. Shaklee and Mims (1982) conducted two experiments that 
required participants to recall cell frequencies. Their experiment was the first that 
reported detailed information about the recalled frequencies o f causal information (cf., 
Smedslund, 1963; Yates & Curley, 1986). Previous experiments either did not distinguish 
between event states (Yates & Curley, 1986), only summarized the tendency to over- or 
underestimate cell frequencies (Smedslund, 1963), or did not require estimates of the 
entire contingency table (Arkes & Rothbart, 1985).
Shaklee and Mims (1982) required participants to recall the cell frequencies o f 12 
problem sets. In Experiment 1, one group recalled the cell frequencies and judged 
contingency. Estimates o f the cell frequencies were not perfect. Judgments were recorded
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on a nominal scale which prevented an assessment of whether discrepancies between the 
actual and recalled contingency could account for errors in contingency judgments.
Indirect Assessments. Jenkins and Ward (1965, Experiment 2) indirectly 
addressed the role of memory forjudging contingency. Participants estimated the 
conditional probabilities required to for the delta rule, which were used to calculate a 
subjective Ap (i.e., Aps)- The estimated conditional probabilities were not reported and 
the resulting Aps values were not consistent with participants’ judgments or with the 
contingencies.
Wasserman et al. (1993) also required that participants estimate the conditional 
probabilities, from which they calculated Aps- Wasserman et al. (1993) required that 
participants estimate the likelihood that their responses on a key produced or did not 
produce an outcome (i.e., light flash). The actual conditional probabilities derived from 
participants’ responses were not consistent with their estimates. Judgments were reported 
to be more influenced by [A /(A + B)\ then by [C !{C + £))]. They argued that a weighting 
coefficient for [C /(C  + D)] could improve the fit but would be ad hoc and not warranted. 
I argue that the subjective cell importance literature validates such a modification. Their 
data were used as evidence against the Rule-Based Model and a lengthy discussion stated 
a desire to abandon its account of contingency judgment.
Summary
The current investigation aims to start a systematic investigation of the role of 
memory forjudging contingency. Many explanations for erroneous judgments have been 
proposed in the literature. However, the possibility that memory contributes to inaccurate 
contingency judgments has received little attention. The argument for the role of memory
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forjudging contingency consisted o f a review of early research in the literature. Two 
existing bodies of research, subjective cell weighting and order effects, were also 
discussed. In addition, three models of contingency judgment and two variations of the 
typical procedure were discussed due to their relevance to memory demands when 
judging contingency. Last, the existing research pertaining to of the role of memory for 
judging contingency was discussed.
The following experimental investigation will consist o f two phases. The first 
phase, Chapters I and II, aims to replicate and extend the results obtained by Shaklee and 
Mims (1982). The second phase, Chapters III and IV, aims to introduce a task distinction, 
popularized by Hastie and colleagues (Hastie & Park, 1986; Hastie & Pennington, 1989), 
to the contingency judgment literature. Its contents are dedicated to increasing our 
understanding of the role of memory forjudging contingency.
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CHAPTER I
EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECT OF SLIDE DURATION
Memory of the events that define a relation seems intuitively necessary to form a 
veridical judgment o f contingency. Contingency (Ap) is the extent that two variables are 
related, which is mathematically expressed by:
A p = [ A I  ( A + B ) ] - [ C I { C  + D ) }  (1)
where A, B, C, and D are the frequencies of the event states. Event states, collectively 
referred to as causal information, are the four types of instances that can define the extent 
that two variables are related (See the cells labeled a, b, c, and d  in Figure B l). Memory 
of causal information is especially important when judgments are formed in their 
absence, which is often the case. A discrepancy between contingency and a contingency 
judgment may be due, in part, to an inaccurate mental representation. That is, the judge 
may believe that the contingency is defined by a different set of events than it actually is. 
Consider an individual shown a problem set defined by: la,  5b, 1c, 5d. If he or she 
believes that a different set of event states was presented, their judgment would be 
expected to differ from that based on the actual set. The greater the discrepancy between 
the actual and perceived causal information, the greater the expected discrepancy 
between contingency and the judgment o f contingency.
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Many factors may result in a discrepancy between actual and perceived causal 
information. First, beliefs about the importance of causal information might bias 
encoding. Second, beliefs about the importance of causal information might bias its recall 
(Crocker, 1982). Third, participants might have difficulty distinguishing the four event 
states (Crocker, 1981). Last, the amount of causal information might exceed an 
individual’s memory span. Each of the previously stated possibilities strongly suggests 
that the mental representation o f causal information is not perfect.
The current investigation is not concerned with whether memory errors occur, but 
how they occur. A systematic pattern of errors might suggests one of two things: (1) that 
some forms of causal information are more salient than others and have a greater chance 
of being correctly recalled or (2) that beliefs about the importance o f causal information 
influences their likelihood of being correctly recalled. It would also be particularly 
relevant if  an inaccurate mental representation o f causal information can account for 
judgment errors. If  memory errors can account for judgment errors, judgments should be 
more consistent with the perceived contingency than with the actual contingency. The 
perceived contingency (Ap  ’), or inferred contingency, is the extent that the causal 
information stored in memory is related. The value of Ap ’ is calculated using the same 
equation as Ap  (see Equation 1); however, a participant’s estimates of the frequencies of 
causal information are used instead of their actual frequencies.
Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) procedure serves as a good starting point to begin the 
current investigation. In their experiment, participants recalled the frequencies of causal 
information that defined problem sets using a trial-by-trial (TBT) procedure. A TBT 
procedure presents causal information sequentially and one event state at a time. Both of
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their experiments demonstrated that the magnitude o f errors increased across cells a, b, c, 
and d. However, the trend was not supported by significant differences in Experiment 2.
It is not possible to determine whether Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) data are 
consistent with past research. The majority of past research has failed to report detailed 
analyses. For example, Smedslund (1963) and Crocker and Taylor (1978; as cited by 
Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) reported only on the tendency to over- and underestimate cell 
frequencies. One experiment reported no consistent trend (Smedslund, 1963), while the 
other reported that judges overestimated information that was consistent with their 
expectations and underestimated information that was inconsistent with their expectations 
(Crocker & Taylor, 1978; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). Yates and Curley 
(1986) reported a statistical index (i.e., the sum of the deviations) that did not distinguish 
between event states. Alloy et al. (1980; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) never 
published their experiment indicating that biases in recall and information search can 
account for judgment errors, which prevents a detailed analysis it results. It is also likely 
that the sources of the errors in the Alloy’s et al. (1980; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 
1984) and Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) experiment are different. Alloy et al. (1980) 
assessed beliefs about the contingency itself, whereas the results reported by Shaklee and 
Mims’ (1982) are consistent with beliefs about what information is important forjudging 
contingency.
The limited research from which to compare Shaklee and Mims' (1982) results is 
problematic. A pilot study in my laboratory failed to replicate their results. However, the 
pilot study differed from their experiment in a number of ways. First, the pilot study used 
abstract cues to depict the input and output (i.e., Variables X and Y). Shaklee and Mims
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used contextual cues that depicted plausible relations, which may have activated specific 
beliefs (e.g., Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Shanks, 1991). Second, Shaklee and Mims 
(1982) required that participants view 12 problem sets. The pilot study only required that 
participants view one problem set. The pattern of errors may have emerged only after 
averaging data or judging several problem sets. Third, Shaklee and Mims (1982) used 24 
event states to define problem sets. The pilot study only used 18 events states. A 
difference o f 6 event states is small; however, its inclusion may have increased task 
difficulty and the need for a strategy to encode and/or recall causal information. Last, the 
pilot study did not require that participants judge the problem sets. Participants were only 
required to recall the cell frequencies. If the pattern o f errors is due to beliefs about 
judging contingency, then the absent judgment task might explain why no pattern 
emerged in the pilot study. That is, participants may have viewed the pilot study as a 
memory task and equated the importance o f causal information.
The proposed experiment more closely replicated the procedure used by Shaklee 
and Mims’ (1982). Both abstract and contextual cues depict event states and the problem 
sets are identical to those used by Shaklee and Mims. Finally, cell estimates and 
judgments are required for each problem set. However, the current experiment also 
included a manipulation to impact the likelihood that strategies are used to aid memory. 
That is, the duration that each event state is shown varies across conditions. Event state 
duration was manipulated because statements from participants in the pilot study 
suggested that they adopted strategies to aid recall.
Several hypotheses are proposed in the current experiment. First, it is expected 
that the pattern of errors replicates that reported by Shaklee and Mims’ (1982). That is,
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the magnitude of errors is expected to increase across cells a, b, c, and d. Second, it is 
expected that the magnitudes of errors are exaggerated in the condition with the shorter 
event state duration (i.e., 3 s). Third, participants exposed to the shorter event state 
duration are expected to perceive the longer event state duration as an easier task and vice 




One hundred twenty students (27 males and 93 females, mean age = 18.71) 
enrolled in lower-level psychology courses at the University of New Hampshire 
participated in the current experiment. All participants received course credit for their 
participation. O f the participants, 70% were freshman and 10 % were upper classmen 
(i.e., 7.5% were juniors and 2.5% were seniors).
Design
A mixed design was used that consisted of a within-subjects factor (Cell) and 
three between-subjects factors (Block Order, Type of Cue, & Slide Duration).
Cell (4 levels), the within-subjects factor, refers to participants’ estimates of the 
four forms of causal information. Estimates of causal information were subtracted from 
their actual frequencies to determine the absolute and signed cell deviations for each cell. 
Mean cell deviations, both absolute and signed, were calculated for each cell across the 
12 problem sets. The Comparison Set was not included in the calculation o f the means. 
The 12 problem sets were borrowed from Shaklee and Mims’ (1982; Experiment 1); 
however, an oversight by the author resulted in one problem set failing to match that used
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by Shaklee and Mims (i.e., 8a, 5b, 9c, 2d was used instead of the intended 9a, 5b, 1c, 3d). 
Table A l displays the actual frequencies of causal information and the Ap  values for each 
problem set.
Twelve of the problem sets were arranged in three blocks of four. The order of the 
problem sets within blocks is listed in Table A l. Block Order (3 levels) refers to the order 
in which participants viewed the blocks: 1-2-3, 2-3-1, or 3-2-1. The Comparison Set was 
presented to all participants last, regardless of block order.
Type o f Cue (2 levels) refers to whether the slides depicted abstract or contextual 
cues. In the abstract condition, cues defined the relation between Variables X and Y. In 
the context condition, cues defined the relation between plant watering and plant growth. 
The input and output in both conditions were asymmetric, meaning they corresponded to 
the presence or absence o f a single event (Allan, 1993), and were displayed within a 
white box in the center of the slide. The input, if  present, was depicted on the upper half 
of the rectangular box, while the output, if  present, was depicted on its lower half. Cues 
in the abstract condition were typed in Times New Roman font, while cues in the context 
condition were hand drawings. Each slide contained peripheral cues that were unrelated 
to the contingency (The abstract condition contained a broken line that separated the top 
and bottom halves of the slide; the context condition contained the boot of the farmer that 
either watered or did not water the plant). Microsoft PowerPoint software displayed the 
slides via a PC compatible LCD projector.
Slide Duration (2 levels) refers to the event state duration. That is, the rate that 
slides advanced from one event state to the next. Event states either advanced at a rate of 
one slide every 3 s or one every 5 s. The 12 problem sets borrowed from Shaklee and
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Mims (1982) used the same event state duration. However, the Comparison Set used the
event state duration of the alternative condition.
Table A2 displays the number of participants in each experimental condition.
Sessions were conducted in groups that ranged from 2 to 10 participants. Assignments to
experimental conditions were random with the only restraint being that it did not result in
a condition exceeding a total of 11 participants.
Measure and Items
Each measure contained a short description of the cues that defined the relation.
The short description in the abstract condition read as follows:
Some events occur as a result of another’s presence. For example, observing 
Variable Y might be more likely when Variable X is also present. However, 
some events occur as a result of another’s absence. For example, Variable Y 
might be more likely to occur when Variable X is absent. Still other events might 
be equally likely to occur whether or not another Variable is present. Use these 
slides to decide whether Variable Y is an event that is more likely to occur when 
Variable X is present, absent, or if it doesn’t matter whether it is present or 
absent.
The short description in the context condition read as follows:
Some plants need water to stay healthy. For example, their growth would depend 
on whether they received water each week. However, some plants need no water 
at all and will not grow if they are given water. These plants would be healthiest 
when given no water each week. Still other plants will grow regardless of 
whether they are watered or not. Use these slides to decide whether this plant is 
one that stays healthiest when watered, not watered, or if it doesn’t matter 
whether they are watered each week.
Each measure required that participants estimate the frequencies of causal 
information, judge the relative likelihood of the output variable, judge the strength of the 
relation, and indicate their certainty in their previously completed judgments and cell 
estimates. There was also an item included only on the Comparison Set measure.
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First, participants estimated the frequencies of causal information and entered
their estimates into a blank contingency table. Below each table the following sentence
could be read: There are a total o f 24 events in this problem set.
Second, participants judged the relative likelihood of the output given the
presence o f the input. Judgments of relative likelihood were recorded on a scale ranging
from +3 (much more likely) to -3 (much less likely). The following is an example of the
relative likelihood item:
For this relation, the slides indicate that the presence of the input resulted in the output 
being
+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3
much somewhat a bit just a bit somewhat much
more more more as less less less
likely likely likely likely likely likely likely
than when the input is absent. Circle the scale number that best completes the sentence. 
The terms “relation”, “input”, and “output” were appropriately changed to match the cues 
used in the problem set.
Third, participants judged the strength of contingency. Judgments of strength 
were recorded on a unidirectional scale that ranged from 0 to ±100. Labels were located 
at the scale’s 30, 70, midpoint (50), and two endpoints (0 and ±100).
Fourth, participants reported their perceived certainty in the accuracy of their cell 
estimates and judgment o f strength. Certainty ratings were recorded on a Likert Scale 
ranging from 1 (just guessing) to 10 (absolutely certain).
Last, participants indicated the relative difficulty when recalling the cell 
frequencies in the Comparison Set. That is, whether recalling cell frequencies was easier, 
harder, or just as easy/hard as the other problem sets. The scale ranged from +2 (much 
easier than) to -2 (much harder than) and read as follows:
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After viewing the slides in this comparison set, recalling the number of instances were
+2 +1 0 -1 -2
much somewhat just as som ewhat much
easier easier easy /  hard harder harder
than than as than than
the previous sets completed in this experiment.
Procedure
Participants received a packet that included an informed consent form,
abbreviated experimental instructions, debriefing form, and 13 multiple-item measures
when they arrived. The experimenter began the session by reading the extended version
of the experimental instructions, which read as follows:
Our world is filled with things that go together, things that are influenced by one 
another, or things that relate to one another. We encounter these things in our 
everyday life. For instance, things may occur more frequently with one another.
One example would be that taller people also tend to be heavier people. Things 
may also occur less frequently with one another. For instance, it is less likely to 
rain when it is currently sunny outside. Things may occur just as frequently in the 
presence or absence of something else. For instance, a car is just as likely to run 
out of gas whether it is painted red—or green—or whether you are driving alone 
or with a passenger. The paint job and passenger have no effect on running out of 
gas. In this experiment you will be given information about hypothetical events 
that may or may not go together—be influenced by one another—or relate to one 
another.
For example, you may be asked the likelihood of it snowing and seeing a bird 
outside your window. Each time you look out your window, you may find that it 
is snowing and a bird is perched outside your window —which will look like this 
{Show slide of cell a}. Notice that this information corresponds to Cell A, in the 
table in front of you, both the snow —first row—and the bird—first column—are 
present. You might find that it is snowing, but there is no bird perched outside 
your window—which will look like this {Show slide of cell b). Notice that this 
information corresponds to Cell B, the snow is present—it is still in the first row- 
—, while the bird is absent—second column. You might also find that it is not 
snowing and that a bird is perched outside your window—which will look like 
this {Show slide of cell c}. Notice that this information corresponds to Cell C, 
the snow is absent—in the second row—, while the bird is present—first column.
And lastly, you might find that it is not snowing and that there is no bird perched 
outside your window—which will look like this {Show slide of cell d}. Notice 
that this information corresponds to Cell D, both the snow—in the second row— 
and bird—second column—are absent.
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After viewing 24 such instances, which may or may not be about snow and birds, 
you will be asked to recall the number of each type of instance. In the provided 
table similar to the one labeled with A, B, C and D, you will be asked to enter the 
number of times each of four event types occurred. In other words, you will be 
shown 24 events of any combination of the four possibilities just discussed. You 
will then be asked to recall from memory the number of times each of the four 
event types were observed—in other words—how many times you remember 
seeing each of the four events—and enter them into the blank table provided.
We ask that you put any writing utensils down while viewing the events. I think 
we all know that memory is not perfect, we wish to learn how memory works— 
so pay close attention and be sure to refer only to your memory—not that of your 
neighbors.
You will also be asked to {refer to the scale item} judge the relation between the 
two events. A value of positive three indicates that the events always occurred 
together—meaning that every time you looked out the window it was snowing 
and a bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell a}—or it wasn’t 
snowing and no bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell b}— 
in other words, they were either always simultaneously present or absent—this 
would be a strict positive relationship. Snowing and seeing a bird were perfectly 
related.
A value of negative three indicates that the events never occurred together— 
meaning that every time you looked out the window it was snowing and no bird 
was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell c}—or it wasn’t snowing 
and a bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell d) —in other 
words, they never simultaneously both occurred—this would be a strict negative 
relationship. Snowing and never seeing a bird were perfectly related.
A value of zero indicates that you were equally likely to see a bird outside your 
window whether it was or wasn’t snowing—no relationship. Snowing had no 
effect on seeing a bird
As you might have guessed, we will not show you a strict relationships—that 
would be too easy—the relationships will be somewhere in the middle of the two 
extremes.
You will also be asked {refer to the scale item} to mark a numeric value on a 
scale ranging from 0 to 100 to describe the strength of the relation between the 
two events. Our primary interest with this item is your perceived strength of the 
relationship. Strict relationships come in two forms, both of which would receive 
a rating of 100. It may be that the events always occurred together. It may be that 
the events never occurred together. Both of which would receive a value of 100. 
If it didn’t matter whether it was snowing, the rating should be zero. With this 
item we are not concerned with whether it is a positive or negative relationship— 
we simply want a measure of the strength of the relationship.
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask 
them now. Remember—this is not a competition and you should not talk to,
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consult with or observe the work of others. And remember to place your pencils 
down when viewing each set of slides.
Hyphens indicated points at which the experimenter paused to facilitate participant’s 
comprehension of the instructions.
The consent form was administered after the recital of the extended instructions 
and before presenting the first problem set. All participants choose to participate in the 
experiment.
The type of cues (abstract or context), order of blocks (Block Order 1-2-3, 2-3-1, 
or 3-1-2), and slide duration (3 or 5 s) all varied to define the 12 experimental conditions. 
Participants were given as much time as they needed to complete each measure and were 
told to look at the screen to inform the experimenter that they were ready for the next 
problem set. Upon completing the comparison Set, participants completed the set of 
demographic items. All participants were thanked for their participation, told to take the 
debriefing form, and were offered to stay after to receive an informal debriefing.
Results 
Cell Deviations
The discrepancies between participants’ estimates and the actual cell frequencies 
were used to create three distinct variables. First, absolute cell deviations were calculated 
to test the first hypotheses. Second, signed cell deviations were calculated to provide 
different, but equally important, information about participants’ estimates. Mean absolute 
cell deviations provided information about the magnitude of errors, while mean signed 
cell deviations provided information about whether the magnitude o f errors were greater 
for over- or underestimations. Errors due to over- and underestimations similarly affected 
the mean absolute cell deviations; however, they did not similarly affect the mean signed
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cell deviations because their respective signs were used to calculate them. Last, mean 
signed unit errors were calculated to provide information about the general tendency to 
over- or underestimate cell frequencies4.
All data, means, and analyses were based on the 12 judged problem sets. Paired- 
samples t tests were used to determine whether differences existed between cells in the 
mean absolute and mean signed cell deviations. The planned set of t tests contrasted cells 
a and b, cells b and c, and cells c and d. In addition, tests were calculated on the data 
when collapsed across all conditions and separately for each slide duration condition.
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. Mean absolute cell deviations are displayed in 
the top panel of Table A3. When collapsed all across conditions, the mean absolute cell 
deviation for cell a was significantly different than that obtained for cell b, t{\ 19) = -2.24, 
Mse = 0.06,/? < .05. The remaining tests revealed no significant difference between cells 
b and c or between cells c and d  (all ps > .66). Therefore, two additional follow-up t tests 
were used that contrasted cells c and d  with cell a. The mean absolute cell deviation for 
cell a was significantly different than those obtained for cells c and d, cell c, t(l 19) = - 
2.29, Mse = 0.05; cell d, t(l 19) = -2.19, Mse = 0.05, all ps < .05.
The t tests indicated different patterns in the slide duration conditions. In the 3-s 
slide duration condition, the results were similar to that when the data were collapsed.
The mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was significantly different than that obtained 
for cell b, t(\ 19) = -2.19, Mse = 0.09,/? < .05 level. The remaining tests again revealed no 
significant difference between cells b and c or between cells c and d  (all ps > .28).
4 Participants’ estimations o f the actual cell frequencies were coded using the following conventions to 
calculate signed unit errors: overestimations were given a value of 1.0, underestimations were given a value 
of -1.0, and correct estimations were given a value of 0. The above described convention permitted an 
assessment of participants’ tendency to overestimate or underestimate cell frequencies.
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Therefore, two additional tests contrasted cells c and d  with cell a. The mean absolute 
cell deviation for cell a was significantly different than those obtained for cells c and d, 
cell c, t( 119) = -2.79, MSE = 0.09; cell d, t( 119) = -1.91, MSE = 0.08, all ps < .05. In the 5- 
s slide duration condition, no significant differences existed between cells in any of the 
planned or follow-up t tests (all ps > .10).
The mean absolute cell deviations for the cells in the top row of the contingency 
table, cells a and b, were contrasted with those in the bottom row, cells c and d. Paired- 
samples t tests were conducted when collapsed across all conditions and separately for 
both slide durations; neither o f which reached statistical significance (all ps > .093).
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. The mean signed cell deviations are displayed in 
the bottom panel of Table A3. When collapsed across all conditions, the mean signed cell 
deviation for cell a was significantly different than that obtained for cell b, /(119) = -4.32, 
M s e  = 0.08, p  < .05. The remaining tests revealed no significant difference between cells 
b and c or between cells c and d  (allps > .36). Therefore, two additional follow-up tests 
were used that contrasted cells c and d  with cell a. The mean signed cell deviation for cell 
a was significantly different than those obtained for cells c and d, cell c, t(l 19) = 3.51, 
Mse = 0 M , p <  .05; cell d, t( 119) =  2.55, MSE=0.09,p  < .05.
In the 3-s slide duration condition, the analysis revealed a similar pattern. The 
mean signed cell deviation for cell a was significantly greater than that obtained for cell 
b, t{ 119) = 2.76, Mse — 0.14,/? < .05 level. The remaining tests revealed no significant 
difference between cells b and c or between cells c and d  (all ps > .31). Therefore, two 
follow-up tests contrasted cells c and d  with cell a. The mean signed cell deviation for 
cell a was significantly different than that obtained for cell c, t(l 19) = 2.93, Mse = 0.96, p
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< .05. However, the mean signed cell deviation for cell a was not significantly different 
than that obtained for cell d, t(\ 19) = 1.71, Mse = 1.10,/? = .09.
In the 5-s slide duration condition, the mean signed cell deviations were quite 
different. The mean signed cell deviation for cell a was significantly greater than that 
obtained for cell b, /(119) = 3.53, Mse ~  0.08,/? < .05. Again, the remaining tests revealed 
no significant difference between cells b and c or between cells c and d  (all ps > .10). 
However, the follow-up tests were not both significant. The mean signed cell deviation 
for cell a was not significantly different than that obtained for cell c, t( 119) = 1.95, Mse = 
0.96, p  = .06. Like the other analyses, the mean signed cell deviation for cell a was 
significantly different than that obtained for cell d, t{ 119) = 2.02 Mse = 0.10,/? < .05.
The mean signed cell deviation for the cells in the top row of the summary table 
were also contrasted with that for the cells of the bottom row. Paired samples t tests were 
conducted when the data were collapsed across all conditions and separately for both 
slide durations; neither of which reached statistical significance (all ps > .13).
Signed Unit Errors. Signed unit errors were calculated to determine the 
percentage of estimates that were over-, under-, and correct estimations (Table A4). The 
mean percentages of correct estimations were calculated across the four forms of causal 
information. An independent samples t test indicated that the difference in the mean 
percentages of correct estimations in the two slide duration conditions was significant, 
t{6) = -9.64, DiffSE= 1.85,/? <.01.
Mean signed unit errors are also displayed in Table A4. Mean signed unit errors 
can range from -1.0 to +1.0. Positive values indicate that errors were more likely to be 
overestimations, while negative values indicate that errors were more likely to be
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underestimations. There were no hypotheses or planned comparisons for the mean signed 
unit errors. Therefore, the data will be reviewed in the Discussion.
Multivariate Analyses
A multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) determined whether there was 
any effect o f Slide Duration (2 levels), Type o f Cue (2 levels), and/or Block Order (3 
levels) on the mean absolute cell deviations. Slide Duration had a significant main effect 
on all four forms of causal information, cell a, F (l) = 6.84, MSe -  3.83,p  < .05; cell b, 
F(\)  = 14.37, MSe = 7.02 , p  < .05; cell c, F ( l)  = 15.91, MSe = 11.07,/? < .05; and cell d, 
F(\ ) = 8.94, MSe = 6.34,/? < .05. However, neither Type of Cue nor Block Order had a 
significant main effect on any o f the mean absolute cell deviations. In addition, no 
interaction with any combination o f factors reached statistical significance.
Relative Difficulty in Recall
An independent-samples t test was conducted on the relative difficulty item to 
determine whether differences existed in the two slide duration conditions. The difference 
between the 3-s and 5-s slide duration conditions approached but did not reach 
conventional significance, t(6) = 1.79, DiffsE “  .51,/? = .08.
Judgments
Rule-Analvsis Technique. Problem sets were designed so that one’s success 
judging their directions can determine the rule used to judge contingency. That is, a 
participant’s pattern o f success judging contingencies can be used to facilitate the rule- 
analysis technique. A participant was said to have correctly judged a problem set if  they 
correctly determined its direction. Meaning that a participant chose one of the positive 
options when judging a positive contingency (i.e., “much more likely”, “somewhat more
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likely”, or “a  bit more likely”), one of the negative options when judging a negative 
contingency (i.e., “much less likely”, “somewhat less likely”, or “a bit less likely”), or 
“just as likely” when judging a noncontingent relation.
The rule-analysis technique categorized participants as having used a rule-based 
strategy if the following requirements were fulfilled: (1) at least two of the three 
problems from a rule’s subset were correctly judged (i.e., cell a subset; a versus b subset; 
sum o f  diagonals subset; and conditional probabilities subset) and (2) at least two of the 
three problems of all subsets of lesser sophistication were also correctly judged. 
Participants were categorized as having used the rule of the greatest sophistication of 
which the previously mentioned requirements were met.
The design of the rule-analysis technique (see Shaklee, 1983 for a detailed 
description) makes it unlikely that a participant using one o f the lesser sophisticated rules 
can successfully judge a contingency from a more sophisticated subset5. Participants 
whose success judging subsets does not conform to the design of the rule-analysis 
technique may have done one o f two things: (1) they may have used multiple rules to 
judge contingency or (2) they may have used an unidentified rule. It is impossible to 
determine which possibility applies to such a participant; therefore, they are categorized 
as unclassifiable. Participants who do not correctly solve at least two problems from any 
of the subsets are categorized as having used strategy 0.
The percentages of participants categorized as having used the various rules are 
displayed in Table A5. There were no hypotheses or planned comparisons proposed for 
the rule-analysis technique. Therefore, the data will be reviewed in the Discussion.
5 It is even less likely that a participant using a rule of lower sophistication can correctly judge two of the 
three problems from a rule’s subset that is higher in sophistication.
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Judgments. Pearsons correlation coefficients (r) were calculated to determine the 
relation between judgments of strength, Ap, and Ap ’ (Table A6). The judgment of 
strength scale was unidirectional, which made it more appropriate to use the absolute 
values o f Ap and Ap ’ to calculate r values. When data were collapsed across all 
conditions, judgments o f strength were significantly correlated with Ap, r = .06, n = 1420, 
p  < .05. Judgments o f strength were also significantly correlated with A p ’, r = .06, n = 
1415, p  < .05. The difference between the two previously mentioned correlations was 
minuscule. The strongest relationship, by far, was the relationship between Ap and Ap ’, r 
= .83, n = 1431,/? < .05.
Discussion 
Cell Deviations
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. To test the first hypothesis, a set of planned 
paired-samples t tests were performed on the mean absolute cell deviations. The general 
trend across cells was not consistent with that reported by Shaklee and Mims’ (1982; i.e., 
the magnitude of errors did not increase across cells a, b, c, and d) in any of the reported 
analyses (see Table A3). Therefore, the planned tests did not adequately characterize 
differences in the mean absolute cell deviations and, as a result, additional follow-up tests 
were conducted.
The follow-up tests indicated that the magnitude of the errors for cell a was 
significantly less than those for the remaining three cells. This trend occurred in all but 
the analyses conducted on the 5-s slide duration condition, which suggested that it was a 
reliable effect. The lack of any significant differences in the 5-s slide duration condition 
suggests that participants may have adopted strategies to aid recall. Participants also
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might have adopted strategies in the 3-s slide duration condition; however, time might not 
have permitted efficient use. Unfortunately, the strategy that participants may have used, 
if  at all, can only be speculated.
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. The mean signed cell deviations revealed that the 
magnitude o f errors for cell a was greatest for overestimations. The exact opposite was 
true for the remaining cells. This trend resulted in the mean signed cell deviations for cell 
a being, for the most part, significantly greater than those for the remaining three cells. It 
may be that cell a, the co-occurrence of two variables, is a more salient cue that results in 
its frequency being consistently overestimated. A tendency to overestimate cell a might 
also account for the tendency to underestimate the remaining cells. The experimental 
instruction clearly stated that problem sets were defined by 24 events. Therefore, an 
effort to ensure that estimates totaled 24 events would force an overestimation of cell a 
result in at least one underestimation of the remaining cells.
Signed Unit Errors. The signed unit errors helped determine whether differences 
existed in the likelihood of correctly estimating cell frequencies in the two slide duration 
conditions. The independent-samples t test indicated that the percentage of correct 
estimations were significantly greater in the 5-s slide duration (M = 68.23, SD = 1.30) 
condition than in the 3-s slide duration condition (M = 50.43, SD = 3.46). The signed unit 
errors also indicated that, for the most part, more than 50% of the cell estimates for each 
cell were correct. Two exceptions occurred in the condition with the shorter event state 
duration for cells c (46.9%) and d  (48.4 %).
The mean signed unit errors were also examined because its sign can be used as 
an index of the tendency to over- or underestimate cell frequencies. Participants were
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more likely to overestimate cell a and underestimate the remaining cells in all but the 5-s 
slide duration condition (Table A4). The signs of the mean signed unit errors and mean 
signed cell deviations were consistent with one another; the one exception occurred in the 
5-s slide duration condition for cell d  (Ms = .03 and -.02, respectively; SDs = .69 and 56, 
respectively). The reported trend in the mean signed unit errors differed from 
Smedslund’s (1963) experiment; in which, no trend existed. However, the data reported 
by Smedslund (1963) were not averaged across multiple problem sets like they were in 
the current experiment.
Multivariate Analyses
A MANOVA was conducted on the mean absolute cell deviations to test the 
second hypothesis. O f particular interest was the main effect o f Slide Duration. Type of 
Cue and Block Order were also assessed; however, no differences were expected and 
their inclusion served as manipulation checks. The MANOVA indicated that only Slide 
Duration had a significant main effect on any of the four mean absolute cell deviations.
As expected, mean absolute cell deviations were higher in the 3-s slide duration condition 
(Table A3). Block Order and Type of Cue served as manipulation checks; therefore, their 
lack of significance is an indication that they did not have an effect on the mean absolute 
cell deviations.
Relative Difficulty of Recall
To test the third hypothesis, responses on the relative difficulty item were 
compared in the two slide duration conditions. The difference in participant’s perceived 
difficulty recalling cell frequencies was in the predicted direction; however, the 
difference failed to reach statistical significance. Participants indicated that it was easier
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to recall cell frequencies when given more time to view event states (M = .25, SD = .80) 
and that it was harder to recall the cell frequencies given less time (M =  -.02, SD = .79). 
This topic will be discussed further in the Conclusions.
Judgments
Rule-Analysis Technique. The percentage of participants categorized as having 
used each rule is in many ways similar to that reported by Shaklee and Mims (1982). 
First, Shaklee and Mims (1982; Experiment 2) found, as did we, that about a third of the 
participants (i.e., 27 % when collapsed across all conditions of their experiment) were 
unclassifiable. This trend proved to be true in the current experiment when the data were 
collapsed across all conditions and in each slide duration condition (3-sec: 37.7%; 5-sec: 
32.2%; combined: 35%). Second, very few participants were categorized as having used 
the delta rule. The infrequent assignment of the delta rule suggests that participants are 
modest judgers’ of contingency. Third, participants were more likely to use simpler rules 
to judge contingency when task difficulty was increased. Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) 
increased task by adding an additional counting task, while the current experiment 
manipulated the event state duration. Nevertheless, the percentage of participants that 
used the cell a rule in the 3-s slide duration condition (i.e., 27.9%) was more than twice 
that in the 5-s slide duration condition (i.e., 13.6%).
Bivariate Correlations. To test the fourth hypothesis, Pearsons correlation 
coefficients (r) were calculated on the absolute values of judgments o f strength, Ap, and 
Ap  The resulting r values were low (Table A6), which may have resulted from misuse 
of the judgment of strength scale. Several measures of central tendency suggest that 
participants misused the judgment o f strength scale and awarded noncontingent relations
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a value of 50 (M =  49.40, Mdn = 50, Mode = 50.0; note that Ap = 0.0). Even participants 
that correctly estimated the frequencies of the 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d  contingency misused the 
scale (n = 44 ,M  = 53.50, Mdn = 50, Mode = 50.0). Misuse o f the unidirectional scale 
resulted in weak correlations because o f the minimal changes in judgments that resulted 
from changes in Ap. That is, the mean judgments for the noncontingent problem sets were 
just as high as those for the positive and negative contingencies (see Table A l).
Conclusions
To summarize, two bodies of evidence suggested that participants differentially 
make errors when recalling the frequencies of causal information. First, the magnitude of 
errors for cell a was less than those for the remaining cells. The relative magnitude of 
errors for cell a is consistent with its ranking of cell importance (i.e., cell a > cells b, c, 
and d; see Crocker, 1982; Maldonado, Catena, Candid, & Garcia, 1999; Mandel & 
Lehman, 1998; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990; Wasserman & Kao, 1993; White, 
2003); however, the magnitude of errors did not increase across all four cells (cf. Shaklee 
& Mims, 1982). Some evidence did suggests that the magnitude of errors increased 
across cells a, b, and c; however, only the difference between cells a and b was 
significant. Perhaps the difference in beliefs about cell importance is greater between 
cells a and b than between cells b, c, and d.
Second, the magnitudes o f overestimations were greatest for cell a and the 
magnitudes o f underestimations were greatest for the remaining cells (i.e., as indicated by 
the mean signed cell deviations). The mean signed unit errors also indicated that 
participants’ estimates were more likely to be overestimations for cell a and 
underestimations for all remaining cells. The shared signs in the previously mentioned
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variables suggest that participants were not only more likely to overestimate cell a but the 
magnitude o f those errors were likely to be greater than those for the underestimations. 
The exact opposite can be said of the latter three cells.
Two factors associated with the use of the unidirectional scale likely contributed 
to the nonsignificant correlations in the current experiment. First, the unidirectional scale 
made it more appropriate to use absolute values when calculating the correlations. The 
absolute values restricted the range o f the included values (e.g., with Ap  the range was 0 
to .62 instead of -.62 to .62). Perhaps if negative values were used the resulting 
correlations would have been stronger. Second, misuse of the unidirectional scale 
resulted in judgment insensitivity (discussed in greater detail in the Discussion).
Peterson (1980) also proposed an explanation that might account for the misuse of 
the unidirectional scale. He argued that erred judgments o f noncontingent relations may 
be due to participants expecting to judge a relation between events, not the lack of a 
relation. It seems unlikely that Peterson’s (1980) explanation accounts for the erroneous 
judgments in the current experiment because the concept o f unrelated events was made 
explicitly clear, which he found was one way to remove this problem in naive 
participants. Therefore, it is more likely that participants failed to understand the scale 
and not that they failed to understand the concept o f unrelated events.
The difference in the mean relative difficulty item was not significant. Responses 
were as expected; however, the difference failed to reach statistical significance. That 
failure may have been due to the placement o f the Comparison Set. Perhaps after having 
judged 12 problem sets, participants had already adopted a strategy to aid their recall. 
Therefore, the impact of adding or removing 2 s from each event state may have been
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attenuated. Perhaps if  the Comparison Set was included earlier in experiment, the 
difference would have been greater in magnitude. That is, before repeated practice 
estimating cell frequencies permitted efficient strategy use.
The exact strategies that participants may have used to aid recall, if any at all, can 
only be speculated. Even if  qualitative feedback had been obtained, research suggests that 
humans are extremely biased and are often inaccurate when commenting on their own 
mental processes (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Therefore, analyzing 
the data might serve as a more appropriate means to determine whether strategies were 
used to aid recall.
A re-analysis o f the data suggested that participants used the total number of 
event states to aid their recall. First, a high percentage of participants’ estimates for each 
problem set totaled 24 (see % Correct Sum in Table A7). Second, the mean sum of 
participants’ estimates (2/s in Table A7) closely approximated 24 for each of the 12 
problem sets. Last, the mean sum of the signed deviations (^Deviations in Table A7) 
closely approximated zero for each problem set. If the sum of the signed deviations 
equals zero, it implies one of three things: (1) that no errors occurred, (2) that 
underestimation errors were offset by an equal number o f underestimation errors, or (3) 
vice versa. None of the previously mentioned statistics can be used to imply that any of 
the cell estimates were correct; however, they do suggest that the majority of participants’ 
estimates were governed by the total number of event states. Therefore, it is uncertain 
whether the estimates in the current experiment reflect what participants actually stored 
in memory.
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Several concerns raised from the current experiment will motivate modifications 
made in Experiment 2. First, providing participants with the total number of event states 
seemed to have promoted strategy use. Therefore, attempts will be made to reduce the 
likelihood that participants use similar strategies to aid recall. Second, the unidirectional 
scale proved to be problematic. Therefore, a bidirectional scale will be used with hopes 
that it improves judgment competency. Last, placement of the Comparison Set will be 
manipulated to determine whether its impacted the relative difficulty of recalling cell 
estimates.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT 2: KNOWLEDGE OF PROBLEM SET TOTALS
Participants may have used strategies to aid their recall of event states in 
Experiment 1. Event states, collectively referred to as causal information, are the four 
forms o f information that define the extent that variables are related. First, participants 
may not have encoded the occurrences of a particular event state when encoding causal 
information. All of the problem sets were defined by 24 events. Therefore, a participant 
could determine the frequency of the event state that was not encoded by subtracting the 
sum of three encoded estimates from 24. If the sum o f the three estimates equals the sum 
of their actual frequencies, the frequency of the disregarded event can be correctly 
determined.
Second, participants might have adjusted their cell estimates to ensure that they 
totaled the correct number of events. Participants made an average o f 3.4 errors per 
problem set6. However, more than 80% of participants’ estimates totaled 24 events 
within problem sets. These statistics suggest that participants made an effort to ensure 
that their estimates totaled 24 events (see Table A7 for more supportive statistics).
6 Errors refer to the sum of the deviations between the actual and recalled frequencies of causal 
information.
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However, adjusting cell frequencies in this manner does not guarantee an improvement in 
cell accuracy.
Third, participants might have used their hands to aid memory o f causal 
information. Experimenters frequently observed participants counting on their hands 
when observing problem sets. One participant shared that she counted the cell 
frequencies on her four knuckles and immediately entered them into the contingency 
table. Shaklee and Mims (1982) made no mention of whether participants were permitted 
to count on their hands or whether they did so. If a participant used his or her hands 
effectively, the task should more appropriately be viewed as a counting task and not the 
intended recall task.
The possibility that participants used strategies to aid recall is a concern because 
they are unlikely to occur in naturalistic settings. Consider a police officer who, after a 
long day, wishes to assess the likelihood that sports cars are driven by college students. If 
the officer’s assessment is limited to the observations made throughout that day, it is 
unlikely that he or she would know the total number of cars in the sample. It is also 
unlikely that the officer would have used his or her hands to count the instances as they 
occurred earlier in that day.
Two modifications in the current experiment were made in an effort to reduce 
strategy use. First, participants were told to rest their hands while viewing slides. It is 
possible that the first manipulation might suggest how to count cell frequencies to 
participants who might not have normally thought of such a strategy on their own. 
Therefore, participants were only told to rest their hands and not why they were to rest 
their hands (i.e., so they would not count cell frequencies on their hands). Second, the
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current experiment manipulated whether participants are told the total number of event 
states. To ensure that the second manipulation is maximally effective, the total number of 
event states varied across problem sets (M = 23.69 Events).
The Comparison Set in Experiment 1 was not as successful as hoped. The time to 
view each event state in the Comparison Set was either longer or shorter than that used 
for the 12 problem sets. Participants rated the change in relative difficulty of recalling the 
cell frequencies o f the Comparison Set with that of the problem sets. The placement of 
the Comparison Set was thought to have resulted in the failure to obtain significant 
differences between conditions. Therefore, the placement o f the Comparison Set will be 
manipulated in the current experiment. That is, participants will either view the 
Comparison Set early or late in the experimental sequence.
Three hypotheses are proposed for the current experiment. First, it is expected that 
the mean absolute cell deviations replicate the pattern of differential errors reported by 
Shaklee and Mims (1982). Second, it is expected that the sum of participants’ estimates 
are more variable in the condition that they are not told the total number of events. Last, 
it is expected that responses on the relative difficulty scale are more extreme when 
participants view the Comparison Set early in the experiment.
Method 
Participants
Fifty-seven students (14 males and 43 females, mean age = 19.19) enrolled in 
lower-level psychology courses at the University o f New Hampshire participated in the 
current experiment. All participants received course credit for their participation. Fifty-
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
six percent o f the participants were freshman and eight percent were upperclassmen (i.e.,
6 and 2%s were juniors and seniors, respectively).
Design
A mixed design was used that consisted of a within-subjects factor (Cell) and two 
between-subjects factors (Set Placement & Set Information). Cell (4 levels), the within- 
subjects factor, refers to participants’ estimates of the four forms of causal information. 
The problem sets from Shaklee and Mims’ (1982, Experiment 1) experiment were 
modified so that the cell frequencies were not all defined by 24 events in such a way that 
they still permitted the rule-analysis technique. Table A8 displays the cell frequencies, 
total number of events, and Ap for each problem set. Problem Sets 1 through 12 are listed 
in Table A8 in the order experienced by participants. Problem sets presented slides using 
a 3-s event state duration. Abstract and contextual problem sets were depicted using the 
same cues from Experiment 1.
Set Placement (2 levels) refers to whether participants viewed the Comparison Set 
early or late in the experiment. The Comparison Set, which had a 5-s event state duration, 
occurred either after the first problem set (i.e., the early condition) or after the 11th 
problem set (i.e., the late condition). The cues that defined the Comparison Set (Context 
II in Table A8) depicted the relation between snowing and seeing a bird perched outside a 
window.
Set Information (2 levels) refers to whether participants were told the total 
number of event states that defined each problem set. Participants in the known set 
information condition were told this information, while those in the unknown set 
information condition were not.
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Data were collected in groups that ranged in size from 4 to 15 participants. Three
of the four experimental conditions were completed in one session. However, the late-
unknown condition was completed in two experimental sessions. As a result, assignments
to experimental conditions were determined by the session that participants attended.
Table A9 lists the number of participants in each experimental condition.
Measure and Items
Measures were identical to those used in Experiment 1 with several exceptions.
First, the short description for the Comparison Set read as follows:
Some birds flourish when it snows. For example, seeing these birds would most 
likely depend on whether it was snowing outside. However, some birds migrate 
in the winter and will not be seen when it snows. These birds would most likely 
be seen when it is not snowing. Still some other birds are likely to be seen 
whether or not it is snowing or not. Use these slides to decide whether this bird is 
one that is most likely seen when it is snowing, not snowing, or if it doesn’t 
matter whether it is snowing.
Second, judgments of contingency were recorded on a measure that obtained the 
strength, direction, and relative likelihood of the output variable with one response. 
Judgments o f contingency were recorded on a bidirectional scale ranging from -100 
(much less likely) to +100 (much more likely). The following is an example of the 
judgment o f contingency item:
When the plant was watered (as depicted in the slides), it was
-100 -60 -30 ±0 +30 +60 +100
 I  |  I  |  I  | ------, -------|  I  | ------- , ------ | ------- ] -------| ------ i -------| -------I -------|
much somewhat a bit just a bit somewhat much
less less less as more more more
likely likely likely likely likely likely likely
to also see plant growth. Draw a line on the scale that best completes the sentence.
Items were modified to reflect the cues depicted in the abstract problem sets and the 
Comparison Set.
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Last, the measures used in the set information conditions differed from one 
another. The following sentence could be read beneath each contingency table in the 
known set information condition: There are a total o f  x events in this problem set. Where 
x is the total number of event states in that problem set. This sentence was not present in 
the unknown set information condition.
Procedure
The experimenter read the instructions at the start o f the session which,
Deviations from Experiment 1 began in the second paragraph and read as follows:
After viewing a set of instances—which may—or may not be about snow and 
birds— you will be asked to recall the number of each type of instance. In a 
blank table—like the one labeled A, B, C and D on the first page—you will be 
asked to enter the number of times each of the four event types occurred. In other 
words—you will be shown a problem set—that consist of any combination of the 
four types of instances just discussed. You will then be asked to recall from 
memory the number of times each of the four event types were observed—(in 
other words)—how many times you remember seeing each of the four events— 
and enter those numbers into the provided blank table.
We ask that during the viewing of slides that you put any writing utensils down 
and rest your hands while viewing the problem set. I think we all know that 
memory is not perfect—we wish to leam how memory works—so pay close 
attention and only refer to your memory—not that of your neighbors.
You will also be asked to judge the relationship between the two events. For this 
item—we ask that you draw a line on the scale that best describes the relationship 
between the events in question. A value of positive 100 indicates that the events 
always occurred together—meaning that every time you looked out the window—
-it was snowing and a bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell 
a}—or it wasn’t snowing—and no bird was perched outside your window {Show 
slide of cell b}—this would be a perfect positive relationship. Snowing and 
seeing a bird always occurred together.
A value of negative 100 indicates that the events never occurred together— 
meaning that every time you looked out the window—it was either snowing and 
no bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell c}—or it wasn’t 
snowing—and a bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell d}— 
this would be a perfect negative relationship. Snowing and seeing a bird never 
occurred together.
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A value of zero indicates that you were equally likely to see a bird perched 
outside your window—whether it was snowing or not. In other words—snowing 
had no effect on seeing a perched bird.
As you might have guessed—we will not show you a strict relationships—that 
would be too easy—the relationships in this experiment—will be somewhere in 
the middle of the two extremes.
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask 
them now. Remember—this is not a competition—you should not talk to— 
consult with—or observe the work of others. Please do not look back at 
previously completed problems. You will complete a total of thirteen problems 
throughout the experiment. And remember—we ask that while viewing the slides 
that you—put down any writing utensils down and rest your hands.
Hyphens and underlined font were points at which the researcher paused or emphasized 
statements to facilitate participants’ comprehension. All other aspects o f the experiment 
were conducted in the same manner described in Experiment 1.
Results 
Cell Deviations
The discrepancies between the actual cell frequencies and participants’ estimates 
were used to create three variables that provide different information about the data: 
mean absolute cell deviations, mean signed cell deviations, and signed unit errors (See 
Results in Chapter I for more details). Two sets of paired-samples t tests contrasted mean 
cell deviations, absolute and signed, to determine whether the pattern o f cell differences 
replicated Experiment 1 (i.e., a ^ b ; a ^ c ; a ^ d ; S e t  1) or Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) 
experiment (i.e., a i- b; b ^  c; c 4- d: Set 2). Tests were conducted on the data when 
collapsed across all conditions and separately for each set information condition.
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. Prior to conducting the planned comparisons, a 
multivariate analysis o f variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the mean absolute cell 
deviations. The independent variables (i.e., set placement and set information) served as
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the MANOVA’s factors. Set Information, Set Placement, and their interaction had no 
effect on any of the four cells (all ps > .34).
Mean absolute cell deviations are displayed in the top panel o f Table A10. When 
data were collapsed across conditions, the first set of tests revealed that the mean absolute 
cell deviation for cell a was not different than those obtained for cells b or d, cell b, t(56)
= -1.12, Mse = 0.07. p  = .27; cell d, t{56) = -0.86, Mse = 0.08,p  = .39. However, the mean 
absolute cell deviation for cell a  was significantly less than that obtained for cell c, 1(56)
= -2.49, Mse = 0.09,/? < .05. The second set of tests indicated that the mean absolute cell 
deviation for cell b was not different than that obtained for cell c, t(56) = -1.73, Mse = 
0.09, p  = .09. However, the mean absolute cell deviation for cell c was significantly 
different than that obtained for cell d, t(56) = 2.00, Mse = 0.08,/? = .05.
The patterns of significant differences were different from one another in the set 
information conditions. In the known set information condition, the pattern was similar to 
that reported when data were collapsed across all conditions. That is, the first set of tests 
indicated that the mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was not different than those 
obtained for cells b and d, cell b, t(28) = -1.74, Mse — 0.09,/? = .092; cell d, t(28) = -0.98, 
Mse = 0.10,/? = .34. The mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was, again, significantly 
different than that obtained for cell c, t{56) = -2.57, Mse = 0.14,/? < .05. The second set of 
tests indicated that the mean absolute cell deviation for cell b was not different than that 
obtained for cell c, t(56) = -1.60, M se = 0.119,/? = .121. However, the mean absolute cell 
deviations for cell c was significantly greater than that obtained for cell d, t(56) = 2.44, 
Mse = 0.101,/? < .05. In the unknown set information condition, none of the tests 
indicated that cells were significantly different from one another (all ps > .39).
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Mean Signed Cell Deviations. A MANOVA was also calculated on the mean 
signed cell deviations, which again served as a manipulation check. Set Information had a 
significant main effect on cell b, F( 1) = 5.63, Mse = 2.14,p  = .02. Set Placement also had 
a significant main effect on cell b, F (l) = 7.08, Mse = 2.69, p  =  .01.
Mean signed cell deviations are displayed in the bottom panel of Table A10.
When data were collapsed across all conditions, the first set of test indicated that the 
mean signed cell deviation for cell a  was significantly different than those obtained for 
the remaining three cells, cell b, 56) = 3.86, Mse = 0.13; cell c, t(56) = 6.42, Mse = 0.12; 
cell d, t( 56) =  5.15, Mse = 0.14; all ps < .05. The second set of tests revealed that the 
mean signed cell deviation for cell b was significantly different than that obtained for cell 
c, t{56) = 2.36, Mse = 0.12,p  < .05. However, the mean signed cell deviations for cell c 
was not different than that obtained for cell d, t(56) =  -.58, Mse =  0.13,p  = .56.
In the known set information condition, the first set o f tests revealed that the mean 
signed cell deviation for cell a was not significantly different than that obtained for cell b, 
t(28) = 1.67, Mse =  0.16 ,p  = . 11. However, the mean signed cell deviation for cell a was 
significantly different than those obtained for cells c and d, cell c, 28) = 4.05, Mse = 
0.17; cell d, t(28) = 4.07, M se  = 0.167, all ps  <  .05. The second set o f tests revealed that 
the mean signed cell deviation for cell b was significantly different than that obtained for 
cell c, t{28) =  2.81, Mse =  0.154, p  <  .05. However, the mean signed cell deviation for 
cell c was not different than that obtained for cell d, t(28) = -.12, Mse = 0.171, p  = .90.
In the unknown set information condition, the first set o f tests revealed that the 
mean signed cell deviation for cell a was significantly different than that obtained for 
each of the remaining three cells, cell b, t(27) = 3.73, Mse = 0.21; cell c, t(27) =  5.00, Mse
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
= 0.18; cell d, t(21) = 3.31, Mse = 0.22; all ps  < .05. The second set of tests revealed that 
no significant differences existed between cells b and c or between cells c and d, cells b 
and c, t(27) = .63, Mse = 0.17; cells c and d, t(27) = -.66, Mse = 0.21,allps > .52.
Signed Unit Errors. Table A ll  displays for each cell the percentage of estimates 
that were over-, under-, or correct estimations. An independent-samples t test indicated 
that the percentages of correct estimations in the set information conditions were not 
significantly different from one another, t{6) = 0.54, DiffsE ~ 2.47,p  = .33.
Table A 11 also displays the mean signed unit errors, which can range from -1.0 to 
+1.0. Positive values indicate that errors were more likely to be overestimations, while 
negative values indicate that they were more likely to be underestimations. No 
hypotheses or planned comparisons were proposed for the mean signed unit errors. 
Therefore, the data will be reviewed in the Discussion.
Sum of Estimates
The mean sum of participants’ estimates was calculated within problem sets, 
hereafter referred to as the sum of estimates (labeled as Actual in Table A12). Table A12 
lists the minimum and maximum of the sum of estimates (labeled as Min and Max in 
Table A12, respectively). The minimum and maximum for each problem set were used to 
calculate its range, hereafter referred to as the range of the sums. An independent samples 
t test indicated that the range of the sums was significantly different from one another in 
the set information conditions, t{24) = -5.85, DiffsE = 1.63,/? < .05.
The percentage of participants whose sum of estimates totaled the correct number 
of event states are also listed in Table A12 (labeled as % Correct Sum). A second t test 
indicated that the percentage o f participants whose sum of estimates totaled the correct
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number o f events were significantly different from one another in the set information 
conditions, f(24) = 19.07, DiffsE -  3.10, p  < .05.
Relative Difficulty in Recall
Responses on the relative difficulty item were used to determine whether 
differences existed in the set placement conditions. An independent-samples t test 
indicated that the values in the set placement conditions were not significantly different 
from one another, t(41) = 1.73, DiffsE = .28, p = .09.
Judgments
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance. A third MANOVA, again serving as a 
manipulation check, determined whether the independent variables had an effect on the 
judgments of contingency. Only Set Placement indicated that it had a significant main 
effect on the judgments of contingency for Problem Set 12, F( 1) = 4.57, Mse = 7140.90,/? 
< .05. No other main effects were significant.
Rule-Analvsis Technique. Judgment accuracy for the rule-analysis technique was 
determined in a slightly different manner. Participants were said to have successfully 
judged a problem set if  they correctly determined its direction. However, the direction of 
participants’ judgments was determined by the judgment of contingency item instead of 
relative likelihood item (cf. Experiment 1). All other aspects o f the rule-analysis 
technique were performed as described in Experiment 1.
Bivariate Correlations. Table A14 lists the resulting r values o f the correlations 
between judgments of contingency, Ap, and Ap  When collapsed across all conditions, 
judgments o f contingency were significantly correlated with Ap, r = 0.23, n = 657, p  <
.05. Judgments o f contingency were also significantly correlated with A.p’,r=  0.29, n =
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652, p  < .05. The difference between the two previously mentioned correlations 
approached, but failed to reach, conventional significance, t(676) = -1.35,/? = .08 [one­
tailed test]. Last, Ap  and Ap  ’ were also significantly correlated with one another, r = 0.82, 
n = 619,p  < .05.
In the known set information condition, a similar pattern of results was found. 
Judgments o f contingency were significantly correlated with Ap, r = 0.21, n = 341 ,P <  
.05. Judgments of contingency were also significantly correlated with A/? ’, r = 0.27, n = 
339, p  < .05. However, the difference between the two previously mentioned correlations 
was significant, t(343) = -1.76,/? < .05 [one-tailed test]. Last, Ap  and A/?’ were also 
significantly correlated with one another, r=  0.81, n = 346,/? < .05.
In the unknown set information condition, a similar pattern o f results was also 
found. Judgments of contingency were again significantly correlated with Ap  and with 
A/?’, Ap, r = 0.24, n = 316; A/?’, r=  0.31, n = 313, all ps < .05. The difference between the 
two previously mentioned correlations was also significant, t(333) = -2.42,/? < .05 [one­
tailed test]. In addition, Ap  and Ap  ’ were also significantly correlated with one another, r 
= 0.83, n = 333, p  < .05.
Discussion 
Cell Deviations
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. Two sets of paired-samples t tests tested the first 
hypothesis. The two sets o f tests determined whether the data supported the results of 
Experiment 1 or Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) experiment. For the most part, there were no 
significant differences in the magnitudes o f errors between cells in the current 
experiment. Two exceptions being that the magnitude o f errors for cell c was
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significantly higher than those obtained for cells a and d  in all but the unknown set 
information condition. Like Experiment 1, the magnitude of errors increased across the 
first three cells o f the contingency table (i.e., cells a, b, and c).
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. Mean signed cell deviations for each cell were 
examined to determine whether the magnitude of overestimations was greater than that 
for underestimations, or vice versa (see bottom panel of Table A10). Like Experiment 1, 
participants consistently overestimated the frequency of cell a to a greater extent than 
they underestimated its frequency and the exact opposite was true for the remaining three 
cells. Differences in the mean signed cell deviations between cell a and each of the 
remaining three cells were significant. However, there was one exception to the 
mentioned trend. The magnitudes of errors for cell b were greatest for overestimations in 
the known set information condition and, as a result, the difference between cells a and b 
was not significant.
The MANOVA revealed two significant main effects. First, the mean signed cell 
deviation for cell b was higher in the unknown set information condition (M = .15, SD = 
.55) than in the known condition (M = -.21, SD = .73). Second, the mean signed cell 
deviation for cell b was higher in the late set placement condition (M = .18, SD = .70) 
than in the early condition (M = -.24, SD = .57). Further analysis indicated the late-known 
condition was the only one in which the mean signed cell deviations were positive (M=  
.41, SD = .57). The mean signed cell deviations in the remaining three conditions (i.e., 
late-unknown, early-known, early-unknown) were all negative (Ms = -.04, -.09, & -.42, 
respectively). It is not apparent why the mean signed cell deviations were positive for 
only one experimental condition. However, it does suggest that the tendency for the
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magnitude o f errors for cells b, c, and d  to be greatest for underestimations is a robust 
effect.
Signed Unit Errors. The signed unit errors were used to determine if any 
differences existed in the likelihood of correctly estimating cell frequencies in the set 
information conditions. There was no difference in the percentages o f correct estimations 
between the two set information conditions, which suggests that knowledge of the total 
number of event states was not used in a way to improve cell accuracy. Ensuring that cell 
estimates totaled the correct number of events does not guarantee an increase in cell 
accuracy. The data from the current experiment are consistent with that notion.
The mean signed unit errors were also examined because its sign can be used as 
an index of the tendency to over- or underestimate cell frequencies. Participants were 
more likely to overestimate confirming cases and underestimate disconfirming cases 
(Table A l l ) .  The one exception occurred for cell b in the known set information 
condition (M=  .03, SD = .77). The signs of the mean signed unit errors and the mean 
signed cell deviations were consistent with one another for cells a, b, and c. However, the 
mean signed unit errors were positive for cell d  and negative for the mean signed cell 
deviations. Their differences indicate that although participants were more likely to 
overestimate the frequency of cell d  the underestimations were of greater magnitude. This 
difference may at first seem problematic; however, the present investigation is the first to 
report mean signed unit errors. As a result, it is not known whether any consistent trends 
are to be expected with this variable.
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Sum of Estimates
To test the second hypothesis, independent-samples t tests were performed, across 
set information conditions, the range of the sums and the percentages o f participants 
whose sum of estimates totaled the correct number of event states (see Table A12). First, 
the range of the sums was significantly larger in the unknown set information condition 
(M =  14.00, SD = 4.42) than in the known set information condition (M =  4.46, SD = 
3.89). Second, the percentage of participants’ whose sum of estimates totaled the correct 
number o f events was significantly higher in the known set information condition (M = 
88.88, SD = 5.50) than in the unknown set information condition (M = 29.94, SD = 9.74). 
Collectively, the t tests suggest that the sum of estimates were more variable when 
participants did not know the total number of events.
Evidence that participants adjusted the frequencies o f their estimates was of 
interest in the current experiment. Other than significant differences in the likelihood that 
estimates totaled the correct number of events, no other differences were found between 
the set information conditions. There was no difference in the percentage of correct 
estimations and both set information conditions produced the same trend across cells in 
the mean absolute and the mean signed cell deviations. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
differential patterns of errors reported in Experiment 1 were due to participants adjusting 
cell frequencies.
Relative Difficulty of Recall
To assess the third hypothesis, participants’ responses on the relative difficulty 
scale were examined. The difference between the early (M =  .78, SD = .85) and late (M = 
.30, SD = .98) conditions was in the predicted direction. However, the difference failed to
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reach statistical significance. The data suggest that by the time participants viewed the 
Comparison Set late in the experiment they had learned to efficiently use a strategy to aid 
their recall. The data also suggest that early in the experiment participants either have not 
adopted a strategy yet or have not learned to use it efficiently enough to decrease the 
perceived difficulty o f the recall task.
The lack of a significant difference between the set placement conditions on the 
relative difficulty item may have been due to the size of the scale. The relative difficulty 
item, a 5-point Likert scale, may have been too small to obtain a significant difference 
across conditions; that is, especially considering that values were expected on the positive 
end of the scale in both conditions. Had one condition rated an increase in perceived task 
difficulty and the other condition a decrease, as in Experiment 1, perhaps a significant 
difference would have been obtained. In retrospect, had the Comparison Sets been 
implemented earlier in Experiment 1, as in the current experiment, perhaps a significant 
difference would have been obtained then.
Judgments
Rule-Analysis Technique. The percentage of participants categorized as having 
used each rule is in many ways similar to that reported by Shaklee and Mims (1982; 
Experiment) and Experiment 1 (see Table A 13). First, approximately one third of the 
participants were deemed as unclassifiable. Second, participants were more likely to use 
simpler rules to judge contingency. Third, the percentages o f participants categorized as 
having used the delta rule were rare. However, the majority o f participants in the current 
experiment were categorized as having used the a-versus-b rule and not the cell-a rule 
(cf. Experiment 1).
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Bivariate Correlations. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated on 
judgments o f contingency, Ap, and Ap  ’ to test the last hypothesis. The differences in the 
correlations were in the predicted directions. Indicating that the correlations between 
judgments and Ap  ’ were significantly stronger than those between judgments and Ap. 
However, the difference in correlations did not reach statistical significance when the 
data were collapsed across all conditions. This effect will be discussed in greater detail in 
the Conclusions.
Conclusions
To summarize, the failure to obtain significant differences in the mean absolute 
cell deviations suggests that the differential pattern of errors is a weak effect. However, 
the failure to replicate the effect with significant differences is reminiscent of what 
occurred in Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) experiments. Significant differences between cells 
were not consistently obtained in their two experiments. In fact, only two comparisons 
were reliably significant across experiments. First, the magnitude of errors for cell a was 
less than that obtained for cell b. Second, the magnitudes of errors for the cells in the top 
row were less than those in the bottom row. However, a monotonic increase in the 
magnitude of errors was found in both experiments. Therefore, the failure to support the 
first hypothesis through significant differences might not be of great concern.
It was argued in Experiment 1 that the same of pattern of results in two of the 
three reported analyses was an indication of the robustness of the effect (i.e., when data 
were collapsed across conditions and in the 3-s slide duration condition). Similar results 
were also found in the current experiment (i.e., when the data were collapsed across 
conditions and in the known set information condition) and the consensus is now that the
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differences in the magnitude of errors is a weak effect. Therefore, it is more likely that 
the effect in one o f the experimental conditions was responsible for the shared trend when 
data were collapsed across conditions.
The fact that participants were more likely to overestimate confirming cases and 
to underestimate disconfirming cases may be consistent with that reported by Crocker 
and Taylor (1978; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). As suggested by Peterson 
(1980), participants arrive at experiments with strong expectations that they will judge a 
relationship between the depicted events. It might also be that participants expect to judge 
a positive relationship, especially when contextual cues are used that depict real world 
relations. Crocker and Taylor (1978; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) reported that 
participants consistently overestimated the frequencies of information that were 
consistent with their expectations and underestimated information that were inconsistent 
with their expectations. If participants expected to judge a positive relation, then the 
confirming cases are the expectation consistent information and the disconfirming cases 
are the expectation inconsistent information. A re-analysis of the data indicated that 
participants overestimated confirming cases and underestimated disconfirming cases for 
contextually defined problem sets (Ms = .11, -.07, -.07, and .07 for cells a, b, c, and d). 
The means indicated a different pattern across cells when the problem sets were defined 
by abstract cues (Ms = .17, .06, -.03, and -.04 for cells a, b, c, and d). However, the 
question remains as to why a similar tendency was not reported in Experiment 1 for the 
participants that viewed 12 contextually defined problem sets.
As predicted, the correlations between contingency judgments and Ap ’ were 
significantly higher than those between judgments and Ap. This effect suggests that
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judgments are more consistent with that stored in memory than with what actually 
occurred. This effect is the biggest contribution of the current investigation. Therefore, an 
extended discussion of its results and implications will be conducted.
The resulting r values might have been artifacts o f pooling data across the set 
information conditions. Further analyses, reported here for the first time, revealed that the 
correlations between judgments and Ap  ’ (i.e., rs for A /7 ’ equaled .36, .52, .44, & .52) were 
stronger than those between judgments and Ap  in each experimental condition (i.e., rs for 
A/7 equaled .27, .45, .35, & .42 in the early-known, late-known, early-unknown, and late- 
unknown conditions, respectively). Each experimental condition was a separately 
conducted experimental session; therefore, each session can be viewed as independent 
replication (Baron & Perone, 1998; Sidman, 1988).
The r values obtained in the current experiment were relatively weak in 
comparison to previous research (cf., Allan & Jenkins, 1980; 1983; Wasserman et al., 
1993; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990). One might argue that the weak r values are an 
indication of poor experimental control; however, a closer look at the data suggests that 
this not the case. Problem sets were borrowed from Shaklee and Mims’ (1982; see also 
Shaklee & Tucker, 1980) experiment and were designed for the rule-analysis technique, 
which exploits the circumstances in which the rule-based strategies produce inaccurate 
judgments. Problem sets designed in such a manner may be particularly difficult to judge. 
If the problem sets are difficult due to their design, then the correlations between 
judgments and A/7 should become progressively weaker as the subset’s sophistication 
increases.
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Table A15 lists the resulting r values between judgments o f contingency, A/?, and 
Ap ’ for the four subsets o f the rule-analysis technique in the order o f increasing 
sophistication. The r values between judgments and Ap  for the cell a and a-versus-b 
subsets are consistent with that reported in previous research (cf. Allan & Jenkins, 1980; 
1983). However, the correlations between judgments and Ap  progressively decreased and 
became negative as sophistication increased. The negative r value in the Ap subset is 
consistent with what one would expect because the rule-analysis technique defined 
judgment accuracy by the direction o f participants’ judgments (Shaklee & Mims, 1982; 
Shaklee, 1983). Therefore, the overall weak correlations obtained in the current 
experiment can be accounted for by the use of the problem sets from the rule-analysis 
technique.
The results of the current experiment are most consistent with a rule-based 
account of contingency judgment. The associative model of contingency judgment 
assumes that memory of causal information is irrelevant forjudging contingency (Baker, 
Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996) and that judgments are formed through an 
experiential mechanism. It is unclear how the associative model can account for a 
tendency for judgments to be more consistent with memory o f events than with their 
actual frequencies. According to the associative model, there is no reason for the 
relationship between judgments and Ap  ’ to be stronger than that between judgments and 
Ap .
The results of the current experiment also suggest that rule-based strategies, or at 
least an approximation o f them, are used to judge contingency. It is unlikely that a strict 
adherence to any rule is used by participants to judge contingency. However, it is likely
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that individuals use a set o f questions that, upon being answered, permits an 
approximation of that which is predicted by the rule-based strategies. The fact that 
judgments are more highly correlated with a rule based on one’s memory, which is an 
approximation in its self, suggests that rough estimates o f rule-based strategies are used 
to judge contingency.
The results o f the current experiment might also suggest that Ap ’ is a more 
suitable index from which to assess the accuracy of participants’ judgments. Many 
researchers have disputed whether Ap, or any normative statistic, is an appropriate index 
from which to assess the accuracy o f judgments (Mandel & Lehman, 1998; Shaklee and 
Mims, 1983). Although the rule by which Ap  ’ is calculated is the same as Ap, use of 
participants’ estimates as its inputs would arguably change its status as a normative 
statistic (see Mandel & Lehman, 1998 for a discussion o f normative ness). It also seems 
more reasonable to assess judgment accuracy on what the individual believes they are 
judging as opposed to what they are judging. The only drawback to using Ap ’ is that 
obtaining participants’ estimates is very cumbersome. However, use o f Ap  ’ might be even 
more beneficial in situations in which larger discrepancies exists between memory and 
the relevant information or when judgments are not based on information provided by the 
experimenter.
Discrepancies between memory and actual information might be relevant to 
illusory correlations. Illusory correlation has been defined as the tendency to perceive a 
relation between events that are not related or are related to a lesser extent than that 
which it is judged (Chapman, 1967). Illusory correlations might more appropriately be 
viewed as judgments based on a mental representation that is quite discrepant from that
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which exists. An inaccurate mental representation of events might be the mechanism by 
which illusory correlations are formed. If illusory correlations are mediated by inaccurate 
mental representations, then its definition should be broadened. The definition of an 
illusory correlation must be broadened because an inaccurate mental representation can 
result in an increase or decrease in the magnitude of the perceived relation.
Hamilton and Gifford (1976; Experiment 1) has similarly argued that illusory 
correlations are based on inaccurate mental representations. Their experiment 
investigated stereotypic person perception, which they argue is the social equivalent to 
illusory correlations. Participants rated the likeability of members from two groups that 
differed in their relative size, after members of each group were paired with desirable and 
undesirable traits. Favorable ratings were biased towards the larger group despite the 
proportions o f desirable and undesirable traits being equal in the two groups. It was 
concluded that because the pairings of undesirable traits with members of the smaller 
group were infrequent that their occurrences were a salient event. The salience of the 
events resulted in its frequency being overestimated, which biased favorable ratings 
towards the larger group. This finding suggests that perhaps illusory correlations, at least 
their social equivalents, are accompanied with a similarly biased mental representation of 
the relevant events.
Summary of Phase I
The first phase of the current investigation collectively addressed five hypotheses. 
First, cell estimates were examined to determine whether participants differentially made 
errors when recalling their frequencies. Second, event state duration was manipulated to 
determine whether it impacted the magnitude of errors. Third, the impact of the event
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state duration was examined on participants’ perceived difficulty when recalling cell 
frequencies. Fourth, the impact of participants’ knowledge of the total number of event 
states was examined on their cell estimates. Last, Ap and Ap  ’ were correlated with 
contingency judgments to determine their relative dependence on memory of causal 
information. The following segment summarizes the main results and conclusions 
relevant to these five hypotheses.
Differential Pattern of Errors
Three variables were used to assess differences across cells. First, the mean 
absolute cell deviations were used as an index of the magnitude o f errors. Shaklee and 
Mims’ (1982), using the same variable indicated that the magnitude of errors increased 
across cells a, b, c, and d  in Experiments 1 and 2. The magnitude of errors were only 
found to increase across cells a, b, and c in the current experiment. The magnitude of 
errors for cell d  never once exceeded that for cell c. It is believed that the differential 
pattern in the magnitude of errors is not a robust effect.
Second, the mean signed cell deviations were used as an index of whether the 
magnitude of errors were greater for under- or overestimations. The current investigation 
is the first that used the mean signed cell deviations to characterize cell estimates and, as 
a result, no specific hypotheses were proposed. However, this variable did produce a 
reliable pattern across Experiments 1 and 2. The magnitude o f errors were greatest for 
cell a, while the exact opposite was true for cells b, c, and d. It is believed that cell a is a 
more salient cue, which increases the likelihood that its frequency is overestimated (see 
Hamilton & Gifford, 1976 for a similar argument).
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Last, signed unit errors were used as index of the tendency to over- or 
underestimate cell frequencies. Originally, the signs of the mean signed unit errors and 
means signed cell deviations were consistent with one another (Experiment 1). However, 
in Experiment 2 their signs were different for cell d. It is not clear, at this point, whether 
either pattern is an indication of a real tendency to under- or overestimate cell 
frequencies. The similarities across experiments for cells a, b, and c do suggest that the 
tendencies to under- and overestimate cells frequencies are systematic (cf. Smedslund, 
1968).
The Effect of Slide Duration
In Experiment 1, the event state duration was manipulated. I concluded that the 
shorter duration interfered with participants’ use of strategies to aid recall. The 
magnitudes o f errors were significantly greater in the condition with the shorter event 
state duration. It is believed that the longer event state duration permitted more efficient 
use of strategies, which resulted in there being no differences in the magnitude of errors 
across cells.
Relative Difficulty of Recall
Participants viewed 12 problem set using the same event state duration; however, 
a Comparison Set was also viewed that used a different event state duration. Participants 
indicated whether an increase or decrease in the time to view each event state impacted 
the perceived difficulty o f recalling cell frequencies. In Experiment 1, responses 
indicated that more time resulted in a relatively easier task (i.e., 5 s vs 3 s) and that less 
time resulted in a relatively harder task (i.e., 3 s vs 5 s). Only one event state duration was 
used in Experiment 2. However, participants indicated that additional time was more
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beneficial when provided earlier in the experiment. It is believed that the limited range of 
the relative difficulty item, a 5-point Likert scale, contributed to the failure to support this 
hypothesis with significant differences.
Sum of Estimates
Experiment 2 further addressed whether participants used strategies to aid their 
recall. Evidence suggested that participants made an effort to ensure that their estimates 
totaled the correct number o f events (Experiment 1). Therefore, whether participants had 
such knowledge was manipulated in Experiment 2. The sum of participants’ estimates 
provided strong evidence suggesting that, when available, participants used the total 
number of event states to ensure that their estimates summed to that number. However, 
the data did not suggest that knowledge of the total number of events impacted the 
accuracy of participants’ cell estimates. The differential patterns o f errors were similar 
whether participants had knowledge of the total number o f events, which suggests that 
the patterns are not due to this particular strategy.
Judgment and Memory
Finally, Ap  ’ was used to determine whether its use could compensate for errors in 
contingency judgments. Participants’ misuse o f the unidirectional judgment scale 
Experiment 1 did not permit an assessment of this hypothesis. The bidirectional judgment 
scale was appropriately used in Experiment 2, which permitted an assessment of the 
stated hypothesis. Judgments and Ap ’ were more highly correlated with one another than 
judgments and Ap, which supported the notion that judgments are more highly correlated 
with memory of the contingency (i.e., Ap  ’) than with the actual contingency (i.e., Ap). 
This finding was extensively discussed.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 3: KNOWLEDGE OF JUDGMENT TASK
The relationship between memory and contingency judgments might be further 
understood if  a judgment task distinction is acknowledged. Hastie and colleagues (Hastie
6  Park, 1986; Hastie & Pennington, 1989) argue that there are at least two types of 
judgment tasks, which differ in their dependence on memory. The two types of judgment 
tasks, on-line and memory-based, also differ in how people form their judgments. On-line 
judgment tasks occur when participants are aware of the task at hand and are able to form 
their judgment as the relevant information is encountered. On the other hand, memory- 
based judgment tasks occur when participants are made aware o f the task after having 
previously viewed the relevant information and, as a result, are forced to form their 
judgment on that which can be recalled. Memory and judgments are related on memory- 
based judgment task, while they are not as highly related on on-line judgment tasks7.
The work o f Hastie and colleagues (Hastie & Park, 1986; Hastie & Pennington, 
1989) deals with social judgments. Social judgments refer to inferences made about other 
people that include, but are not limited to, the following: judging the likely causes of 
another’s behavior (e.g., Hastie, 1984), rating aspects of another’s personality (e.g.,
7 Hastie and colleagues’ (Hastie & Park, 1986; Hastie & Pennington, 1989) task distinction is only relevant 
to contingency judgment experiments that utilized a trial-by-trial procedures, which presents information 
serially. Experiments that utilize a summarized procedure are not relevant to the current discussion because 
in those situations judgments are based on the readily available information, not that which was 
experienced and/or stored in memory.
78
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Hastie & Kumar, 1979), and evaluating another’s suitability for a given task (e.g., Hastie 
& Park, 1986). The social judgment and contingency judgment literatures differ in a 
number of ways; their most important difference, at least for this investigation, is how 
judgment accuracy is traditionally assessed. The contingency judgment literature 
typically quantifies the extent that two variables are related through the use of a statistic 
(Ap  is the most frequently used statistic; e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Wasserman & 
Shaklee, 1984). As a result, contingency judgments accuracy has frequently been 
assessed considering its approximation to the statistic’s value (e.g., Allan & Jenkins,
1980; 1983; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Erlick & Mills, 1967; cf. Shaklee, 1983). On the 
other hand, social judgments are subjective impressions which often cannot be 
objectively determined as correct, incorrect, or expressed by a precise statistic. Therefore, 
it is not known whether the judgment task distinction will be supported by differences in 
contingency judgments. If  the judgment task distinction does apply to contingency 
judgments, it might account for the failure to obtain a relationship between memory and 
judgment in previous research (Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Wasserman, et al., 1993).
The contingency judgment literature has almost exclusively examined on-line 
judgments and no experiment has compared memory-based and on-line contingency 
judgments; several factors might explain such absences. First, several experiments have 
failed to find a relationship between memory and contingency judgments (e.g., Jenkins & 
Ward, 1965; Wasserman, et al., 1993). However, the failed experiments contained on-line 
judgment tasks in which no relationship is expected. Second, the Associative Model 
(Shanks, 1985; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) and judgment task distinction (Hastie & Park, 
1986; Hastie & Pennington, 1989) were introduced around the same time. The
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Associative Model, which has dominated modem thinking about contingency judgment, 
assumes that memory of causal information is not necessary forjudging contingency 
(Baker, Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996) and may have halted the limited number of 
investigations dedicated to the role of memory forjudging contingency. Third, 
conventions in the contingency judgment literature might be partly responsible for the 
almost exclusive use of on-line judgment tasks. For example, the experimental procedure 
and judgment scale are often explained to participants prior to viewing the first problem 
set. Explaining the judgment scale or task would inform participants of the later task and, 
by definition, result in an on-line judgment. Fourth, experimenters became reluctant to 
state that participants mentally compute rule-based strategies to judge contingency (see 
Wasserman, 1990; and cf. Wasserman, 1993). Investigating the relationship between 
memory and contingency judgments is, in a way, accepting the notion that participants 
attempt to mentally compute judgments via rule-based strategies.
To the best of my knowledge, only one experiment claims to have investigated 
memory-based judgments of contingency. In that experiment, Arkes and Rothbart (1985; 
Experiment 1) presented names on slides that varied according to two dimensions: (1) 
gender (i.e., male or female name) and (2) relative placement in the alphabet (i.e., begins 
with a letter from the first [letters a-m] or second [letters n-z] halves of the alphabet). 
Labeling the rows and columns of a contingency table (e.g., row 1: male names, row 2: 
female names, column 1: first half of alphabet, column 2: second half of alphabet) 
permits any name to be appropriately categorized by the two dimensions. Names were 
selected so that no relation existed between the two dimensions. Participants estimated 
the frequencies of either a specific row or column of the contingency table (e.g., recall
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the number o f  female names). Judgments were biased by the information that participants 
were asked to recall (i.e., the specific row or column).
Several aspects of Arkes and Hothbart’s (1985) experiment raise doubts as to 
whether participants actually judged contingency. First, only the frequencies of two cells 
were recalled. Contingency requires the frequencies o f all four cells; one might argue that 
to obtain a true contingency judgment that the entire summary table should have been 
estimated. Second, judgments were not predicted by the use of any known rule-based or 
associative account o f contingency judgment. Instead, judgments were predicted by 
simple inferences made about other cells (see design of Arkes & Rothbart, 1985; 
Experiment 1). Last, judgments were not of contingency but of the relative likelihood of 
events (i.e., who are more likely to have names beginning with a letter in the second half 
o f the alphabet, males or females?). Judgments of contingency require an estimation of 
the extent that variables are related, while judgments of relative likelihood ask which of 
two variables is most likely (see Waldmann & Holyoak, 1997 for a similar argument). 
These criticisms are intended to express that memory-based contingency judgments have 
yet to be adequately addressed, not to challenge the results of the experiment.
The current experiment will compare judgments of contingency formed in 
memory-based and on-line judgment tasks. Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) procedure will 
again be used. However, the points at which participants are informed of the judgment 
task will differ across the three experimental conditions. Participants in the on-line 
condition will be informed of the judgment task before viewing the problem set, as 
typically done. Participants in the two memory-based conditions (i.e., memory-based-PE 
and memory-based-PR) will both be informed of the judgment task after viewing the
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problem set. Participants in the memory-based-PE (Post Encode) condition will be 
informed after the viewing problem set (i.e., after encoding cell frequencies), while those 
in the memory-based-PR (Post Recall) condition will be informed after completing the 
summary table (i.e., after encoding and recalling cell frequencies).
Previous research has demonstrated that the magnitude of errors increases across 
cells a, b, and c when recalling cell frequencies (Experiments 1 and 2; Shaklee & Mims, 
1982). The differential pattern in the first three cells is consistent with the notion that 
subjective cell importance influences the magnitude of errors. Subjective cell importance 
refers to beliefs about the relevance of each cell forjudging contingency (e.g., 
Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990). Therefore, it might be that subjective cell importance 
influences either the recall or encoding of causal information in a way that the accuracy 
of the more important cells are higher than the lesser important cells. The current 
experiment may prove useful in determining the source of the differential pattern in the 
magnitude o f cell errors.
It may be that subjective cell importance influences the amount of resources one 
dedicates to the encoding of causal information. If the differential pattern is due to biased 
encoding it should only occur in the on-line condition. No differential pattern should 
occur in either memory-based condition because beliefs about cell importance would not 
have the opportunity to bias encoding; that is, participants are not aware of the judgment 
task until after the encoding of causal information.
It may be that subjective cell importance influences the retrieval of causal 
information (Crocker, 1982). If  the differential pattern is due to biased encoding it should 
not occur in the memory-based-PR condition. However, the pattern should emerge in
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remaining two conditions. No differential pattern should occur in the memory-based-PR 
condition because subjective cell importance will not have the opportunity to bias 
retrieval; that is, participants are not aware of the judgment task until after the encoding 
o f causal information.
The results o f Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the type o f scale used to record 
judgments might influence judgment competency. The current experiment will use 
multiple measures to assess judgments of contingency. Participants will judge the relative 
likelihood of the output variable given the presence of the input variable, which, in 
essence, asks participants whether the presence of the output variable is more or less 
likely when the input variable is also present. Participants will also judge the extent that 
the two events are related, which will consist of a scale ranging from -100 to +100 that 
request an estimation of both the strength and direction of the relation. Although both 
judgments are of the same contingency, previous research suggests that participants 
might interpret the questions differently and, as a result, answer them with differing 
degrees of accuracy (Shaklee & Tucker, 1980). Shaklee and Tucker (1980) used between- 
groups comparisons, while the current experiment will use within-subjects comparisons 
to determine judgment scales impact judgment competency.
Several hypotheses are proposed in the current experiment. First, it is expected 
that the magnitude o f errors will increase across cells a, b, and c and replicate previous 
research (Experiments 1 and 2; Shaklee & Mims, 1982). No hypotheses are proposed 
about the presence o f the differential pattern in the judgment task conditions; however, 
differences between conditions, as discussed above, might provide insights about its 
likely source. Second, it is expected that the mean signed cell deviations will be positive
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for cell a and negative for cells b and c. Third, it is expected that participants’ responses 
on the two judgment scales will differ in judgment accuracy.
Method 
Participants
Seventy-six students (26 males and 50 females, mean age = 19.41) enrolled in 
lower-level psychology courses at the University of New Hampshire participated in the 
current experiment. All participants received course credit for their participation. More 
than 90% of the participants were freshman and sophomores (i.e., 41 and 51%s, 
respectively). Eight percent were upperclassmen (i.e., 6.6 and 1.3 %s were juniors and 
seniors, respectively).
Design
A mixed design was used that consisted of a within-subjects factor (Cell) and two 
between-subjects factors (Event Sequence and Type of Judgment). All slides in the 
current experiment were presented using a 5 s event state duration.
Cell (4 levels), the within-subjects factor, refers to participants’ estimates of the 
four forms o f causal information. Participants’ estimates were subtracted from the actual 
frequencies to determine the absolute cell deviations, and signed cell deviations, and 
signed unit errors for each cell. Participants judged one problem set and its frequencies of 
the causal information totaled 24 events and were as follows: 10a, 4b, 2c, 8d.
Event Sequence (2 levels) refers to the orders that event states were presented: 
forward and backward. The order o f the forward condition was determined by a quasi-
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Orandom process ; its resulting order was as follows: cadaadbdbadbadadacbadada. The 
quasi-random order was reversed for the backward condition.
Type of Judgment (3 levels) refers to the point at which participants were made aware 
of the judgment task. Participants in each condition (1) viewed the event states, (2) 
estimated the frequencies of causal information, and (3) judged the portrayed 
contingency. The point at which the judgment task instmctions were read, which 
informed participants of the judgment task, varied across the three conditions. In the on­
line condition, the judgment task instructions were read at the start o f the experiment. In 
the memory based-PE condition, the judgment task instructions were read after viewing 
the problem set. In the memory based-PR condition, the judgment task instructions were 
read after completing the summary table.
The cues that depicted the event states were different from those used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. The cues were still asymmetric (Allan, 1993) but they were 
displayed adjacent to a line that partitioned the right and left halves o f the slide. The input 
and output variables depicted the relation between Variables X and Y. Variable X, if 
present, was depicted to the left of the partition, while Variable Y, if  present, was 
depicted to its right. Microsoft PowerPoint software displayed the slides via a PC 
compatible LCD projector.
Measure and Items
Participant estimated the frequencies o f causal information, judge the relative 
likelihood of events, indicate their contingency judgments on a line scale, and indicate
8The four coats o f  a traditional deck o f cards were assigned to one o f  the four forms of causal information 
(i.e., ♦, * , *, and V for cells a, b, c, and d, respectively). Cards appropriately representing each event state 
was entered into a hat and sampled without replacement. The order by the cards were removed from the hat 
determined the order o f events in the forward condition.
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the certainty in their estimates. Cell estimates, judgments of the relative likelihood, and
the certainty ratings were recorded as explained in Experiment 1.
Contingency judgments were recorded on a line judgment scale similar to that
used in Experiment 2. However, the labels and ticks were removed with the exception of
the mid- and endpoints. The line judgment scale ranged from +100 {much more likely) to
-100 {much less likely) and read as follows:
On the scale below ranging from +100 to -100, draw a mark on the line that best characterizes 
the effect of Variable X on Variable Y.
+100 0 -100 
I__________________ I___________________ I
Upon completing the line judgment scale, participants were asked to state the intended 
numeric value and sign o f their line judgment.
Procedure
At the start of the experiment, participants were given a packet of materials. The
experimenter began the session by reading the following instructions:
In this experiment you will be presented with two sequences of slides containing 
abstract information. The first sequence will include 8 slides and will be used as 
a practice set to familiarize you with the experimental procedure. The second 
problem set will include 24 slides. The length of this experiment is expected to 
be a little over an hour. We ask that you do not attempt to work ahead of the rest 
of the group. Please remember to enter the last six-digits of your social security 
number in the top right hand comer of each sheet. This ID number will be used to 
keep information anonymous and confidential.
Throughout this experiment, the slides will present information in one of the 
following four event forms.
Variable X and Variable Y may both be present: [Insert Cell a]
Variable X may be present while Variable Y may be absent: [Insert Cell b]
Variable X may be absent while Variable Y may be present: [Insert Cell c]
Variable X and Variable Y may both be absent: [Insert Cell d]
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These four forms of information can all be represented in and summarized in the 
following table: [Insert Summary Table]
After viewing the slides, your task will be to fill-in the summary table with the 
frequency of each of the event forms shown during the sequence. Please free 
your hands of any pens or pencils during the presentation of the slides. The 
experimenter will inform you when it is okay to use your pen or pencil to fill in 
the summary table. The first will be a practice set consisting of 8 events, while 
the second problem sets will contain 24 events.
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask 
them now. This is not a competition and you should not talk to, consult with or 
observe the work of others. You will have 10 minutes to complete each summary 
table and the follow-up questions.
Each packet also included the judgment task instructions that informed
participants o f the later judgment task, which read as follows:
Given that the two variables are presented together, a possible relationship may 
exist between the two variables. In the sequence of slides, it may be the case that 
Variable Y is either more likely, just as likely, or less likely to occur in the 
presence of Variable X. Following the completion of the summary table, your 
task will be to form a judgment of the strength and direction of the relation 
between Variable X and Variable Y.
To asses your judgment of the relation between Variable X and Variable Y 
several follow-up questions will be used. Among other things, you will be asked 
to judge the relation between Variable X and Variable Y on a scale ranging from 
+3 to -3 (i.e., as shown below) and to mark a line on a scale corresponding to the 
strength and direction of the relation. In the completion of the follow-up 
questions you are free to view the contents of the summary table.
Examples of the rating scales:
Example A: [Insert judgment of relative likelihood scale]
Example B: [Insert line judgment scale]
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask 
them now. This is not a competition and you should not talk to, consult with or 
observe the work of others. You will have up to 10 minutes to complete each 
summary table and the follow-up questions.
The judgment task instructions were inserted into the packet at points to accommodate 
the three experimental conditions. The consent form, demographic items, and closing of 
the experiment were conducted in the same manner described in Experiment 1.
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Results
Cell Deviations
As explained in Experiments 1 and 2, the discrepancies between participants’ 
estimates and the actual cell frequencies were used to create three variables that provide 
different information about the data: mean absolute cell deviations, mean signed cell 
deviations, and signed unit errors (A more detailed discussion of the differences between 
the three forms of data can be found in the Results section of Chapter I).
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. To determine whether any differences existed in 
the magnitude of errors between cells, a series of paired-samples t tests were performed 
on the mean absolute cell deviations (top panel o f Table A17). Previous research suggests 
that the increase in the magnitude of errors across cells is not a robust effect 
(Experiments 1 and 2; Shaklee & Mims, 1982). Therefore, two sets o f test compared 
differences in the mean absolute cell deviations. The first set of tests assessed differences 
between cell a and each o f the three remaining cells, while the second set assessed 
differences between the top and bottom rows of the summary table. Tests were conducted 
on the data when collapsed across all conditions and separately for each judgment task 
condition.
The first set o f tests did not reveal any significant differences between cells.
When data were collapsed across all conditions, the analysis revealed that the mean 
absolute cell deviation for cell a was not different than those obtained for either of the 
remaining three cells, cell b, t{16) = 1.18; cell c, t(16) = -1.73; cell d, t{76) = -0.94; allps 
> .09. In the on-line condition, the mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was not 
different from those obtained for either of the remaining three cells, cell b, t(25) = 0.68;
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cell c, t(25) = -1.85; cell d, t(!5) = -.75; all ps > .08. In the on-line condition and when 
data were collapsed across all conditions, the difference in the mean absolute cell 
deviation between cells a and c approached but failed to reach conventional significance 
(i.e., p  = .09 when data were collapsed; p  = .08 in the on-line condition). In the memory 
based-PE condition, the mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was not different from 
those obtained for the remaining three cells, cell b, t(27) = 1.10; cell c, t{27) = 0.00; cell 
d, t(27) = -0.56; all ps > .29. In the memory based-PR condition, the mean absolute cell 
deviation for cell a was not different from those obtained for either o f the remaining three 
cells, cell b, t(22) = 0.00; cell c, t(22) = -1.31; cell d, t{22) = -0.37; all ps > .20.
The second set o f tests only indicated a significant difference for one of the 
analyses. When the data were collapsed across all conditions, the difference between the 
cells in the top row and bottom row was significant, t(76) = -2.60, Mse = 0.09,p  = .01. 
However, the difference between cells in the top and the bottom rows did approach 
statistical significance in the on-line condition, t(25) = -1.94, MSE = 0.169,p  = .064. All 
other ps  were > .14.
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. To determine whether any differences existed in 
the magnitude of over- or underestimations, the mean signed cell deviations were 
examined (see bottom panel of Table A 17). The current investigation has reported 
evidence that the mean signed cell deviations are positive for cell a, negative for cells b 
and c, and either negative (Experiment 1) or positive (Experiment 2) for cell d. Therefore, 
the paired-samples t test assessed differences between cell a and each of the three 
remaining cells. The planned comparisons were conducted on the data when collapsed 
across all conditions and separately for each judgment task condition.
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For the most part, the difference in the mean signed cell deviations was significant 
when cell a was contrasted with cells b and c. When collapsed across conditions, the 
mean signed cell deviation for cell a was significantly different than those for cells b and 
c, cell b, t(76) = -3.29, Mse = 0.16; cell c, t(76) = -4.45, Mse = 0.24, all ps < .05.
However, the mean absolute cell deviations for cells a and d  were not significantly 
different from one another, t i l  6) = 0.00, Mse = 0.16,p =  .99. In the on-line condition, the 
mean signed cell deviation for cell a was again significantly different than those for cells 
b and c, t{25) = -2.82, Mse ~ 0.19; t(25) = -2.87, Mse = 0.40, all ps < .05. The mean 
absolute cell deviations for cells a and d  were also not significantly different from one 
another, t(25) = 0.00, Mse = 0.22, p  = .99. However, the memory-based-PE condition 
failed to produce significant difference between cells a and those for cells b and d, cell b, 
t{27) = -1.41, Mse = 0.35; t i l l )  = 0.48, Mse = 0.37; all ps > .17. The mean signed cell 
deviations for cell a in the memory-based-PE condition was significantly different than 
that obtained for cell c, t(27) = -2.19, Mse = 0.46,p  < .05. In the memory based-PR 
condition, the mean signed cell deviation for cell a was again significantly less than those 
for cells b and c, cell b, t{22) = -2.65, Mse = 0.26; cell c, t(22) = -2.74, Mse ~ 0.40, all ps 
< .05. The mean absolute cell deviations for cells a and d  were again not significantly 
different from one another, cell d, t i l l )  = -1.16, Mse = 0.19,p  = .26.
Signed Unit Errors. Signed unit errors were calculated, as explained in 
Experiment 1. The percentage of participants that over-, under-, or correctly estimated the 
cell frequencies are shown in Tables A17 and A18. Table A18 displays the percentages 
of each type of signed unit error when collapsed across all experimental conditions (top 
panel), for the forward condition (middle panel), and for the backward condition (bottom
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panel). A t test indicated that there was no difference in the percentages of correct 
estimations in the event sequence conditions, t(6) = -0.73, DiffsE = 5.37,p  = .46.
Table A19 displays the percentages of each type o f signed unit errors separately 
for the judgment task conditions: on-line judgment condition (top panel), memory based- 
PE condition (middle panel), and memory based-PR condition (bottom panel). Several t 
tests compared the percentages of correct estimations between judgment task conditions. 
There was no difference in the percentages of correct estimations in the on-line and 
memory based-PE conditions or between the two memory based conditions, on-line vs. 
post-encode, t(6) = 0.62, DiffsE = 5.12; post-encode vs. post-recall, t{6) = 0.50, DiffsE = 
3.88, all jos > .13. Elowever, the percentage of correct estimations in the on-line and 
memory based-PR condition were significantly different from one another, t(6) = 1.39, 
DiffsE = 3.68,/? < .05.
Mean signed unit errors were also calculated because they permit can serve as an 
index of participants’ tendency to over- (M >  0.00) or underestimate (M < 0.00) cell 
frequencies. Means are also displayed in Tables A17 and A18. In all of the reported 
analyses, participants were more likely to underestimate confirming cases and 
overestimate disconfirming cases.
Judgments
Judgments o f Relative Likelihood. Table A20 lists the frequency and cumulative 
percentage of participants that selected each option on the judgment of relative likelihood 
scale. The sign of participant’s responses were used to determine judgment accuracy, as 
previously done for the rule-analysis technique (See Experiments 1 &2). As displayed in
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Table A20, more than 50% of the participants correctly judged the problem set using the 
judgment o f relative likelihood scale.
Line Judgments of Contingency. The value of line judgments were determined by 
dividing the distance o f each response from the scale’s midpoint by the total distance of 
the scale’s corresponding endpoint (i.e., 0 to +100 positive responses or from 0 to -100 
for negative responses). Negative line judgments (i.e., between -100 and 0) were 
multiplied by negative one to distinguish them from positive judgments. All positive line 
judgments were considered correct (i.e. 74.7% of the total responses), while those that 
were either negative or equal to zero were considered incorrect (i.e., 16 & 9%s of the 
total responses, respectively).
Numeric Estimate of Contingency. Judgments accuracy was also determined 
according to participants’ numeric estimates o f the strength and direction of the 
contingency. Again, all positive numeric estimates were considered correct (i.e. 71% of 
the total responses), while those that were either negative or equal to zero were 
considered incorrect (i.e., 18 & 1 l% s of the total responses, respectively).
Inter-Judgment Agreement. Pearsons correlation coefficients (r) were calculated 
on participant’s responses on the three judgment scales. The resulting r values are 
displayed in Table A21 across all conditions and for each judgment task condition. The 
correlations between responses on each of the judgment scales were all significant at the 
p <  . 01 level. Due to the design o f the current experiment, r values could not be 
calculated between judgments and Ap9.
9 The design of the current experiment only consisted o f one problem set. For Pearsons correlation 
coefficients (r) to be calculated, both variables must vary to some extent. The inclusion o f only one 
contingency (Ap)  in the current experiment will not permit the calculation o f r because the value of the 
contingency will be constant. This problem is typically overcome by requiring that participants judge
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Judgment accuracies, as defined by the three judgment scales, were compared to 
determine whether of the judgment scale impacted judgment competency. Thirteen 
instances were identified in which a discrepancy existed between judgments on either of 
the three judgment scales (see Table KIT).
Event Sequence
A multivariate analysis o f variance (MANOVA) was used to determine whether 
event sequence had an effect on either of the dependent measures reported above. There 
were no reliable effects found for any of the reported variables (all ps  > .25).
Discussion 
Cell Deviations
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. Previous research has suggested that the 
differential pattern in the magnitude of errors is not a robust effect (Experiments 1 and 2; 
Shaklee & Mims, 1982). Therefore, the lack of significant differences between the mean 
absolute cell deviations is not of great concern. However, there was no evidence that the 
magnitude of errors increased across cells in any of the reported analyses (see Table 
A17). The current experiment only had one problem set, while previous experiments have 
all contained 12 problem sets (i.e., Experiments 1 and 2; Shaklee and Mims, 1982). 
Therefore, it might have been that the differential pattern in the magnitude of errors 
emerges after repeated exposure to the experimental procedure (see Experiment 1 for a 
similar argument).
The failure to obtain the differential pattern in the magnitude of errors in either 
condition will not permit any conclusions about its likely source, as planned. If  the
multiple contingencies or, more appropriate for this design, requiring that participants judge different 
contingencies.
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differential pattern only occurs after repeated exposure, as suggested by the current data, 
the proposed procedure can not determine its source. It is not possible to contain cell 
estimates from multiple problem sets in which subjective cell importance only biases the 
encoding or recalling o f cell frequencies.
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. The planned comparisons conducted on the mean 
signed cell deviations categorized the effect well. However, the signs o f the first three 
cells of the summary table (i.e., cells a, b, and c) were opposite of what was predicted. 
The data indicated that the magnitude of underestimations for confirming cases were 
greater than that for overestimations and the exact opposite was true for disconfirming 
cases (see bottom panel Table A 17). Again, the current experiment only included one 
problem set which explain the different trend obtained in the mean signed cell deviations.
Mean Signed Unit Errors. The means of the percentages of correct estimations, 
calculated across the four cells of each condition, were examined to determine whether 
differences existed between the experimental conditions. No differences in the 
percentages of correct estimations existed between the two event sequence conditions, 
which suggest that the order of presenting event states had no effect on the likelihood of 
correctly estimating cell frequencies.
The rank order o f the mean percentage o f correct estimations in the judgment task 
conditions was as follows: on-line (M = 69.22, SD  = 7.03), memory-based-PE (M =
66.08, SD = 7.45), and memory-based-PR conditions (M =  69.22, SD = 7.03). It may be 
that knowledge of the judgment task prompted purposeful encoding and recalling, which 
resulted in an advantage when estimating cell frequencies. Participants’ knowledge of the
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judgment task might have heightened the perceived importance of the recall task to 
ensure satisfactory performance on the later judgment task. Participants in the on-line 
judgment condition purposefully encoded and recalled the event states, while those in the 
memory-based-PE condition only purposefully recall them. Participants in the memory- 
based-PR did not purposefully encode or recall the event states, which might explain its 
ranking with respect to the judgment task conditions. If purposefully encoding and 
recalling do separately improve the accuracy of cell estimates, then it could account for 
the rank order obtained across conditions (see Saitoh, 1981 for comments on the benefits 
of meaningful learning).
The mean signed unit errors were also examined to assess participants’ tendency 
to over- or underestimate cell frequencies. The mean signed unit errors indicated that 
participants were more likely to underestimate confirming cases and to overestimate 
disconfirming cases, which was also the opposite of what was predicted (see Mean 
Signed Cell Deviations in Results). The directions (i.e., signs) o f the mean signed unit 
errors and mean signed cell deviations were identical in the current experiment. Again, 
the current experiment only included one problem set which might explain the different 
trend obtained in the mean signed unit errors.
Inter-Judgment Agreement. Bivariate correlations were performed to assess the 
extent that participants’ judgments were similar on the judgment scales. The r values 
between line judgments and numeric estimates o f contingency were stronger than all 
other correlations (r > .97). High levels between the line and numeric estimates might 
have occurred because the latter were judgments o f the former. The relative likelihood 
scale was highly correlated with both the line and numeric estimates of contingency but
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to a lesser extent than they were correlated with one another (.48 > r > .78). The lower r 
values between the relative likelihood scale and the other scales suggest that participants 
did not use it as appropriately to judge contingency. Judgment accuracy, determined by 
the sign of participants’ judgments, also suggested that the relatively likelihood scale was 
not as appropriately used as the line judgment and numeric estimate scale (i.e., 56, 71, 
and 75%s o f participants’ judgments were deemed correct, respectively). On several 
occasions responses on the judgment scales were inconsistent with one another (i.e., 
judgments made by the same participants contained conflicting signs; see Table A22). 
Differences in judgment accuracy between scales suggest that individuals do perceive 
them as asking different questions (see Shaklee & Tucker, 1980) and that the line 
judgment and numeric estimate scales are more appropriately used to judge contingency.
Conclusions
The current experiment set out to replicate the differential pattern in the 
magnitude of errors and determine whether it was due to biased encoding or recalling of 
causal information. The current experiment failed to produce a differential pattern in the 
magnitude o f errors in any of the judgment task conditions. A re-analysis of Experiment 
2’s data, reported here for the first time, suggested that the differential pattern in the 
magnitude o f errors is due to averaging data across multiple problem sets. As displayed 
in Table A23 (see note), the differential pattern was only present in 4 of the 12 problem 
sets. The emergence of the differential pattern only when the data are averaged is 
consistent with the notion that it is not a robust effect.
The current experiment failed to produce a differential pattern in the three 
judgment task conditions because it contained only one problem set. Therefore, the
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current design cannot determine whether subjective cell importance influences the 
differential pattern in the magnitude of errors. In the current design, cell estimates can 
only be obtained once because subjective cell importance will likely influence of 
additional estimates. However, other manipulations might provide insights into whether 
subjective cell importance influences the differential pattern. Experiments typically 
consists o f measures that ask questions that direct participant’s attention to cell a when 
judging contingency (e.g., Benassi, Knoth, & Mahler, 1985; Dennis & Ahn, 2001; Kao & 
Wasserman, 1993; Lopez et al., 1998; Mandel & Lehman, 1998; Shaklee & Mims, 1982; 
Ward & Jenkins, 1965). Several experiments have demonstrated that redirecting 
participant’s attention to a different cell alters participants’ beliefs about cell importance 
accordingly (Crocker, 1982; White, 2003). If subjective cell importance impacts the 
magnitude o f errors, then shifting participants’ attention should also alter the differential 
pattern.
Differences in the mean signed cell deviations across cells were also not as 
expected. The magnitude of underestimations was greater than the overestimations for 
confirming cases, while the exact opposite was true for the disconfirming cases. The 
signs for cells a, b, and c were opposite o f what was found in Experiments 1 and 2, which 
might be accounted for by several factors. First, the trend might have been due to the use 
of only one problem set. A similar argument was also made for the mean absolute cell 
deviations. Second, it might be that the make-up of the contingency resulted in the 
following pattern. For example, the judged contingency was defined by the following 
frequencies of causal information: 10a, 4b, 2c, M. The majority of the frequencies were 
confirming cases, which were consistently underestimated in the current experiment. It
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may be that participants are more likely to underestimate cells that are frequent and 
overestimate cells that are relatively infrequent.
Experiment 2’s data was re-analyzed to determine whether the actual cell 
frequencies influenced the tendency to over- or underestimate cell frequencies, reported 
here for the first time. The re-analysis indicated that the magnitudes o f underestimations 
were greatest for high cell frequencies (i.e., i f />  5, then M >  0.00) and that the 
magnitudes of underestimations were greatest for those that are low (i.e., i f />  5, then M  
> 0.00). When means were calculated for each problem set, the sign of most cells could 
be predicted by assessing its frequency (i.e., 43 of 48 cases were predicted; see Table 
A24). The mean of the cell frequencies that defined the problem sets increased across 
cells a, b, c, and d  in both Experiments 1 and 2 (5.08, 5.50, 6.25, & 7.17 in Experiment 1; 
5.33, 5.42, 6.00, & 7.07 in Experiment 2, respectively). Therefore, the increase in the 
mean cell frequencies across cells a, b, c, and d  can account for the differential pattern in 
the mean signed cell deviations. The same argument can be made for the differential 
pattern of errors in the mean signed unit errors because their signs have, for the most part, 
been the same across experiments.
To address the possibility that the increase in the magnitude of errors might also 
be accounted for by an increase in the magnitude of errors, the mean absolute cell 
deviations from Experiment 2 were also re-analyzed (Table A23). In only 5 of the 12 
problem sets was the magnitude o f errors lowest for the most infrequent cell and only on 
three occasions was it the second lowest cell that had the second lowest frequency (see 
Table A23 note). Therefore, it is unlikely that the cell frequencies also accounted for the 
increase in the mean absolute cell deviations. In addition, the mean cell frequencies
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increased across all four cells and the magnitude of errors for cell d  was never found to 
be higher than that for cell c (cf. Shaklee & Mims, 1982).
Last, the current experiment also provided evidence that the structure of the 
judgment scale might influence the obtained judgment. There has been limited research 
dedicated to the impact o f judgment scales on the likelihood of obtaining accurate 
judgments of contingency (Arkes & Rothbart, 1985; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980). If 
judgment scales do affect judgment accuracy, then further questions must also be asked. 
Researchers might wish to determine the judgment scale that is most likely to produce 
veridical judgments. Researchers might also wish to identify the judgment scale that is 
interpreted by participants as the equivalent to definition used in the contingency 
judgment literature.
In closing, the failure to support both the first and second proposed hypotheses 
was beneficial to the current investigation. As a result, it became evident that the 
differential pattern in the magnitude of errors is a by-product of averaging data. It also 
became evident that the differential pattern in the mean signed cell deviations and the 
mean signed unit errors are influenced by the cell frequencies used to define the problem 
sets. The third hypothesis, however, was supported and it suggested that different 
judgment items can be interpreted by participants as asking different questions that 
warrant vastly different responses. Although the majority of the current’s experiments 
were null, they contributed greatly to the current investigation and has benefited this line 
of research.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 4: THE SURPRISE ELEMENT
Research comparing on-line and memory-based judgment is limited in the number 
o f problem sets that can be used to facilitate between-groups comparisons. Only one 
memory-based judgment can be obtained from each participant because additional 
inferences are likely to be on-line judgments. On-line judgments occur, by definition, 
when the individual is aware o f the judgment task and updates his or her judgment as the 
relevant information is encountered. Memory-based judgments occur when the relevant 
information is encoded for another purpose; therefore, it must be recalled to form a 
judgment after the fact (Arkes & Rothbart, 1985; Hastie, Park, & Weber, 1984).
Experiment 3 compensated for the limited number o f judgments with a practice 
problem set and practice slide. The practice problem set consisted o f 8 event states (i.e.,
3 a, 2b, 2c, 1 d) and the practice slide re-introduced them, in the same order, on a timeline. 
As the event states completed the once blank timeline, the cells o f an adjacent summary 
table were simultaneously updated to reflect the causal information that had been 
introduced. At the end of the practice slide, the cells of the summary table were 
consistent with that which defined the practice problem set.
The practice problem set and practice slide were intended to familiarize 
participants with the recall task. Task familiarity was a concern because of the limited
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number o f problem sets can be used10. In retrospect, the practice problem set and practice 
slide may have suggested a means by which to remember the cell frequencies. Therefore, 
the practice problem set and practice slide might also account for the absent differential 
patterns in Experiment 3 (see Experiment 3 for additional arguments).
A more elaborate technique will be used in the current experiment to ensure task 
familiarity that does not also suggest a means by which to complete the task. Participants 
in the memory-based and on-line conditions will view 5 problem sets. Participants in the 
memory-based condition will be told that the experiment is concerned with their ability to 
recall the cell frequencies, while those in the on-line condition will be told that it is 
concerned with their ability to judge the relation between events. After observing the 
fourth problem set, participants in both conditions will, for the first time, be informed of 
their second task. Participants in the memory-based condition will judge the relation 
between the events, while those in the on-line condition will be asked to recall the cell 
frequencies. This procedure is also limited in the number of problem sets that can be used 
to facilitate between-groups comparisons; however, participants should be familiar with 
the experimental task when the data are obtained.
Two hypotheses are proposed in the current experiment. First, it is expected that 
there will be a stronger relationship between judgments and inferred contingency (Ap ’) 
than between judgments and actual contingency (Ap) in both judgment task conditions. 
Both Ap and Ap ’ are calculated using the same equation; however, actual cell frequencies
10 Two observations from previous experiments also suggested that some percentage o f participants might 
not have been completely familiar with the experimental task upon starting the first problem set. First, on 
occasions participants have asked questions about the experimental task after having viewed the first 
problem set. Questions were asked even though the experimenter previously had asked, prior to starting the 
first problem set, whether anyone had any questions. Second, several participants in previous experiments 
did not provide estimates for the first problem set (i.e., 1 and 4 participants in Experiments 1 and 2, 
respectively). Although only a speculation, it might be that participants that did not provide estimates for 
the problem set were not familiar with the task after viewing it.
101
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
serve as inputs for Ap  and participants’ estimates of the cell frequencies are used for Ap 
The Ap statistic is frequently used as an index of the extent that variables are related, 
while I have argued that Ap ’ is an index o f the perceived contingency (Note that Ap ’ 
oftentimes differs from Ap due to memory error; see Experiments 1-3). Second, it is 
expected that there will be a stronger relationship between participants’ judgments and 
Ap ’ in the memory-based condition than in the on-line condition.
Method 
Participants
Ninety-six students (20 males and 75 females, mean age = 19.43) enrolled in 
lower-level psychology courses at the University o f New Hampshire participated in the 
current experiment. All participants received course credit for their participation. Sixty 
and 24%s of the participants were freshman and sophomores, respectively. Sixteen 
percent were upperclassmen (i.e., 12.6 and 3.4%s were juniors and seniors, respectively). 
Design
The design consisted of a within-subjects factor (Cell) and a between-subjects 
factor (Type of Judgment). Cell (4 levels) refers to participants’ estimates of the actual 
cell frequencies, which are displayed in Table A25 with the Ap for each problem set.
Type of Judgment (2 levels) refers to the judgment task that distinguished the two 
experimental conditions. Abstract and contextual cues represented the event states, which 
were identical to those used in Experiment 2. Microsoft PowerPoint software displayed 
the slides via a PC compatible LCD projector at a rate of 1 event state every 4 s.
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Measure and Items
Participants, when appropriate, estimated the frequencies of causal information 
(i.e., the recall task), judged the contingency (i.e., the judgment task), and indicated their 
certainty in the previously completed recall task and/or judgment task. All measures were 
identical to those used in Experiment 2.
Procedure
Participants received a packet that contained the instructions, consent form, five
multiple-item measures, and debriefing form. The consent form was administered after
the instructions; the instructions in the memory-based condition read as follows:
In the current experiment you will view five Problem Sets that portray the Event 
States of two variables. Event States provide distinct information about the 
absence or presence of the two variables. Consider the case in which two 
variables correspond to Cows (Variable 1) and Grass (Variable 2). It may be the 
case that either the Cows and Grass are present on a farm (Event State 1 -  Cell 1) 
or that Cows are present and there is No Grass (Event State 2 -  Cell 2), It might 
also be the case that there are No Cows and Grass is present (Event State 3 -  Cell 
3) or that there are No Cows and No Grass (Event State 4 -  Cell 4) on the farm.
The five Problem Sets will each consist of 24 Event States and will be defined by 
any combination of the four Event States, as described above.
[Insert Summary Table]
During the viewing of each Problem Set, you must put down your writing utensil 
and rest your hands. After viewing each Problem Set, you will be prompted to 
recall the number of instances that each of the four Event States occurred. With 
your pen or pencil, please enter the number of times that each Event State 
occurred in the appropriate cells of a blank table, like the one above.
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask 
them now. This is not a competition and you should not talk to, consult with, or 
observe the work of others.
The instructions for the on-line condition differed from those listed above. The 
differences informed participants of the judgment task instead of the recall task and read 
as follows:
During the viewing of each Problem Set, you must put down your writing utensil 
and rest your hands. After viewing each Problem Set, you will be prompted to
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judge the relationship between the set of Event States. With your pen or pencil, 
please mark on the provided the extent that the two variables are related as 
portrayed by the event states.
[Insert Contingency Scale]
In the two experimental conditions, the task order for Problem Sets 4 and 5 
differed. Participants in the on-line condition viewed the problem set, completed the 
recall task, judged the extent that the two variables are related, and then completed the 
two certainty ratings. Participants in the memory-based condition viewed the problem set, 
completed the judgment task, estimated the frequencies of causal information, and then 
completed the two certainty ratings.
The demographic items and closing of the experiment were conducted in the 
manner described in Experiment 1.
Results 
Judgments
Bivariate Correlations. Pearsons correlation coefficients (r) were calculated 
between judgments of contingency, Ap, and Ap ’ when the data were collapsed across all 
conditions and separately for each judgment task condition (see Table A29). When the 
data were collapsed across all conditions, judgments were significantly correlated with 
Ap, r = 0.37, n = 327,p <  .01. Judgments of contingency were also significantly 
correlated with Ap ’, r=  0.29, n = 153,/? < .01. The difference between the two previously 
mentioned correlations was not significant, t(327) = 1.88, p  = .97. Last, Ap andp  ’ were 
significantly correlated with one another, r=  0.66, n = 330,p  < .01.
A similar pattern was found in the on-line condition. Judgments were again 
significantly correlated with Ap, r = 0.25, n = 232, p  < .01. Judgments of contingency 
were also significantly correlated with A p ’,r=  0.62, n = 90, p  < .01. The difference
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between the two previously mentioned correlations was also significant, t{229) = -10.45, 
p  < .05. Last, Ap  andp  ’ were also significantly correlated with one another, r -  0.73, n -  
95,p  < .01.
A similar pattern was also found in the memory-based condition. Judgments were 
again significantly correlated with Ap and A p ’, Ap, r = 0.67, n = 95; A p ',r=  0.55, n = 93; 
all ps  <.01. The difference between the two previously mentioned correlations was not 
significant, t{92) = 2.11 ,p  = .98. Last, Ap andp  ’ were also significantly correlated with 
one another, r=  0.73, n = 95,p  < .01.
To test the second hypothesis, the difference in the correlations between 
judgments and Ap ’ in the memory-based and on-line conditions was tested for 
significance. The difference between judgments and A p ’ in the judgment task conditions 
was not significant, 2dxff— .71, p  = .76.
Judgment Accuracy. Mean judgments are displayed for all problem sets in Table 
A25. Only the resulting mean judgments for Problem Sets 4 and 5 are discussed because 
they were the only two judged by all participants. Mean judgments for Problem Set 4 in 
the memory-based condition (M  = .27, SD = .26, Mdn = .30, Mode = .30) and on-line 
condition (M=  .21, SD = .36, Mdn = .20, Mode = .00) were both appropriately positive. 
Mean judgments for Problem Set 5 in the memory-based condition (M = -.28, SD = .34, 
Mdn = -.30, Mode = .00) and on-line condition (M = .27, SD = .36, Mdn = -.30, Mode = - 
.30) were both appropriately negative.
Judgment accuracy was also determined by the sign o f participants’ resulting 
judgments, as done for the rule-analysis technique (see Shaklee, 1983). Problem Set 4 
was correctly judged by 60% of the participants in the memory-based and 75% and those
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in the on-line judgment conditions. Problem Set 5 was correctly judged by 64% of the 
participants in the memory-based and 77% of those in the on-line judgment conditions. 
Cell Deviations
The discrepancies between participants’ estimates and the actual frequencies of 
causal information were used to create three variables that provide different information 
about the data: mean absolute cell deviations, mean signed cell deviations, and signed 
unit errors (see Chapter I for more details).
Mean Absolute and Signed Cell Deviations. There were no hypotheses or planned 
comparisons proposed for the mean absolute or signed cell deviations (see Tables A26 
and A27, respectively). Therefore, the data will be reviewed in the Discussion.
Mean Signed Unit Errors. Table A28 displays the percentage o f correct 
estimations for each problem set, separately for each cell. Figure B2 displays the trend in 
the mean percentage o f correct estimations (listed as % Correct), calculated across the 
four cells, for each problem set. The trend across problem sets was not expected; 
therefore, paired-samples t tests were conducted to assess the differences across problem 
sets post hoc (i.e., Problem Set 1 ^  2, 2 ^  3, 3 ^  4, 4 ^  5). In the memory-based condition, 
differences in the mean percentage of correct estimations between Problem Sets 1 and 2,
3 and 4, and 4 and 5 were significant, 1 vs. 2, t(3) = -3.51, Mse — 4.17; 3 vs. 4, t{3) =
6.70, Mse = 4.53; 4 vs. 5, t(3) = -4.53, Mse = 3.70; all ps  < .05. No other differences in 
either condition reached statistical significance.
Table A28 also displays the mean signed unit errors from the current experiment, 
which will also be reviewed in the Discussion.
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Discussion
Judgments
Bivariate Correlations. As was the case in Experiment 2, the correlations between 
judgments and Ap  as well as between judgments and Ap  ’ were all significant. To test the 
first hypothesis, the difference in the correlations between judgments and Ap  and 
judgments and Ap ’ was calculated. The difference was only significant the on-line 
condition, in which the relation between judgments and Ap ’ (r = .62) was significantly 
stronger than that for judgments and Ap (r = .25). Not only was there not a significant 
difference between the correlations in the memory-based condition, but the values were 
not in the expected direction. That is, the correlation between judgments and Ap (r = .67, 
p  < .05) was slightly lower than that between judgments and Ap ’ (r = .55, p  < .05).
A number o f factors may have contributed to the reported results. First, the task 
order in the memory-based condition differed from that used in previous experiments. 
Forming a judgment prior to declaring the estimates of causal information may have 
impaired cell accuracy (i.e., due to forgetting and/or interference). Evidence suggests that 
cell accuracy for Problem Set 4 in the memory-based condition was affected as a result of 
forming their judgment first. As displayed in Figure B2, the mean percentage of correct 
estimations increased across the first three problem sets; however, it decreased on 
Problem Set 4 (M =  19.48, SD = 3.10) to levels comparable to that on the first problem 
set (M=  19.70, SD = 1.93). It may be that the mental representation stored in memory 
was rapidly deteriorating as time passed. The deterioration might also have been 
exacerbated by the introduction of the judgment task n . Introducing the judgment task
11 In the current and previous experiments, participants have been observed declaring their frequency 
estimates very quickly at the end o f the problem set and being told to complete the multi-item measure.
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prolonged the declaring of the frequency estimates, which may have resulted in the 
declared estimates being quite different from that which was used to form their judgment.
Judgment Accuracy. Judgment accuracy was assessed using two techniques.
Mean judgments were calculated and the percentages of correct judgments were 
compared. Mean judgments in the on-line (M=  .27, SD = .26) and memory-based 
conditions (M =  .21, SD = .36) for Problem Set 4 were similar in sign and strength, which 
suggests that regardless of the judgment task condition participants arrived at similar 
judgments.
The data indicated that a slightly higher percentage of participants in the on-line 
condition correctly judged Problem Sets 4 and 5 (i.e., 75 and 77%s, respectively) than in 
the memory-based condition (60 and 64%s, respectively). I have argued that perhaps Ap  ’ 
is a more appropriate statistic from which to determine judgment accuracy, which seems 
even more appropriate for the memory-based condition. A re-analysis of the data 
obtained for Problem Set 4 indicated that five participants perceived (i.e., according to 
their Ap  ’) a negative contingency and provided a negative judgment. In addition, three 
participants perceived a noncontingent relation (i.e., -.05> Ap ’> .05) and judged it as 
noncontingent. The same analysis for Problem Set 5 indicated that three participants 
perceived a noncontingent relation (i.e., -.05> Ap  ’ > .05) and judged it as noncontingent. 
No participant perceived the relation as negative and judged it accordingly. Judgment 
accuracy improves in both the memory-based (i.e., 71 and 77% for Problem Sets 4 and 5, 
respectively) and on-line conditions (i.e., 81 and 67%s for Problem Sets 4 and 5,
Participant’s eagerness to complete the measure may have been due to their own knowledge that the 
accuracy of their recall is greatly reduced as time passes.
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respectively) if  judgments consistent with Ap’ are also considered correct, which further 
supports the notion that it can be used to assess judgment accuracy.
Cell Deviations
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. The lack of a general trend in the magnitude of 
errors might have been due to several factors (Table A26). First, it might have been that 
the current experiment did not contain enough problem sets for the differential pattern to 
emerge (see Experiment 3 for an extended argument). Second, the mean percentage of 
correct estimations was impaired by the introduction of the judgment or recall task during 
Problem Set 4. Introducing a novel task may have interfered with the emergence of the 
differential pattern. Last, judgments were not required for Problem Sets 1 through 3 in the 
memory-based condition. I have argued throughout this investigation that the differential 
pattern in the magnitude o f errors might be due to beliefs about each cell’s importance for 
judging contingency. Therefore, Problem Sets 4 and 5 in the memory-based condition are 
the only problem sets in which beliefs about subjective cell importance could have biased 
participants’ cell estimates.
In Experiment 3, the increase in the magnitude of errors across cells was affected 
by an increase in the mean cell frequencies. The mean cell frequencies did not increase 
across cells in the current experiment: 6.2, 5.4, 7.8, and 5.2 for cells a, b, c, and d. 
Therefore, differences in the mean absolute cell deviations across cells might prove 
relevant. When data were calculated across the entire experiment, there was no evidence 
that the magnitude of errors increased as the mean cell frequencies increased (see last row 
of Table A26). The magnitude of errors did increase as cell frequencies increased within 
problem sets (i.e., in 20 o f the possible 48 cases; see note in Table A26), which is
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extremely damaging to the results first reported by Shaklee and Mims’ (1982). Future
research is needed to determine whether the increase in the magnitude o f errors is due to
10an increase in the mean cell frequencies .
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. There also were no proposed hypotheses for the 
mean absolute cell deviations (Table A27). As was the case with the data obtained in 
Experiments 2 and 3, the directions (i.e., signs) of the mean signed cell deviations were 
well predicted by the actual cell frequencies (i.e., 33 of 36 cells were correctly predicted; 
see note in Table A27). Participants underestimated cell frequencies to a greater extent 
when they were high (i.e., i f / >  5, then M >  0.00) and overestimated them to a greater 
extent when they were low (i.e., i f />  5, then M >  0.00; see Table A27); this tendency 
will hereafter be referred to as the cell estimation rule. Ironically, the cell estimation rule 
was not successful predicting the sign of the mean signed cell deviations in the memory- 
based condition; that is, when calculated across problem sets (Ms = 6.2, 5.4, 7.8, and 5.2 
for cells a, b, c, and d). The cell estimation rule did predict the signs of the mean signed 
cell deviations when calculated across all problem sets in the on-line condition13.
Signed Unit Errors. When the signed unit errors were calculated, three trends 
were identified in which the percentage of correct estimations increased across 
consecutive Problem Sets (Figure B2). There was an increase across the first three 
problem sets in the memory-based condition and, after a significant decrease between
12 The problem sets in the current experiment were not designed to assess whether an increase in the 
absolute value o f the cell frequencies resulted in an increase in the magnitude o f errors. As a result, the 
difference in the mean cell frequencies between cells b and d  was very small. A larger discrepancy in the 
mean cell frequencies between cells b and d  would have permitted this hypothesis to be fully addressed.
13 Note that the means averaged across all problem sets in the on-line condition were not based on five 
problem sets because estimates were only required following Problem Sets 4 and 5. Therefore, the mean 
cell frequencies in the on-line condition were different for cells a, b, c, and d  (i.e., 6.5, 6.5, 5, and 6, 
respectively). This signs o f the mean signed cell deviations were well predicted in the on-line condition by 
the cell estimation rule.
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Problem Sets 3 (M =  50.03, SD = 8.82) and 4 (M = 19.70, SD = 1.93), it again increased 
in both the memory-based and on-line conditions. The increase in the percentage of 
correct estimations suggests that correctly estimating cell frequencies improves with 
practice, which is consistent with the notion that strategies are used to aid recall (see 
Experiments 1 and 2). The decrease in the percentage of correct estimations in the 
memory-based condition was argued above to have been due to either the introduction of 
the judgment task or the order of the two experimental tasks (see Bivariate Correlations 
in Discussion).
The mean signed unit errors were also calculated (Table A28). As with previous 
experiments, there was a high level of consistency between the signs of mean signed unit 
errors and the mean signed cell deviations. Therefore, the cell estimation rule could also 
predict the sign of the mean signed unit error. There was one discrepancy in the signs 
between the mean signed unit errors and mean signed cell deviations occurred for cell d 
in Problem Set 1, in which the cell estimation rule predicted a negative sign and the mean 
signed unit error was positive (M = .02, SD = .90). The high level of consistency 
between the two variables implies that when participants are more likely to overestimate 
cell frequencies their magnitudes are greater than the underestimations. The exact 
opposite can be said for the underestimations.
Conclusions
To summarize, contingency judgments were more highly correlated with Ap  ’ than 
with Ap. The one exception occurred in the memory-based condition, in which the 
correlation between judgments and Ap  was not different from that between judgments 
and Ap  ’. As a result, the first hypothesis was partially supported.
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The second hypothesis was clearly not supported. The difference in the 
correlations between judgments and Ap ’ in the memory-based and on-line conditions was 
not significant. In fact, the difference was in the opposite direction from that which was 
expected. The results of the current experiment suggest that judgments are more highly 
correlated with memory in the on-line condition than in the memory-based condition, 
which is the exact opposite of what was predicted. However, the order in which the recall 
and judgment task were completed differed in the on-line and memory-based conditions. 
Perhaps if they were equated, the second hypothesis would have been supported.
The current experiment provided further support for the use of Ap  ’ to assess 
judgment accuracy. The percentages of judgment accuracy were also improved when the 
sign of Ap ’ was used instead of Ap  (cf. Shaklee & Mims, 1982; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980). 
It seems reasonable to assess judgment accuracy with what the individual remembers of 
the contingency (Ap  ’) rather than with the actual contingency (Ap). The use of Ap ’ seems 
even more justified when time has elapsed between the viewing of the events and the 
forming of the judgment or when the frequencies o f causal information are unknown (i.e., 
to the experimenter and to the individual). Future research should attempt to quantify the 
benefits of using Ap  ’ over Ap  when assessing judgment accuracy (see Experiment 3 for a 
more detailed discussion).
The current experiment did not intend to address the impact of the actual cell 
frequencies on cell deviations and, as a result, strong conclusions can not be made. 
However, the mean absolute and mean signed cell deviations were both influenced by the 
actual cell frequencies. The influence of the actual cell frequencies on the cell deviations 
is independent o f beliefs about subjective cell importance. To the best of my knowledge,
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no body o f psychological research has documented tendencies to estimate frequencies in 
the manners reported in the current experiment. Therefore, the impact of each cell’s 
frequency on the cell estimates may be an artifact o f the experimental task.
Summary of Phases I and II: General Discussion
The current investigation has documented several important contributions to the 
contingency judgment literature. The following discussion summarizes the main 
contributions of the second phase of the current investigation, while mentioning related 
areas that will benefit from further research.
Cell Deviations
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. The current investigation set out to determine 
whether participants differentially make errors when recalling cell frequencies, as 
suggested by Shaklee and Mims (1982). Initially, it was argued that the differential 
pattern in the magnitude o f errors were due to beliefs about subjective cell importance. 
For example, the rank order of participants’ beliefs about cell importance (i.e., a> b> c>  
d) might have influenced the magnitude of errors when recalling cell frequencies (i.e., a < 
b < c < d). The current investigation never found that the magnitude of errors increased 
across all four cells (cf. Shaklee & Mims, 1982). However, the magnitude o f errors did 
increase across the first three cells (see Experiments 1 & 2). Evidence suggested that the 
differential pattern in the magnitude o f errors is a weak effect that is not promoted by 
beliefs about subjective cell importance, but by the cell frequencies used to define 
problem sets. In Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) experiment and Phase I of the current 
investigation, the increase in the magnitude of errors was confounded by an increase in 
the mean cell frequencies. However, the mean cell frequencies did not increase across
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cells in Experiment 4 and, within problem sets, increases in the magnitude of errors 
tracked the increase in cell frequencies (see Table A26 note). Further research is needed. 
However, the evidence gathered thus far challenges the results first reported by Shaklee 
and Mims (1982).
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. Originally, there were no proposed hypotheses 
about the mean signed cell deviations and it was unknown whether they would provide 
any useful insights about the data. Data throughout the current investigation suggested 
that the actual cell frequencies influenced whether the magnitude of errors was greater for 
over- or underestimations. If the cell frequency was less than or greater than 5, then the 
magnitude o f errors was greater for over- or underestimations, respectively. The 
influence of the actual cell frequency on the magnitude and direction of estimation errors 
was referred to as the cell estimation rule. The one limitation of the cell estimation rule is 
that it can not predict the sign of the mean signed cell deviations for cells that contain 5 
events. If a cell contained 5 events the magnitude of errors were equally as likely to be 
either under- or overestimations.
The cell estimation rule might be explained by a ceiling and floor effect. The 
greater magnitude of overestimations for cell frequencies less than 5 might be explained 
by a floor effect. The range of possible estimates on the lower end is restricted because a 
negative frequency is not possible, which might permit the unrestricted range of the upper 
end (i.e., overestimations) to be o f a greater magnitude and result in a positive mean 
signed cell deviation. While a real ceiling does not exist on the upper end for cell 
frequencies greater than 5, it could be argued that participants are aware that the problem 
sets are not exclusively defined by one event state. Therefore, knowledge of the
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distribution of events might similarly serve as a ceiling and restrict the upper-end of 
participants’ estimates.
Mean Signed Unit Errors. The signed unit errors served two purposes throughout 
the current investigation. First, signed unit errors permitted an assessment o f the 
percentages of estimates that were over-, under-, and correct estimations. The signed unit 
errors permitted an indication of the likelihood of errors when estimating cell 
frequencies, which was absent from the work reported by Shaklee and Mims (1982). 
Close to 50% of the total estimations were correct. Shortening the event state duration 
(Experiment 1) and introducing a surprise task (Experiment 4) decreased the percentage 
of correct estimations. Second, the mean signed unit error served as an index o f the 
tendency to over- or underestimate cell frequencies. The signs of the mean signed unit 
errors and mean signed cell deviations were, for the most part, consistent with one 
another; however, occasionally their signs were different and on each of those occasions 
the latter variable was better predicted by the cell estimation rule. Therefore, the mean 
signed cell deviations are better characterized by the cell estimation rule. The tendency to 
over- or underestimate actual cell frequencies was systematic, which differed from that 
concluded by Smedslund (1963). The cell estimation rule, when applied to the data 
reported by Smedslund (1963; see Table II in Smedslund on pp. 168), could not predict 
the tendency to over- or underestimate cells in his experiment. However, numerous 
differences exist between the two procedures which might not warrant such a 
comparison.
Final Reflections on Cell Estimates. The current investigation demonstrates that 
cell estimates are influenced by a variety of situational factors. First, knowledge of the
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total number of event states influenced the sums of participant’s estimates (see 
Experiment 2). Second, knowledge of the distribution o f causal information is thought to 
influence the upper end o f participant’s estimates; that is, when cells contain more than 5 
events (see Experiment 4). The two previously mentioned influences suggest that 
knowledge of the situation promotes cognitive reasoning that affects reports of that stored 
in memory. Similar types o f reasoning might always aid memory and pure indications of 
that stored in memory are never obtained, especially when reporting on complex or 
ambiguous events. Similar plausible forms of reasoning have been found to influence 
discourse processing (e.g., Lea, 1995; Lea, Mulligan, & Walton, 2005), memory of 
pictures (e.g., Allport, 1954; Seamon, et al., 2002), and eyewitness testimonies (e.g., 
Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). Perhaps there is a natural tendency to incorporate logical 
reasoning into the interpreting of information stored in memory (see Bartlett, S. F. C., 
2003; Von Hecker, 2004).
Memory and Judgment
The primary purpose o f the current investigation was to illuminate the role of 
memory for judging contingency, which has not received much attention in the 
experimental literature. The current investigation documented evidence that warrants the 
continued investigation of the role o f memory forjudging contingency, which will be 
discussed below.
First, the current investigation suggests that contingency judgments are based on 
individuals’ memory of the contingency. Contingency judgments were more highly 
correlated with Ap  ’, which uses estimates of cell frequencies, rather than Ap, which uses 
the actual cell frequencies. I argue that judgments are more highly correlated with Ap ’
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because participants crudely attempt to judge contingency from the frequencies of causal 
information. Participants’ estimates of the cell frequencies often differ from that which 
actually occurred. Experiments 2 and 4 suggest that compensating for each participant’s 
discrepant mental representation (i.e., calculating Ap  ’) improved the ability to predict 
contingency judgments; that is, with respect to the ability to predict judgments from Ap. 
In other words, errors in judgment can partially be accounted for by errors in memory. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the information stored in memory is used to 
judge contingency.
Second, the current investigation suggests that judgments are formed by rule- 
based strategies or some rough approximation of them because the only difference 
between Ap, a rule-based strategy, and Ap  ’ are its inputs. Therefore, the higher 
correlation obtained when correlating judgments with Ap  ’, instead of Ap, suggests that 
judgments are formed in a manner that approximates the delta rule. Shaklee (1983) 
pointed out that the outputs of all of the rule-based strategies are highly correlated with 
one another. Therefore, suggesting that the current experiment provides evidence for one 
specific rule is not warranted. The marked improvement in the correlations when using 
Ap ' also suggests that some computational process is at work when judging contingency. 
Both the Rule-Based and Belief-Revision Models have computational components in 
their accounts o f contingency judgment; therefore, the results are more in favor with their 
accounts than with the Associative Model.
Third, the current investigation suggests an alternative means by which to assess 
the accuracy o f contingency judgments. There has been some debate as to the 
appropriateness o f using a normative statistic to assess the accuracy of participants’
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judgments (Mandel & Lehman, 1998; Shaklee, 1983). I have argued that perhaps Ap ’ is a 
more appropriate means by which to compare judgment accuracy. Further research is 
needed to quantify the benefits of using Ap ’ over Ap; however, the arguments proposed 
here have been promising. For example, it has been argued that Ap ’ might be more 
beneficial when the relevant information is not controlled or known to the experimenter. 
It may also be that causal knowledge, preconceived notions, stereotypes, illusory 
correlations, and biases are the result of inaccurate Ap
Final Reflections on Judgment and Memory. The current investigation has 
demonstrated that the role of memory forjudging contingency deserves experimental 
attention. The issues discussed within the current investigation have investigated two 
possible applications of the role of memory forjudging contingency. That is, the memory 
of causal information and the dependence of judgments on memory under different task 
conditions. There are many other components of memory that are relevant to contingency 
judgments. For instance, the frequency estimates were more than likely stored in short­
term memory. While forming the contingency judgment is likely to occur in working 
memory, which many believe is different from short-term memory (Baddeley, 1995; 
Baddeley, 2000). The Belief-Revision Model holds that past causal knowledge impacts 
contingency judgments, which is more than likely stored in and retrieved from long-term 
memory. Therefore, all three major structures o f memory (i.e., short-term, working, long­
term memory) are worthy of investigation.
Future directions in the current line of research will explore the naturalistic 
applications o f the current investigation’s finding. For example, the contingencies used 
throughout the current investigation were defined by, on average, 24 event states.
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Judgments made in naturalistic settings are often based on much larger samples. It must 
be determined whether the relationship between judgment and memory exist when 
frequencies are unknown or are high in quantity. Consider the relationship between 
memory and judgments in free-operant procedures. Free-operant procedures permit 
participants to respond on an operandum as many times as they wish throughout a set 
period o f time and their responses either will or will not produce an outcome (Allan, 
1993). High rates of responding are frequently observed using free-operant procedures 
(Benassi, Knoth, and Mahler, 1985; Wasserman, Chatlosh, & Neunaber, 1983).
Therefore, it is unlikely that a participant would form a judgment on the actual 
frequencies of causal information. However, participants would be capable of estimating 
the percentage of each of the four forms of causal information. The delta rule produces 
the exact same output when the percentages of each event state are used as inputs instead 
of its actual frequencies14. It may be that participants use a similar process when judging 
contingency when the total number of frequencies are unknown or are abundant.
Future research should also address the major limitation encountered in the 
current investigation. In Experiment 4, the data did not indicate that judgments in the 
memory-based condition were more highly correlated with Ap ’ than with Ap. The failure 
was argued to have been the result of switching the task order, which intended to rule out 
an alternative explanation for the results obtained in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Switching 
the task order intended to demonstrate that declaring cell estimates before forming a 
judgment did not increase the likelihood that judgments were based on their frequencies,
14 Consider the following contingency: 1 la , 4b, 8c, Id. The percentages o f the causal information are .46, 
.33, .16, and .04, respectively. That is, if  the frequencies are divided by the number o f event that defined the 
problem set (i.e., 24). The output of the delta rule based on the percentages (.46/[.46+.33])- (. 14/[. 16+.04])
= -.22) is identical to its output when the frequencies are used (11/[1 l+4])-(8/[8+l]) = -.22).
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which might not have occurred otherwise. Fortunately, there are other ways to reduce the 
likelihood that declaring cell estimates influences the following judgment. First, the order 
in which the event states are requested might be counterbalanced. The order in which cell 
estimates were declared might have suggested a ranking of their importance or a means to 
integrate them to judge contingency (see Wasserman, Dorner, & Kao, 1990 for a similar 
argument). Second, the request for estimates of the frequencies o f causal information 
might be listed in sentence form (see Crocker, 1982). As argued earlier (see 
Introduction), the presence of the contingency table might elicit a greater tendency for 
participants to a use rule-based strategy when judging contingency. Third, upon declaring 
each frequency estimate they can immediately be removed from the participants’ 
presence. Any combination of the above stated manipulations might compensate for the 
concern that motivated changing the task order in Experiment 4. The most logical 
progression of this line o f research is to address the previously mentioned concerns, 
which will serve to strengthen the arguments stated throughout this investigation.
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APPENDIX A
Table A l.
Means and Standard Deviations o f  Each Judged Problem Set in Experiment 1.
Block Causal Information Contingency(Ap)
Judgment 
M  SD
1 11a, 4b, lc, 8d .62 .62 .23
4a, lb, 3c, 16d .64 .54 .26
4a, 4b, lc, 15d .44 .54 .27
2a, 12b, 0c, lOd .14 .50 .29
2 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d .00 .52 .26
4a, 4b, 8c, 8d .00 .46 .21
8a, 5b, 9c, 2d -.20 .53 .24
la, 5b, 3c, 15d .00 .51 .30
3 la, 8b, 11c, 4d -.62 .51 .26
4a, l ib ,  8c, la -.62 .51 .21
4a, 4b, 15c, Id -.44 .51 .25
12a, 2b, 10c, Od -.14 .60 .23
CS 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d .00 .54 .27
Note. Judgments o f strength were divided by 100 to facilitate comparisons with 
contingency. Ap  = delta p; SD  = standard deviations; CS = comparison set.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A2.
Number o f  Participants in Each Experimental Condition in Experiment 1.
Slide Block Type of Cue
Duration Order Abstract Context
3 sec 1-2-3 7 11
2-3-1 11 12
3-1-2 11 9
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A3.
Means and Standard Deviations o f  Absolute and Signed Cell Deviations in Experiment 1.
Slide Duration Contingency Table Cell
All Cellsa b c d
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations
3 Second 0.95 (0.83) 1.15 (0.79) 1.20 (1.01) 1.10(0.98) 1.10(0.05)
5 Second 0.60 (0.65) 0.65 (0.60) 0.59 (0.55) 0.65 (0.62) 0.62 (0.02)
All Conditions 0.78 (0.76) 0.90 (0.74) 0.90 (0.87) 0.88 (0.85) 0.87 (0.03)
Mean Signed Cell Deviations
3 Second .21 (.73) -.17 (.53) -.15 (.48) -.03 (.64) -.04 (.09)
5 Second .19 (.48) -.09 (.43) .01 (.42) -.01 (.46) .03 (.06)
All Conditions .20 (.61) -.13 (.48) -.07 (.45) -.02 (.56) -.03 (.08)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the 
standard error of the means (for All Cells).
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A4.
Percentage o f  Recalled Frequencies that were Overt, Correct, and Under Estimations o f  
the Contingency Table Cells in Experiment 1.
Type of Contingency Table Cell
S ul Xll 3X1011
a b c d
All Conditions (n = 1433)
% Over 21.4 19.2 20.0 21.4
% Correct 61.9 56.5 58.3 60.0
% Under 16.7 24.4 21.8 18.6
Mean .05 (.62) -.05 (.66) -.02 (.65) -.03 (.63)
3 S Slide Duration Only (n = 731)
% Over 25.7 23.3 23.9 25.4
% Correct 54.6 46.9 48.4 51.8
% Under 19.7 29.8 27.6 22.7
Mean .06 (.67) -.07 (.73) -.04 (.72) -.03 (.69)
5 S Slide Duration Only (n = 702)
% Over 17.0 15.0 15.8 17.1
% Correct 69.5 66.4 68.5 68.5
% Under 13.5 18.7 15.7 14.4
Mean .03 (.55) -.04 (.58) .00 (.56) .03 (.56)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A5.
Percentage o f  Participants Using Various Rule-Based Strategies in Experiment 1.
Rule-Based Strategy
Condition Zero Cell A A Vs B dD dP Unclassifiable
Percentage o f Participants
3 s (n = 61) 14.8 27.9 8.2 11.5 0.0 37.7
5 s (n = 59) 10.2 13.6 13.6 28.8 1.7 32.2
All (n = 120) 12.5 20.8 10.8 20.0 0.8 35.0
Note. Percentages are based on the total number of participants in their respective groups; 
therefore, percentages only sum to 100 percent when added across individual rows. 
Strategies used by participants were determined by the Rule-Analysis Technique.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A6.
Intercorrelations Between the Absolute Values o f  Judged Strength, Judged Contingency, 
and Inferred Contingency in Experiment 1.
Judgment Contingency InferredContingency
Judgment -- a.057* .055**
Contingency — c.832**
Inferred Contingency
an =  1420. Dn =  1415. cn =  1431.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A7.
Descriptive Statistics fo r  the Sum o f  Deviations fo r  Each Problem Set in Experiment 1.
Problem Set
Range of 
Sums % Correct Sum 
(Sum of Events)
Mean Sum of Deviations
Min Max r /s ^Deviations SD
1 15 38 74.8 (24) 23.95 -.05 2.06
2 19 28 79.2 (24) 23.87 -.13 1.03
3 19 27 79.2 (24) 23.86 -.14 0.88
4 19 30 83.3 (24) 24.00 .00 1.10
5 17 30 77.8 (24) 23.88 -.12 1.41
6 17 50 80.7 (24) 24.07 .07 2.85
7 20 30 77.5 (24) 24.10 .10 1.12
8 19 29 86.7 (24) 23.91 -.09 1.01
9 20 40 83.8 (24) 24.25 .25 1.87
10 19 33 87.5 (24) 24.03 .03 1.18
11 19 26 84.2 (24) 23.86 -.14 0.85
12 17 28 88.3 (24) 23.93 -.08 1.09
CS 20 32 84.8 (24) 24.07 .07 1.17
Note. Numbers in parentheses are the sum of event states that define each Problem Set.
CS = comparison set.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A8.
Means and Standard Deviations o f  Each Judged Problem Set in Experiment 2.




Cell Frequencies Z M SD
1 Context la, 8b, 12c, 4d 25 -.64 -.17 .52
2 Abstract 4a, 4b, 9c, 9d 26 .00 -.30 .33
3 Context 4a, 4b, lc, 14d 23 .43 -.22 .43
4 Abstract 11a, 2b, 9c, Od 22 -.78 .52 .30
5 Context 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d 24 .00 .04 .23
6 Abstract 5a, lb, 3c, 13d 22 .65 .13 .53
7 Context 4a, 4b, 14c, Id 23 -.43 -.25 .48
8 Abstract la, 5b, 3c, 15d 24 .00 -.43 .60
9 Context 13a, 4b, lc, 8d 26 .65 .54 .32
10 Abstract 4a, 10b, 7c, Id 22 -.59 -.41 .30
11 Context 9a, 5b, 7c, 3d 24 -.06 .26 .32
12 Abstract 2a, 12b, 0c, 9d 23 .14 -.62 .41
CS Context II 8a, 5b, 9c, 2d 24 -.20 .12 .31
Note. Judgments o f strength were divided by 100 to facilitate comparisons with
contingency. Ap = delta p; SD = standard deviation; CS = comparison set.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A9.
Number o f  Participants in Each Experimental Condition in Experiment 2.
Set Placement
Number of Events 
Known Unknown Total
Early 15 13 28
Late 14 15 29
Total 29 28 57
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Table A10.
Means and Standard Deviations o f  Absolute and Signed Cell Deviations in Experiment 2.
Condition Contingency Table Cell
All Cellsa b c 1d
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations
Known 1.09 (.71) 1.26 (.69) 1.45 (.90) 1 . 2 0 (.90) 1.25 (.07)
Unknown 1.23 (.83) 1.24 (.67) 1.34 (.81) 1.27 (.6 8 ) 1.27 (.02)
All Conditions 1.16 (.76) 1.25 (.67) 1.39 (.85) 1.23 (.79) 1.26 (.05)
Mean Signed Cell Deviations
Known .42 (.58) .15 (.55) -.28 (.52) -.26 (.58) .03 (.16)
Unknown .56 (.83) -.21 (.73) -.32 (.61) -.19 (.76) - . 0 2  (.2 0 )
All Conditions .48 (.71) -.03 (.67) -.30 (.56) - . 2 2 (.67) .00 (.17)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the 
standard error o f the means (for All Cells).
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Table A l l .
Percentage o f  Recalled Frequencies that were Over, Correct, and Under Estimations o f  
the Contingency Table Cells in Experiment 2.
Type of Contingency Table Cell
jDSumduon
a b c d
All Conditions (n = 735)
% Over 31.8 27.3 25.0 28.7
% Correct 48.8 43.3 45.0 45.8
% Under 19.4 29.3 29.9 25.5
Mean .12 (.71) -.02 (.75) -.05 (.74) .03 (.74)
Known Condition Only (n = 344)
% Over 29.3 31.2 24.5 25.9
% Correct 49.3 41.1 45.3 49.9
% Under 21.3 27.7 30.1 24.3
Mean .08 (.71) .03 (.77) -.06 (.74) .02 (.71)
Unknown Condition Only (n = 361)
% Over 34.3 23.3 25.6 31.6
% Correct 48.3 45.7 44.7 41.6
% Under 17.4 31.0 29.7 26.9
Mean .17 (.70) -.08 (.73) -.04 (.74) .05 (.76)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table A12.
Descriptive Statistics fo r the Sum o f  Deviations fo r  Each Problem Set in Experiment 2.
Problem Set
Range of Sum 
of Estimates % Correct Sum
Mean Sum of Estimates
Min Max Actual Absolute SD
Known Set Information
1 1 0 25 79.3 (25) 24.91 -0.81 3.00
2 24 27 89.7 (26) 25.93 -0.07 0.46
3 23 30 79.3 (23) 23.55 0.55 1.48
4 2 1 23 93.1 (22) 2 2 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.27
5 2 2 25 93.1 (24) 23.97 -0.03 0.42
6 2 2 24 89.7 (22) 22.14 0.14 0.44
7 2 2 26 86.2 (23) 23.07 0.07 0.65
8 24 26 96.6 (24) 24.07 0.07 0.37
9 25 30 8 6 . 2  (26) 26.10 1 . 1 0 0.82
1 0 2 0 23 89.7 (22) 21.93 -0.07 0.46
1 1 2 2 24 96.6 (24) 23.93 -0.07 0.37
1 2 23 32 89.7 (23) 23.38 0.38 1 . 6 8
CS 24 25 86.2 (24) 24.14 0.14 0.35
Unknown Set Information
1 1 2 35 21.4(25) 23.42 -1.58 5.20
2 2 2 40 14.3 (26) 26.93 0.93 4.23
3 17 25 28.6 (23) 22.50 -0.50 1.84
4 15 26 39.3 (22) 2 2 . 1 1 0 . 1 1 2.59
5 16 33 32.1 (24) 23.75 -0.25 4.23
6 15 28 32.1 (22) 22.61 0.61 3.04
7 17 31 25.0 (23) 23.07 0.07 2.78
8 2 1 30 39.3 (24) 24.22 0 . 2 2 1.97
9 19 35 25.0 (26) 25.36 0.36 3.18
1 0 15 27 42.9 (22) 21.57 -0.43 2 . 6 6
1 1 13 29 21.4 (24) 22.93 -1.07 3.51
1 2 13 30 46.4 (23) 23.57 0.57 2.78
CS 2 0 28 21.4(24) 24.19 0.19 2 . 0 2
Note. Numbers in parentheses are the sum of events that define each problem set. CS =
comparison set.
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Table A13.
Percentage o f  Participants Using Various Rule-Based Strategies in Experiment 2.
Rule-Based Strategy
Condition Zero Cell A A Ys B dD dP Unclassifiable
All (n = 57) 8.9
Percentage of Participants 
19.6 33.9 7.1 0 . 0 30.4
Knowna 10.3 17.2
Set Information 
34.5 6.9 0 . 0 31.0
Unknown13 7.4 2 2 . 2 33.3 7.4 0 . 0 29.6
Earlyb 7.4 18.5
Set Placement 
40.7 3.7 0 . 0 29.6
Late0 10.3 20.7 27.6 10.3 0 . 0 31.0
Note. Percentages are based on the total number of participants in their respective groups; 
therefore, percentages only sum to 1 0 0  percent when added across individual rows. 
Strategies used by participants were determined by the Rule-Analysis Technique.
= 29 and 28.
141
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX A continued
Table A14.
Intercorrelations Between Judged Strength, Judged Contingency, and Inferred 
Contingency in Experiment 2.
Judgment Contingency Inferred Contingency












a> ,c’ ^Participants’ judgments and/or recall frequencies were incomplete, which resulted 
in 22, 5, 7, 17, or 20 data points being excluded from the r statistic, respectively.
*p < .0 1 .
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Table A15.
Intercorrelations Between Judged Strength, Contingency, and Inferred Contingency in 
Experiment 2 Listed Separately For Each Subset o f  the Rule-Analysis Technique.
Judgment Contingency c ’^ n c y
Cell A Subset: Problem Sets 1, 5, 9 (n = 167)
Judgment — a.609** b.650**
Contingency .773**
Inferred Contingency —
A Versus B Subset: Problem Sets 2, 6 , 10 (n =171)
Judgment — °.476** c.508**
Contingency .923**
Inferred Contingency —
Sum Diagonals Subset: Problem Sets 3 ,7 , 11 (n=  171)
Judgment — d-.013 d. 184*
Contingency .832**
Inferred Contingency —
Conditional Probabilities (Ap) Subset: Problem Sets 4, 8 , 12 (n = 170)
Judgment — e-.696** a. 3 5 9 **
Contingency 4 3 4 **
Inferred Contingency —
a, ,c, ^Participants’ judgments and/or recall frequencies were incomplete, which resulted 
in 6 ,10, 7 ,4 , or 5 data points being excluded from the r statistic, respectively.
*p < .05; **/?<.01.
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Table A16.
Number o f  Participants in Each Experimental Condition in Experiment 3.
Event Order Experimental Condition
Online Post-Encode Post-Retrieve
Forward 19 15 14
Backward 7 13 9
Total Participants 26 28 23
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Table A17.
Means and Standard Deviations o f  Absolute and Signed Cell Deviations in Experiment 3.
Condition Contingency Table Cell
All cellsa b c d
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations
On-Line .38 (0.75) .27 (0.53) .77(1.45) .54 (0.90) .49 (0.11)
Post-Encode .71 (1.15) .43 (0.92) .71 (1.30) .89(1.42) .69 (0.10)
Post-Recall .48 (0.73) .48 (0.67) .70(1.26) .52 (0.95) .53 (0.06)
All .53 (0.91) .39 (0.73) .73 (1.32) .66(1.13) .58 (0.08)
Mean Signed Cell Deviations
On-Line -.38 (0.75) .04 (0.60) .77(1.45) -.38 (0.98) .12(0.27)
Post-Encode -.36(1.31) .14(1.01) .64(1.34) -.54(1.59) -.03 (0.27)
Post-Recall -.48 (0.73) . 2 2  (0.80) .61 (1.31) -.26(1.05) .02 (0.24)
All -.40 (0.98) .13 (0.820 . 6 8  (1.35) -.40(1.25) . 0 0  (0.26)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the 
standard error o f the mean (for All cells).
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Table A 18.
Percentage o f  Recalled Frequencies that were Over, Correct, and Under Estimations o f  
the Contingency Table Cells in Experiment 3.
Type of Contingency Table Cell
j^siinidiioii
a b c d
All Conditions (n = 77)
% Over 03.9 16.9 31.2 11.7
% Correct 67.5 71.4 6 6 . 2 61.0
% Under 28.6 11.7 0 2 . 6 27.3
Mean -.25 (.52) .05 (.54) .29 (.51) -.16 (.61)
Forward Event Sequence Only (n == 48)
% Over
2 . 1 14.6 37.5 10.4
% Correct 70.8 70.8 58.3 60.4
% Under 14.6 14.6 04.2 29.2
Mean -.25 (.48) .00 (.55) .33 (.56) -.19 (.61)
Backward Event Sequence Only (n = 29)
% Over 6.9 20.7 20.7 13.8
% Correct 62.1 72.4 79.3 62.1
% Under 31.0 6.9 0 . 0 24.1
Mean -.24 (.58) .14 (.52) .21 (.41) - . 1 0  (.62)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table A19.
Percentage o f  Recalled Frequencies that were Over, Correct, and Under Estimations o f  
the Contingency Table Cells fo r  Each Judgment Task Condition in Experiment 3.
Type of Contingency Table Cell
.estim ation
a b c d
On-Line Judgment (n = 26)
% Over 0 . 0 11.5 34.6 7.7
% Correct 73.1 76.9 65.4 61.5
% Under 26.9 11.5 0 . 0 30.8
Mean -.27 (.45) .00 (.49) .35 (.49) -.23 (.59)
Memory ]Based -  Post Encode Condition Only (n = 28)
% Over 10.7 14.3 28.6 14.3
% Correct 64.3 75.0 67.9 57.1
% Under 25.0 10.7 3.6 28.6
Mean -.14 (.59) .04 (.51) .25 (.52) -.14 (.65)
Memory Based -  Post Recall Condition Only (n = 23)
% Over 0 . 0 26.1 30.4 13.0
% Correct 65.2 60.9 65.2 65.2
% Under 34.8 13.0 4.3 21.7
Mean -.35 (.49) .13 (.63) .26 (.54) -.09 (.60)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table A20.
Frequency (f) and Cumulative Percentage (Cum %) o f  Participants that Selected Each 
Alternatives o f  the Judgment o f  Relative Likelihood Scale in Experiment 3.






- 2 13 98.6
-3 1 1 0 0 . 0
n = 75b
Two subjects did not complete the relative likelihood scale and were not included in this 
analysis.
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Table A21.
Intercorrelations Between Inferred Contingency, Judgments o f  Relative Likelihood, Line 
Judgments, and Numeric Estimates o f  Contingency in Experiment 3 Listed Separately 













Line Judgment — .952
Numeric Estimate —
Memory-Based Post Encode Condition
Relative .479 .516
Line Judgment — .966
Numeric Estimate —
Memory-Based Post Recall Condition
Relative .781 .669
Line Judgment — .977
Numeric Estimate —
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Table A22.
Participants ’ Judgments o f  Relative Likelihood, Line Judgments, and Numeric Estimates 
o f Contingency That Had at Least One Discrepancy in Judgment Accuracy.
Subject ID RelativeLikelihood Line Judgment
Numeric
Estimate
2 2 0 2 - l a 0.96 0.98
5885 -2 a 0.51 0.5
4804 - l a 0.16 -0 . 1 a
0397 -2 a 0.56 0 . 6
6203 - l a 0.54 0.45
0169 -2 a 0.81 0 . 8
7206 - l a 0.52 —
4918 -2 a 0 . 6 8 0.65
2004 -2 a 0.29 0.25
8005 - l a 0 . 6 0.62
6995 - l a 0.37 0.3
5694 -2 a 0.75 0 . 8
8400 2 — -0 .2 a
Note. Judgments are incorrect in that they were perceived as noncontingent or negative.
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Table A23.




a b c d
1 la , 8 b, 12c, 4d 3.35 (3.60) 2.15(2.03) 3.25 (3.36) 1.66(1.33)
2 4a, 4b, 9c, 9d 1.32 (1.45) 1.53 (1.69) 1.26 (1.34) 1.44(1.41)
3a 4a, 4b, lc, 14d 0.74 (0.88) 1.26(1.38) 1.30(2.05) 1.47(1.96)
4a 11a, 2b, 9c, Od 0.63 (1.11) 1.21 (1.74) 1.72 (2.22) 0.67(1.90)
5 6 a, 6 b, 6 c, 6 d 1.16(1.36) 1.39 (1.60) 1.23 (1.28) 1.53 (1.62)
6 5a, lb, 3c, 13d 1.02(1.53) 0.67 (1.55)c 0.70 (1.15)b 1.60 (2.50)
T 4a, 4b, 14c, Id 0.98 (1.73) 1.19(1.37) 1.74(2.85) 1.04(1.87)
8 a la, 5b, 3c, 15d 0.40 (1.13)b 0.51 (0.76) 0 . 6 6  (0 .8 6 ) 0.88 (1.73)
9 13a, 4b, lc, 8 d 1 .1 2 ( 1 .8 6 ) 1.11 (1.19) 1.49(1.71) 1.77 (2.03)
1 0 4a, 10b, 7c, Id 0.63 (1.01)c 0.95 (1.48) 0.82(1.03) 0.47 (1.20)b
1 1 9a, 5b, 7c, 3d 1.37 (1.33) 1.30 (1.18)c 1.32(1.36) 0.93 (1.05)b
1 2 2a, 12b, 0c, 9d 1.35 (2.70) 1.75 (2.73) 1.30 (1.99)b 1.33 (1.98)
Mean — 1.17(0.22) 1.25 (0.13) 1.40 (0.20) 1.23 (0.12)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations (Problem Sets 1-12) and standard 
errors o f the mean (Mean). The means across all problem sets were calculated from the 
numbers included in this table and differ from that previously reported due to rounding.
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Table A24.




a b c d
1 la, 8 b, 12c, 4d 3.28 (3.67) -1.58(2.51) -3.09 (3.50) 0.15 (2.13)
2 4a, 4b, 9c, 9d 0.83 (1.78) 1 . 1 1  (2 .0 0 ) -0.77(1.68) -0.74(1.89)
3 4a, 4b, lc, 14d -0.35 (1.09)a 0 . 1 1  ( 1 .8 8 ) 1.23 (2.10) -0.95 (2.26)
4 11a, 2b, 9c, Od 0.04 (1.28)a 0.96(1.89) -1.61 (2.30) 0.67(1.90)
5 6 a, 6 b, 6 c, 6 d 0.49(1.72) 0.23 (2.11) -0.63 (1.67)a -0.23 (2.22)a
6 5a, lb, 3c, 13d 0.63 (1.73) 0.63 (1.57) 0.32(1.31) -1.21 (2.71)
7 4a, 4b, 14c, Id 0.42(1.95) 0.07 (1.82) -1.28 (3.09) 0.86(1.96)
8 la, 5b, 3c, 15d 0.37(1.14) -0.16 (0.90)a 0.41 (1.01) -0.49(1.88)
9 13a, 4b, lc , 8 d -0.70 (2.06) 0.26(1.61) 1.35 (1.83) -1.18(2.43)
1 0 4a, 10b, 7c, Id 0.18(1.18) -0.67(1.63) -0.19(1.30) 0.44(1.21)
1 1 9a, 5b, 7c, 3d -0.25 (1.90) 0.14(1.76) -0.75 (1.75) 0.30(1.38)
1 2 2a, 12b, 0c, 9d 1.04(2.83) -1.54 (2.85) 1.30(1.99) -0.32 (2.37)
Mean — 0.44 (0.31) -0.04 (0.25) -0.31 (0.38) -0.23 (0.21)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations (Problem Sets 1-12) and standard 
errors of the mean (Mean). The means across all problem sets were calculated from the 
numbers included in this table and differ from that previously reported due to rounding.
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Table A25.
Mean Judgments and Inferred Contingency (A/? ’) o f  Each Judged Problem Set in
Experiment 4.
PS Condition / Ap ■
Ap ’ Judgment
M SD M  SD
1 4a, 4b, 9c, 9d
On-Line . 0 0 — — -.11 .41
Memory Based . 0 0 .08 . 1 2 —
All conditions . 0 0 — — —
2 5a, 5b, 13c, Id
On-Line -.43 — — .03 .56
Memory Based -.43 -.25 . 2 0 —
All conditions -.43 — — —
3 9a, 5b, 7c, 4d
On-Line . 0 1 — — .11 .41
Memory Based . 0 1 .04 .09 —
All conditions . 0 1 — — —
4 9a, 3b, 3c, 8 d
On-Line .47 . 2 0 . 2 1 .21 .36
Memory Based .47 .14 .23 .27 .26
All conditions .47 .17 . 2 2 .24 .32
5 4a, 10b, 7c, 4d
On-Line -.35 - . 2 1 .16 -.27 .36
Memory Based -.35 - . 2 1 .23 -.28 .34
All conditions -.35 - . 2 1 . 2 0 -.28 .35
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table A26.
Means and Standard Deviations o f  Absolute Cell Deviations in Experiment 4.
PS Contingency Table Cell
Condition
a b c d All cells
1
Memory-Based
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations 
2.11 (1.99) 1.75 (1.66) 2.58(2.14) 1.68 (1.59) 2.03 (0.21)
z




1.27(1.48) 0.56 (0.85) 0.83 (0.93) 1.00(1.50) 0.92 (0.15)
H-
On-Line 2.85 (1.96) 1.17 (1.28)a 1.29 (1.18)b 3.23 (2.03) 2.14(0.53)
Memory-Based 2.19(1.72)c 2.06 (1.76)b 2.04 (1.57)a 2.63 (1.82)d 2.23 (0.14)
All Conditions
<
2.52(1.86)° 1.61 (1.59)a 1.67 (1.43)b 2.94 (1.94)d 2.19(0.33)
D
On-Line 1.40(1.61) 1.96(2.29) 1.15 (1.17) 0.92 (1.03)a 1.36 (0.22)
Memory-Based 1.65 (1.66) 2.38 (2.30) 1.10(1.26) 1.19(1.78) 1.58 (0.29)
All Conditions 1.52(1.63) 2.17(2.29) 1.13 (1.21) 1.05 (1.45)a 1.47 (0.26)
On-Line 1.82 ( 1 .8 6 )° 1.63 (1.77)b 1.94 (2.20)d 1.56 (1.78)a 1.74 (0.09)
Memory-Based 2.12(1.92) 1.56(1.89) 1.22(1.17) 2.07 (1.98) 1.74 (0.22)
All Conditions 1.90(1.88) 1.61 (1.80) 1.74(1.99) 1.71 (1.85) 1.74 (0.06)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the 
standard error o f the mean (for All Cells).
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Table A l l .




All cellsa b c d
1
Memory-Based
Mean Signed Cell Deviations
1.68 (2.37) 1.29 (2.04) -2.12(2.61) -0.28 (2.31) 0.14(0.86)
Memory-Based
'I
1.23 (2.72)a -0.12 (2.04)a -2.98 (3.51) 1.30 (1.79) -0.14(1.00)
Memory-Based
A
-0.56(1.88) 0.19 (1.00)a -0.63 (1.08) 0.79 (1.62) -0.05 (0.34)
On-Line -2.47 (2.43) 0.92(1.47) 0.50(1.69) -3.15 (2.16) -1.05 (1.03)
Memory-Based -1.81 (2.13) 1.89(1.95) 1.75 (1.90) -2 . 0 2 (2.50) -0.05 (1.08)
All Conditions -2.14(2.29) 1.40(1.78) 1.13 (1.89) -2.60 (2.38) -0.55 (1.06)
J
On-Line 1.19(1.77) -1.83 (2.40) -0.40 (1.60) 0.38 (1.33) -0.17(0.64)
Memory-Based 1.19(2.02) -2.13 (2.54) -0.27(1.66) 0.40 (2 . 1 1 ) -0.20 (0.71)
All Conditions 1.19(1.89) -1.98 (2.46) -0.33 (1.62) 0.39 (1.76) -0.18(0.67)
On-Line -0.62 (2.80) -0.46 (2.41) 0.05 (1.69) -1.39 (2.52) -0.61 (0.30)
Memory-Based 0.35 (2.58) 0.22 (2.40) -0.85 (2.81) 0.05 (2.36) -0.06 (0.27)
All Conditions 0.07 (2.68) 0.02 (2.42) -0.59 (2.57) -0.36 (2.49) -0 . 2 2  (0.16)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the 
standard error of the mean (for All Cells).
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Table A28.
Percentage o f  Recalled Frequencies that were Correct Estimations o f  the Contingency 
Table Cells fo r  Problem Sets Four and Five o f  Experiment 4.
PS Statistic
Contingency Table Cell
a b c d
1 Memory-Based Condition (n = 48)
% Correct 17.0 2 2 .9a 16.7a 21.3
Mean .49 (.78) .40 (.79) -.50 (.77) .02 (.90)
2
% Correct 33.3 29.2 27.1 46.8a
Mean .25 (.79) -.04 (.85) -.65 (.57) .49 (.55)
3
% Correct 41.7 60.4 43.8 54.2
Mean -.17 (.75) .06 (.63) -.40 (.64) .25 (.64)
4
% Correct 2 1 .3a 2 1 .3a 18.8 17.4b
<
Mean -.57 (.6 8 ) . 6 6  (.60) .65 (.64) -.48 (.78)
D
% Correct 35.4 29.2 43.8 37.5
Mean .35 (.73) -.54 (.65) -.15 (.74) -.08 (.80)
4 On-Line Condition (n =48)
% Correct 1 2 . 8 33.3 29.2 8.3
s
Mean -.70 (.62) .42 (.71) .29 (.80) - . 8 8  (.39)
J
% Correct 41.7 41.7 33.3 41.7
Mean .42 (.65) -.46 (.62) -.08 (.82) .13 (.76)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
a,bRecalled frequencies were missing and one or two estimations were not included in this 
analysis, respectively.
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Table A29.
Intercorrelations Between Judged Strength, Judged Contingency, and Inferred 
Contingency in Experiment 4.
Judgment Contingency InferredContingency
















a.b.c.d.e.t.s-r> • ... ? • _ _i _ _
—
in 3,147, 142, 137, 140, 4, or 5 data points being excluded from the r statistic, 
respectively.
*p < .0 1 .
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Figure B l. A summary table depicting the four event states, their labels, and the unique 
information about the input and output that each cell represents. This table is typically 
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60.00




1 2 3 4 5
Problem Set
Figure B2. The mean percentages of correct cell estimations across each problem set in 
Experiment 4. Means were calculated across all four cells of the problem set. Empty and 
black bars represent the percentage of correct estimations obtained by participants in the 
on-line and memory-based conditions, respectively.
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University of New Hampshire 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research 
Departmental Review Committee Exemption Classification Sheet
Pro|ect D irector.  —      |RB # _ ______ M
3 5D epartm ent.Project Title li  'IDT Reviewerfan —
Reviewer Pleese write comments or contingencies of approval, if any, on a separate sheet of paper, and attach to this form. Place the 
completed form on Hie with the application for review, in the Departmental Review Committee files. Protocol applications and review forms will be forwarded to the Office of Sponsored Research each semester for reporting purposes.
l / t ~ Protocol quallflee a t  EXEMPT under the following subsection (check one) - sa t reverte for detailed category 
deacrlp tlon:
46.101(b)(1) R esearch conducted In established educatlonel selling using normal educational procedures
  46.101(b)(2) Educational testa , surveys, Interviews, observation of public behavlor/no risk
  46.101(b)(3) Educational te sts, surveys, interviews, observation of public behavior not exempt under Subsection 2, above,
it public official or if confidentiality m andated by federal s tatu tes
  46.101(b)(4) Study of existing data
  46.101(b)(6) Study of public benefits or service programs
  46.101(b)(6) Taste and food studies
~~] Refer protocol to the regular IRB for EXPEDITED review under the following subsection (check one):
- —  46.110(b)(1) Clinical studies of drugs/medlcal devices not requiring investigational new drug/device applications.
 46.110(b)(2) Collection of blood sam ples by finger, heel or ear stick, or venipuncture in healthy adults >110 lbs., or others
and children, considering age, weight, health, collection procedure, frequency and am ount of collection.
 46 .110(b)(3) Prospective collection of biological specim ens for research purposes by nonlnvaslve m eans, and In a
non-dlaflgurlng m a n n e r hair and nail clippings, teeth, sweat, saliva, placenta (after delivery), amnlotic fluid (at 
membrane rupture/labor), dental plaque/calculus, mucosal/skln cells, sputum (after saline nebullzatlon)
  46 .110(b)(4) Collection of data  through nonlnvaslve m eans routinely employed in clinical practice (excluding x-rays and
microwaves, and  devices not approved for marketing): physical sensors applied to the skin, weighing, tests 
of visual acuity, Mfll, EKQ, EEG, ultrasound, etc., and m oderate exercise by healthy volunteers.
  46 .110(b)(5) Non-exempt research  involving data, documents, records or specim ens that have been/win be collected solely for
nonresearch purposes (e.g., medical treatm ent or diagnosis).
  46.110(b)(6) Collection of data  from voice, video, digital, or Image recordlnge m ade for research purposes.
 — 48.110(b)(7) Non-exempt research  on Individual or group behavior or characteristics of individuals, such a s  studies of
perception, cognition, motivation, Identity, language, communicetlon, cultural beliefs or practices, and 
social behavior, or research  employing surveys, Interviews, oral histories, focus groups, program 
evaluation, hum an factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.
-  46.110(b)(6) Continuing review of research such as  studies permanently closed to enrollment of new subjects, or for which
ressaich-related Interventions are completed, or for which only long-term follow-up of subjects remains, or for which 
no subjects have been enrolled and no additional risks have been identified, or for which data analysis Is the only 
remslning research  activity.
  46.110(b)(9) Continuing review of research (not conducted under Investigational drug/device applications or exemption) where
categories 2  through 8, above, do not apply, and for which the IRB has determined that the research involves no 
greater than minimal risk, and no additional hsks have been identified.
i  | Refer protocol to the regular IRB for FULL BOARD action (cite reason on separate shset)
i I Protocol cannot be approved as presented (cite reason on separate sheet)
IRB Review er —■? Date: 7^ ( / &  ___________________
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Name:
University of New Hampshire 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research 










Research conducted in established or commonly accepted educational settings, Involving normal 
educational practices, such as:
(I) research on regular or speciBl educational instructional strategies, or
(g) research on the effectiveness of or comparison among instructional techniques, curricula, or
classroom management methods.
Research Involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey 
procedures, Interview procedures or observation of public behavior unless:
(I) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be Identified, directly or 
through Identifiers linked to the subjects; and
(1) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the 
subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to subjects' financial standing, employability, or 
reputation.
Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey 
procedures, interview procedures or observation of pubic behavior that is not exempt under category 
(bX2) *
(I) the human subjects are elected or appointed public officials or candidates for public office; or
(II) federal statute(s) requlre(s) without exception that confidentiality of the personally identifiable 
information wiH be maintained throughout the research and thereafter.
Research involving the collection or study of existing data, dooxnents, records, pathological specimens, 
or dfagnostlc specimens, If these sources are publicly available or E the information is recorded by the 
Investigator  In such a  manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to 
the subjects.
Research and demonstration projects which are conducted by or subject to the approval of department or 
agency heads, and which are designed to study, evaluate, or otherwise examine: (0  pubfic benefit or 
service programs; (H) procedures for obtaining benefits or services under those programs; (R) possible 
changes in or alternatives to those programs or procedures; or (iv) possible changes in methods or levels 
of payment for benefits or services under those programs.
Taste and food quality evaluation and consumer acceptance studies, (I) if wholesome foods without 
additives are consumed or (il) or if a  food is consumed that contains a food ingrerfient a t  or below the 
level and for a  use found to be safe, or agricultural chemical or environmental contaminant a t or below 
the level found to be safe, by the Food and Drug Administration, or approved by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, or the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the U.S. Department o f  Agriculture.
Protocol la approved as presented in the category checked
Protocol Is approved wWi the Honouring conttngencies/coinmeiits (attach shee ts  If nrresaary) 
Protocol Is referred to the IRB for Expedited or Full Board review 
Protocol carwoj: be approved as presented (cite reasons on separate sheet)
DRC Reviewer
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APPENDIX C continued
University of New Hampshire 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research 
Departmental Review Committee Exemption Classification Sheet
Name: Bo(ZOP^~ IRB#:
-foe {Jtt n &1 Cu
Exempt Review
46.101(b)(1) Research conducted In established or commonly accepted educational settings, involving normal 
educational practices, such as:
  (I) research on regular or special educational erstructtonel strategies, or








Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey 
procedures, Interview procedures or observation of public behavior unless:
(!) Information obtained Is recorded In such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or 
through, identifiers linked to the subjects; and
(i)  any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the 
subjects a t risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to subjects' financial standing, employability, or 
reputation,
Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey 
procedures, interview procedures or observation of pubic behavior that is not exempt under category 
(bX2) f t
(I) the human subjects are elected or appointed public officials or candidates for public office; or
(II) federal statute(s) require(s) without exception that confidentiality of the personally identifiable 
information wilt be maintained throughout the research and thereafter.
Research involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, 
or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are pubBdy available or if the information Is recorded by the 
Investigator In such a manner that subjects cannot be Identified, directly or through Identifiers linked to 
the subjects.
Research and demonstration projects which are conducted by or subject to the approval of department or 
agency heads, and which are designed to  study, evaluate, or otherwise examine: (I) pubfc benefit or 
service programs; (I) procedures for obtaining benefits or services under those programs; (il) possible 
changes in or alternatives to those programs or procedures; or (fv) possible changes hi methods or levels 
of payment for benefits or services under those programs.
Taste and food quality evaluation and consumer acceptance studies, (i) If wholesome foods without 
additives are consumed or (ii) of if a food is consumed that contains a  food ingredient A  or below the 
level and for a use found to be safe, or agricultural chemical or environmental contaminant at or below 
the level found to be safe, by the Food and Drug Administration, or approved by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, or the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Protocol is approved as presented in the category checked
Protocol Is approved with the following contingencies/ comments (attach sheets If necessary) 
Protocol is referred to the IRB for Expedited or Full Board review 
Protocol canpot be approved as presented (cite reasons on separate sheet)
'V K   J*
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APPENDIX D
LABORATORY EXPERIENCE INFORMATION FORM
Experiment Number: /  /
Experimenter Christopher Alexander Barnet
General Area of Psychology:
Social - Cognitive Psychology: More specifically this research falls under 
hum an judgment of covariation.
General problem or issue under investigastion:
This experiment alms to isolate whether the tendency to make differential errors in the 
recreation of a summary table is the result of biases at the encoding or retrieval portion 
of the memory process. The main independent varable is the point a t w hich subjects 
are Informed of the intent to form a judgm ent of the relation between the two variables.
Specific hypothesis:
1 - Subjects with informed knowledge of the intention to form a judgm ent prior to viewing 
the slides will differentially make errors.
2 - The bias of differentially making errors stems h*om an encoding error influenced by the 
intent to form a judgment prior to vieweing the causal information.
Correlational or independent and dependent variables:
Independent variable: Point at which subjects of informed of the task to form a judgm ent 
1 - Normal (prior to viewing) 2 - Encode-Free (after viewing) 3 - Retreival-Free (after task) 4 - Never 
D ependent variable: The absolute value of the deviations from perceived and actual cell frequende
Control procedures:
To assess whether forming a judgm ent biases the memory of causal cues, the control group 
(Never) will never be introduced to the bias of forming a judgment. The Normal group will 
be introduced to the bias in a manner consistent with that traditionally in the literature.
Potential implications of study:
This study plans to demonstrate that a subject's knowledge of forming a judgm ent 
may serve as a potentially biasing agent in either the encoding or retrieval of events.
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APPENDIX D continued
LABORATORY EXPERIENCE INFORMATION FORM
Experiment Number / / )
Experimenter: Christopher Alexander Bam_eg________
General Area of Psychology:
Sodal - Cognitive Psychology: More specifically this research falls under 
human judgment of covariation.
General problem or issue under investigastion:
The accuracy in which indiviuals are able to recalled causally relevant information from memory 
when the information is presented to them in a serial fashion. It is expected that recalled 
events will be inaccurate and this may serve as a potential contributor to erroneous judgments of 
contingency.
Specific hypothesis:
1 - Subjects that have a longer exposure to the co-events will have better accuracy in 
their recalled estimates of the actual co-events presented.
2 - Subjects that are presened the co-events in a plausible context will have produce more 
errors in their recalled of the actual co-events.
Correlational or independent and dependent variables:
Independent variables: Exposure time to co-events (3s vs, 5s)
Context of the co-events (plausibly relevents events vs. abstract events)
Dependent variable: The absolute value of the deviations from perceived and actual frequencies.
Control procedures:
To assess whether previous attempts to produce differential errors in recalled error is a by­
product of the extended amout of exposure time in previous work, the current study will expose 
subjects to a condition which will increase the difficulty of the task.
Potential implications of study:
This study plans to demonstrate that under circumstance when strategies can not be
used to encode and recall causal information that causal information is recalled in abiased manner.
To assess whether the the context of the events influences recall.
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APPENDIX D continued
LABORATORY EXPERIENCE INFORMATION FORM
Experiment Number:
Experimenter: Christopher Alexander Barnes
General Area of Psychology:
Social - Cognitive Psychology: More specifically this research falls under 
human judgment of covariation.
General problem or issue under investigastion:
To determine whether memory-based judgments of contingency are more highly 
correlated with the events recalled from memory than on-line judgments of contingency. 
Memory-based judgments refer to judgments that must be made after viewing the relevant 
information, while on-line judgments refer to those that are assessed while viewing the events.
Specific hypothesis:
1 - Participants' judgments of contingency on the memory-based task will be more highly 
correlated with statistically inferred based on die information recalled from memory than 
participant's judgments on the on-line task.
2 - In the fourth problem Set, the accuracy of recall will be better for those participants in the 
memory-based condition than those in the on-line condition.
Correlational or independent and dependent variables:
Independent variable: Type of Judgmnent: Memory-Based vs. On-Line
Dependent variable: Absolute value of the deviations from perceived and actual frequencies; 
Judgments of contingency.
Control procedures:
The two Type of Judgment conditions serve as the control conditions. Forewarning participants 
of the judgment task (On-Line Condition) is expected to result in more accuracte judgments of 
contingency, while not forewarning participants (Memory-Based) is expected to result in 
judgments that are more consistent with what they recall from memory—not what was shown. 
Therefore, predicted differences between conditions will serve to prove an expermental effect.
Potential implications of study:
This study will highlight the importance of recognizing task differences, on-line v b . memory- 
based tasks, in the contingency judgment literature. Real world judgments tend to be memory- 
based, yet experiments tend to use online procedures to investigate contingency judgm ent
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